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Abstract  
This  thesis  argues  that  post-­cognitivist  frameworks  that  understand  cognition  
as  co-­originating  between  brain,  body,  and  world  can  contribute  to  both  the  
production   and   the   knowledge   of   scenography   in   a   post-­representational  
performance   landscape.   By   imbricating   radically   embodied   and   enactive  
cognitive   frameworks,   and   neuroscience  metaphors   of   consciousness   and  
perception  within  original  participatory  scenographic  practice  (Work  Space  I,  
II,   and   III)   I   develop   further  my   ‘arts   praxis’   (Nelson   2006),  what   I   call   the  
‘scenographic   contraption’.   This   practical,   conceptual,   and   analytical  
framework   generates   participatory   encounters   between   materials,   space,  
and  audiences,  and  is  further  used  as  a  way  of  conceptualising  scenography  
and  participation  within  these  shifting  encounters.    
I   assume   three  phases  of   the   creative   researcher’s   condition   in   relation   to  
the   audience–participants,   and   the   cognitive   theories   I   am   using   for   my  
research   design:   the   ‘ignorant’,   the   ‘Janus-­faced’   and   the   ‘predictive’  
scenographer.   I   iterate   between   doing   and   thinking   with   contemporary  
cognitive   frameworks   towards   the   development   of   a   theory   of  
CogScenography,  which  helps  us  understand  and  experience  scenography  
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Documentation  
A  USB  drive   is  accompanying   this  writing.  This  drive   includes  edited  parts  
from   the   documentation   of   the   practice   and   all   the   interviews,  
questionnaires,  and  communication  related  to  this  research.  The  reader  will  
be   notified   with   the   following   sign:      and   further   instructions   when   it   is  
necessary  to  view  relevant  material  in  addition  to  the  writing.  A  PDF  eThesis  
copy  is  also  included  in  this  USB  drive.  
Due  to  the  complexity  and  long  duration  of  the  practice,  the  video  footage  is  
edited   to   include   specific   moments.   This   edited   footage   together   with   the  
embedded   figures   in   the   body   of   the   text,   support   the   specific   arguments  
made   in   my   analysis   for   answering   my   research   questions   during   each  
practice   cycle.  Specifically,   in  WS   I,   I   condensed   the   three-­hour  workshop  
into   six  minutes   in   order   to   show   the   unfolding   of   the   process.   In  WS   II,   I  
have   juxtaposed   an   edited   version   of   the   soundtrack   and   images   from  
different  stages  of   the   installation   to  give   to   the  reader  a  sense  of  how  the  
sound  worked  as  part  of  the  spatial  experience.  In  WS  III,  I  have  used  both  
fast-­forward   and   real-­time   footage   to   support   and   evidence   targeted  
examples  of  the  practice.  
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FIGURE  37.  WS  II-­Attempts  on  Margarita  (multiple  drafts).  Flyer.  Back  side.  
FIGURE  38.  Olivia  Bradbury  performs  her  song.  An  audience–participant  is  
at  the  same  space  as  Olivia,  behind  the  scrim,  playing  with  the  buttons.  
The  button  action  is  projected  live  on  the  screen.  An  audience-­
participant  watches  the  scenography  generated.  
FIGURE  39.  WS  II  -­  Attempts  on  Margarita  (multiple  drafts),  26th  February  
2015,  Stage@Leeds.  Audience–participant  reading  the  various  multiple  
drafts  of  Margarita  produced  during  the  performance.  Photograph  by  
Lucy  Steggals.  
FIGURE  40.  A  still  image  from  the  film:  Synecdoche,  New  York  (2008).  This  
image  was  used  to  communicate  the  idea  of  the  multiple  drafts  to  the  
artists-­participants.  
FIGURE  41.  WS  II  -­  Attempts  on  Margarita  (multiple  drafts),  26th  February  
2015,  stage@Leeds.  Speech  bubble  added  using  material  from  the  
post-­show  discussion  transcript.  According  to  the  ‘multiple  drafts’  
model,  ‘all  varieties  of  perception  –indeed,  all  varieties  of  thought  or  
mental  activity–  are  accomplished  in  the  brain  by  parallel,  multitrack  
processes  of  interpretation  and  elaboration  of  sensory  inputs.  
Information  entering  the  nervous  system  is  under  continuous  “editorial  
revision”  ‘(Dennett  1991,  p.111).  
FIGURE  42.  Saul  Steinberg's  New  Yorker  cover  from  October  8,  1969  is  
used  by  Dennett  in  his  lectures  as  a  ‘successful  image  of  human  
consciousness’  (1996)  because  according  to  Dennett  it  contains  words,  
shapes,  colours  and  communicates  an  experience  where  there  is  not  
an  area  where  it  all  comes  together.  
FIGURE  43.  Inside  the  tunnel.  Listening  to  the  travels  of  Margarita  and  
watching  an  audience–participant  play  with  the  buttons,  while  their  
action  is  projected  on  the  scrim.  
FIGURE  44.  The  processual  designer  imagining-­predicting,  improvising,  and  
constructing  the  props  in  the  studio.  
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FIGURE  45.  Ben  Eyes  (sound  designer)  trying  the  affordances  of  the  tubes.  
The  contraption-­props    in  WS  II  were  built  organically  through  doing-­
thinking,  rather  than  drafted  on  paper  and  constructed  by  a  builder.  
FIGURE  46.  The  tepee  contraption  with  multiple  drafts  on  the  floor.  
FIGURE  47.  the  ‘uncanny  hat’.  
FIGURE  48.  The  clout  example.  
FIGURE  49.  WS  I-­  a  scenographic  workshop  on  consciousness.  The  
audience–participants  were  invited  to  find  the  affordances  in  the  
materials  and  create  a  collective  scenographic  artefact.  
FIGURE  50.  WS  II-­  Attempts  on  Margarita  (multiple  drafts).  The  
scenographer  developed  contraptions-­props  giving  simple  invitations  
(solicitations)  to  the  audience,  inviting  them  to  interact.  
FIGURE  51.  Phishing  ©Xristina  Penna.  
FIGURE  52.  The  process  aesthetics  of  the  work  at  LAB.  Image  by  Alaena  
Turner.  
FIGURE  53.  The  ‘puppet-­booth’  included  a  screen  from  which  one  could  
communicate  with  friends,  collaborators  and  family  members  of  mine  
(i.e.  my  mum  in  the  image  on  the  left)  via  Skype.  
FIGURE  54.  Disembodied  philosopher  of  radical  embodied  neuroscience  
Mark  Miller  in  conversation  with  Martha  Dais.  The  script  given  to  the  
disembodied  guests  was  that  they  really  wanted  to  be  at  the  installation  
but  could  not  make  it.  They  therefore  asked  questions  about  the  
different  parts  of  it.  The  Skype  booth  had  red  theatre  curtains  as  a  
reminder  that  scenographic  perspective  lives  within  the  contraption  
environment,  but  it  is  not  based  on  it,  it  is  used  rather  playfully.    
FIGURE  55.  Facebook  profile  of  Margarita  Attempt.  
FIGURE  56.  The  flyer-­invitation.  
FIGURE  57  and  58.  In  WS  III,  I  did  not  hand-­make  all  of  the  set  myself  like  
in  WS  II  but  provided  drawings.  However,  I  communicated  the  
contraption  idea  to  the  set  builder.  He  picked  up  on  the  idea  and  
developed  in  turn  some  interesting  elements  like  the  camera  cover  that  
was  inside  the  booth  see  Figure  58.  
FIGURE  59.  The  uncanny  hat,  also  known  as  the  clown  hat,  ‘the  hat’,  
‘Homage  to  Tadeusz  Kantor,  Louise  Bourgeois,  and  David  Lynch’.  
FIGURE  60.  An  audience–participant  lying  inside  the  tunnel  listening  to  a  
recording.  
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FIGURE  61.  An  audience–participant  entering  the  tipi  with  the  Margarita  
cocktail.  When  inside  the  tipi  they  were  asked  to  describe  a  landscape  
from  memory  (this  was  the  only  element  in  WS  III  that  was  ushered).  
FIGURE  62.  Inside  the  booth.  Audience–participants’  faces  were  printed  in  
advance  (from  their  FB  profiles)  and  left  for  the  audience-­participants  to  
explore  by  finding  various  potential  combinations  of  these  ‘cut-­out  
masks’  and  their  own  faces  in  front  of  the  camera.  
FIGURE  63.  Audience-­participants  drawing  or  writing.  Figures  (below)  64,  
65,  66,  67.  What  the  audience–participants  drew  was  projected  on  the  
backdrop  of  the  booth  (figures  64,  65).  Inside  the  booth  people  were  
trying  on  the  ‘masks’  in  front  of  a  camera  having  as  a  backdrop  the  
drawings.  This  combination  of  the  face  with  the  mask  in  front  of  the  
customised  backdrop  was  simultaneously  projected  on  the  round  ball-­  
piñata  (figures  66,  and  67).  
FIGURE  68.  Audience–participants  watching  the  faces,  or  other  inventive  
interactions,  coming  from  inside  the  booth.  
FIGURE  69.  The  speakers  were  placed  inside  elements  of  the  set  (like  the  
white  tube  next  to  the  armchair  in  the  specific  case)  giving  an  intimate  
encounter  (when  encountered)  depending  on  the  positioning  of  the  
audience–participants.  
FIGURE  70.  The  sound  script  of  WS  III.  
FIGURES  71  and  72.  The  plinth,  or  steps,  or  treads,  or  pedestal.  
FIGURES  73  and  74.  The  plinth.  
FIGURE  75.  An  audience–participant  under  the  uncanny  hat,  and  another  
one  watching  them.  
FIGURE  76.  Attempt  on  smashing  the  piñata.  
FIGURE  77  and  78.  Collecting  sweets,  balloons,  and  other  treats  from  
inside  the  piñata.  
FIGURE  79.  Make,  Listen,  Talk  ©Xristina  Penna.  
FIGURE  80.  An  updated  conceptualisation  attempt  of  the  contraption  theory  
following  Bal  and  Bleeker,  and  Friston’s  FEP.  The  structure  of  a  
contraption  as  critical,  analytical,  and  practical  tool  for  tackling,  
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Introduction  
  
Within   the   current   shifting   performance   landscape   –of   intimate,   site-­
specific/responsive,  urban  and  expansive  environments–  scenography,   ‘the  
manipulation  and  orchestration  of  the  performance  environment’  (McKinney  
and   Butterworth   2009,   p.4),   is   also   shifting.   Audiences   are   engaged   with  
scenographies   that   are   invisible,   can   be   felt,   walked,   digested,   made,  
ignored,  found,  but  they  can  also  ‘make  us’  (Lotker  and  Gough  2013).  Whilst  
there   is   an   increase   in   the   critical   writing   produced   for   analysing,   and  
situating  scenography  in  the  current  shifting  performance  landscape,  there  is  
however,   a   lack   of   critical   practice   so   as   to   develop   further   questions,  
methodological   tools  and  vocabularies   for  designing,   reflecting,  and   talking  
about  scenography  in  its  current  form.  
Specifically,   there   is   a   gap   in   researching   the   audiences’   experience   and  
engagement   in   contemporary   scenography,   as   well   as   a   more   reflective  
exploration   from   a   practitioner’s   point   of   view,   on   the   processes   of   the  
making  of  participatory  work.  For  example  Sodja  Lotker  (2015)  refers  to  an  
‘invisible’  scenography  that  takes  place  in  the  mind  of  the  scenographer  and  
is   experienced   by   the   whole   body   of   the   audience,   but   there   is   little  
understanding  in  terms  of  the  critical  practice  to  contribute  to  the  knowledge  
of  a  post-­representational,  affective  performance  landscape.    
This  thesis  argues  that  post-­cognitivist  theories  imbricated  within  what  I  coin  
the  understanding  of  contemporary  scenography  ‘as  contraption’  can  help  us  
explain   and   contextualise   the   ‘peculiarities’   (Hann   forthcoming)   of  
scenography,  and  contribute  to  understanding  its  ‘logic  and  distinctive  rules’  
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(Lotker  and  Gough  2013,  p.  3),  as  well  as  the  affect,  and  emotive  responses  
one   may   have   to   performance   design.   This   multi-­disciplinary   project  
explores   the   usefulness   of   applying   cognitive   science   frameworks   in  
researching   participatory   scenographic   processes   and   reception   in   hybrid  
performance   environments,   and   understands   scenographic   experience   as  
co-­originating   between   the   audience,   the   scenographer,   and   the   designed  
environment,  something  I  call  a  ‘groundless  scenography’,  and  I  will  outline  
why  through  my  writing.    
  
Cognitive  and  Performance  Phenomena  
The  noticeable   impact   that   social  media   networks,   virtual   reality   platforms,  
and   other   network-­aided   communication   have   on   our   contemporary  
understanding   of   perception,   social   interactions   and   how  we   negotiate   our  
experience,  is  complemented  by  the  impact  brought  forth  by  the  knowledge  
of  yet  another  complex  network:  that  of  the  human  brain.  Neuroscientists  are  
using  the  development  of  imaging  tools,  e.g.  fMRI,  to  further  understand  the  
brain’s  complex  neuron  system.  However  a  persistent  insight  of  the  second  
half   of   the   20th   century   and   of   the   21st   century,   as   performance   scholar  
Clayton   Drinko   rightly   puts   it,   is   that   ‘there   simply   are   no   universals   in  
neuroscience’  and   ‘it   is   important   to  consider   the   results  of  brain  scans  as  
just  one  piece  of  a  very  complex  conversation’  (2013,  p.97).    
Therefore  other  disciplines  are  employed  to  work  together  based  on  the  rich  
empirical  data  provided  by  brain  scans,  in  order  to  produce  new  knowledge,  
transform   previous   understandings,   or   shed   some   light   on   current  
knowledge   of   what   it   is   to   be   human.   Imaging   studies   may   show   us   that  
brain   functions  and  emotions   (such  as  speech,   stress,   fear,  even  altruism)  
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are   localised   but  what  makes   us   human   is   not   determined   by   behavioural  
switches  that  one  could  turn  on  and  off  in  specific  areas  inside  the  brain.    
Andreas  Roepstorff  (2013)  whose  research  is  located  between  cognition  and  
anthropology   explains   that   scans   are   not   photographic   cameras   but   they  
represent  complicated  mathematics.  These  images  produced  by  the  scans,  
he   continues,   have   a   double   life:   on   one   level   they   are   simplified   and  
presented  by  the  media,  for  example,  as  evidence  to  show  aggression  in  a  
person  compared   to  one  who   is  not  aggressive;;  and  on  another   level   they  
are   used   in   a   laboratory   where   researchers   rate   them,   and   different  
experiments  produce  a  number  of  different  images.  The  first  option  makes  a  
scanner   look   like   a  magical   tool,   where   in   fact   a   scanner   is  more   like   the  
measuring   tool   in   the   second   case   and   therefore   what   is   important,  
according   to  Roepstorff,   is   to  come  up  with  ways  of   representing   the  data.  
He  admits  that  this  is  a  process  similar  to  telling  a  story;;  one  that  seems  to  
be  right  at   the  given  moment,  and   in  relation  to  the  knowledge  of   the  team  
who  is  making  the  analysis  of  the  data  (Roepstorff  2013).    
A   large   number   of   contemporary   cognitive   science   thinkers   (i.e.   Evan  
Thompson;;  Andy  Clark;;  Anthony  Chemero  etc.)  drawing  from  this  empirical  
data  distance  themselves  from  Cartesian  dualism  which  suggests  ‘the  story’  
of   a   distinction   between   the   body   and   mind   and   embrace   ‘the   stories’   of  
embodied,  embedded,  enactive  and  ecological   (the  so-­called  4Es)  aspects  
of   cognition,   which   suggest   that   human   cognition   is   an   on-­going  
collaboration   between   brain,   body   and   environment.      These   post-­
cognitivist   theories,   rooted   in   phenomenology   but   based   on   empirical  
evidence  (the  scans,  ratings,  and  conversations  between  fields   I  discussed  
previously),  suggest  that  cognition  co-­emerges  from  (or  is  rather  enacted  by)  
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the   whole   body   and   its   engagement   with   the   environment,   and   further  
observe  that:  
(T)here  are  strong  phylogenetic  reasons  why  cognitive  capacities  
have   turned  out   to  be  highly  embodied  and  embedded  (Sterelny  
2010,   Stotz   2010,   Jeffares   2010)   and   that,   therefore,   we   need  
explanatory   resources   that   go   beyond   the   dynamics   of   neural  
networks  (Menary  2010,  p.  460).  
  
Evan   Thompson   argues   that   a   similar   understanding   applies   to  
consciousness   and   that   the   story   of   cognition   being   in   the   head   is   like  
suggesting   that   a   cathedral   is   in   the   stones,   or   the   building,  meaning   that  
one   needs   stones   to   make   a   cathedral   and   these   stones   need   to   be  
connected   skillfully,   but   what   makes   the   cathedral   is   also   ‘iconography,  
tradition,   and   its   being   a   place   of  worship’   (in  Heuman   2014).   In   a   similar  
way  he  says   ‘consciousness   isn’t   in   the  neurons  or   their   connections’  only  
but   ‘consciousness   is   a   life-­regulation   process   of   the  whole   body   in  which  
the  brain  is  embedded.  In  the  case  of  human  consciousness,  the  context  is  
also   psychological   and   social’   (ibid.).   The   idea   of   consciousness   and  
cognition   being   not   only   inside   the   neurons   but   within   a   biological   and  
sociocultural,   and   psychological   context   resonates   with   the   idea   of  
scenography  not  being  only   in  the  design  (the  ‘set’,   the  digital   technologies  
i.e.   projections,   the   materials   i.e.   paint,   wood,   fabric,   the   light,   or   the  
positioning  of  the  audience)  but  within  a  co-­originating  relation  with  all  of  the  
above,  and  within  a  specific  geographical  and  sociocultural  context.    
This   interrelational   architecture   of   the   notions   of   consciousness,   and  
cognition,  situate  them  as  far  as  their  organisational  structure  is  concerned,  
within   networks,   brain-­webs,   complex   top-­down  and  bottom-­up   circular   co-­
originating   exchanges,   perpetual   processes,   and   rhizomatic   formations.   I  
argue   that   these   organisational   understandings   of   consciousness,   and  
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cognition   also   share   similarities   with   how   scenography   can   be   structurally  
understood  in  its  participatory  and  expanding  view.    
In  contemporary  performance,  the  landscape  is  being  inhabited  by  forms  of  
hybrid,   participatory,   boundary-­shifting   performance   systems   inviting   the  
audience–participants   to   become   co-­creators   of   the   work.   Claire   Bishop,  
referring   to  participatory  performances,   talks  about   the   ‘return   to   the  social  
turn’   (Bishop  2012,  p.3)  highlighting   that   this   shift   in   spectatorship   is  not  a  
new  phenomenon;;  however  my   research   focuses  on  how   this  participatory  
phenomenon  unfolds  in  the  now.  
Contemporary   theatre  and  performance  scholars  are  exploring   the  creative  
ways   in   which   the   boundaries   between   performance   space   and   audience  
space  shift  or  disappear,  and  the  communication  between  performance  and  
its   audiences   in   this   new   landscape.  Aronson   sets   the   scene   for   today   by  
saying  that  ‘[i]t  may  no  longer  be  a  case  of  violently  shifting  boundaries,  but  
rather   that   the   boundaries   have   disappeared   all   together’   (Aronson   2008,  
p.25).   Therefore   scenography   is   currently   referred   to   by   scholars   as   a  
process  (i.e.  Aronson  2005;;  McKinney  2008)  instead  of  a  set  product,  and  it  
is  explored  as  an  integral  part  of  the  ephemeral,  multimodal,  experiential  and  
multi-­sensorial  nature  of  theatrical  experience(s)  and  beyond.  
Furthermore,   this   two-­way   exchange   between   performance   and   audience  
has   led   scholars   like  Di   Benedetto   to   argue   about   the   ‘power   of   theatrical  
representation   to   transform  the  human  experience’   itself   (2010,  p.x),  or   the  
transformational  effect   that  a  performance,  especially  a  visceral  one,  might  
have   on   our   embodied   ‘plastic   brains’   and   the   ability   of   art   to   ‘deeply  
influence  the  way  that  the  brain  is  structured’    (ibid.  2010,  p.22).  Although  I  
agree   with   Di   Benedetto’s   statement   above   regarding   the   transformative  
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power  of  performance,   I  will   point   to   the   term   ‘theatrical   representation’  as  
problematic,  as  our  era  asks   for  an  art  beyond   representation.   In  cognitive  
studies,   representation   is   also   considered   a   vexed   term   as   it   is   related   to  
cognitive   processing   that   is   ‘computational’,   suggesting   inputs-­outputs   and  
mental  representations  inside  someone’s  head.    
Varela   et   al.,   contrary   to   computationalism,   support   an   understanding   of  
cognition  as  enactive  where  the  organism  and  environment  ‘enfold  into  each  
other  and  unfold  from  one  another’  (1991,  p.217).  This  theory  does  not  have  
a  fixed  foundation,  as  it  is  always  dependent  on  the  pathway  established  by  
our   enfoldment   with   the   environment,   and   our   unfolding   from   it,   and   it   is  
therefore  groundless.  When  Varela  et  al.  refer  to  ‘groundlessness’  they  refer  
to  it  as  a  philosophical  issue,  open  to  discourse,  and  identify  its  roots  to  the  
lack   of   an   ultimate   ground   (Varela   et   al.   1991,   p.214)   i.e.   an   independent  
external  world.  Using  abstract  thought  without  embodiment  is  not  helpful  for  
learning  how  to  live  in  a  groundless  world,  according  to  the  enactivists:  
[C]ognition   is   not   the   representation   of   a   pregiven   world   by   a  
pregiven  mind  but  is  rather  the  enactment  of  a  world  and  a  mind  
on   the  basis  of  a  history  of   the  variety  of  actions   that  a  being   in  
the  world  performs’  (ibid.  1991,  p.9).    
  
My   aim   is   to   bring   the   above   understanding   to   scenographic   making  
processes   and   reception   in   an   attempt   to   communicate   the   synergetic  
coupling  between  the  agent  and  the  environment  and  to  shed  some  light  on  
the   post-­representational   methods,   the   languages   and   the   innovative  
practices  or  the  recycled  practices  that  might  emerge  by  doing  so.  My  focus  
is  on  scenography   in  participatory  performance  as  a  discipline  of  hybridity,  
combinations   and   in-­betweens.   As   a   creative   researcher,   my   enactive  
ontological   understanding   of   the   theatrical   experience   of   contemporary  
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scenography  is  process-­based  where  the  world  and  mind  are  inseparable  in  
a  universe  that  is  ‘enfolding  and  unfolding’  (Varela  et  al.  1991,  p.217).    
Following   scholars   like   McConachie   and   Hart   (eds.   2006);;   Paavolainen  
(2009);;  Di  Benedetto  (2010);;  Shaughnessy  (ed.  2013);;  Bleeker  &  Germano  
(2014);;  Blair  and  Cook  (eds.  2016)  and  others   in   the  field  I  also  agree  that  
embodied,   embedded,   enactive,   ecological   and   affective   (4E)   cognitive  
theory  is  a  valid  framework  for  analysing  the  multi-­faceted  nature  of  theatre  
and  performance.  The  radical  embodied,  enactive,  ecologically  and  socially  
extended   cognitive   theories   i.e.   Varela   et   al.   (1991);;   Gibson   (1986);;   Nöe  
(2004);;  Chemero  (2009);;  Clark  (2008-­2016);;  Bruineberg,  Rietveld,  Kiverstein  
(2012,  2014,  2016);;  Ramstead  et  al.   (2016);;  Roepstorff  et  al.   (2010)  are  of  
particular  interest  to  this  project  and  will  be  used  as  a  way  of  analysing  the  
multimodal   nature   of   creating   scenography   and   the   equally   multimodal  
reception  of  scenography  by  its  audiences  in  my  practice-­led  investigations:  
WorkSpace  I,  WorkSpace  II,  and  WorkSpace  III.    
  
Background  of  the  Researcher  and  Entry  Point  
I  am  entering   this  project  with  nearly  15  years  of  experience   in  design  and  
practice   for   performance   (devised,   installation,   site-­specific),   large-­scale  
events,  and   film  shorts,  and  with  my   training  and  education   focused   in   the  
field   (Drama   Department,   School   of   Fine   Arts,   Aristotle   University   of  
Thessaloniki   1996-­2003,   MA   Scenography,   Central   St   Martin’s   College   of  
Art  and  Design,  UAL,  2004-­2005).  During  my  time   in   the   latter   I  developed  
my  research   interests  around  the  notion  of   the  carnival  and  I  embarked  on  
exploring   the   idea   of   a   polyphonic   collective   consciousness,   between   the  
audience   and   the   performance   space,   following   the   wr
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Bakhtin.  My  practice  was  reinforced  by  a  placement  at  Cricoteca  (Centre  for  
the   documentation   of   the   art   of   Tadeusz   Kantor)   in   Krakow,   where   I   was  
given  the  opportunity   to  be  part  of  a  team  who  investigated  the  archives  of  
Kantor’s  work  and  to  produce  mixed-­media  performance  material  inspired  by  
his  ‘emballages’,  and  drawing  from  notions  of  the  grotesque.  This  mixing  of  
puppetry,   objects,   sound,   performers,   and   audiences’   bodies   has   been  
instrumental   to  my   scenographies   as   the   reader  will   be   able   to   see   in   the  
practice  of  this  work.    
I  have  been  living  and  working  in  London  for  a  decade  before  this  research  
project   (2004-­2013).   London   is   a   vibrant   bubbling  multicultural   cauldron   of  
overflowing   information   and   opportunities;;   living   on   the   boil   can   be  
overwhelming   and   rewarding   at   the   same   time   and   it   needs   effort   and  
resilience  to  navigate  within  the  interchangeable  and  complex  dynamics  of  a  
global  city.  Diversity   in  culture  and   financial  status,   the  gentrification  of   the  
last   decades   is   altering   the   urban   landscape   in   an   unmistakable   way,  
creating  constant  movement  and  juxtaposing  imagery.  The  city  also  provides  
never-­ending   engagement   with   art   and   performance   both   local,   and  
international.   These   parameters,   and   experiences   within   an   urban  
landscape,   have   influenced   my   work   and   have   impacted   on   my   way   of  
thinking   about   scenographic   practice.   In   London   I   co-­founded   in   2006   the  
international   artists’   collective   Poemstomyotherself  
(http://poemstomyotherself.org.uk/),  where  after  a  site-­specific  production  at  
The   Round   Chapel,   Hackney   the   group   engaged   in   an   R&D   project   (Nov  
2008   -­   January   2009)   supported   by   Camden   People’s   Theatre   involving  
collaborative   inter-­disciplinary   art   research   on   memory,   identity   and   the  
brain.   We   developed   a   method   toolkit   for   generating   collaborative  
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performance   material   using   a   system-­game   of   cards,   and   organised  
gatherings   to   talk   about   synchronicity   and   interdisciplinary   artistic  
collaboration.    
London   is   also   where,   since   2008,   I   have   led   the   experimental   platform  
aswespeakproject  (http://aswespeakproject.org  )  where  I  work  together  with  
sonic,   performance   and   other   artists   to   create   hybrid   participatory  
performance  environments  and  present  these  at  contemporary  performance  
festivals,   galleries   and   found   spaces   internationally   like   The   Benaki  
Museum,  Athens  (Locus  Solus  exhibition,  2010);;  The  Round  House,  London  
(Accidental  Festival,  2011);;  El  Museo  Cultural  de  Santa  Fe   (Currents  New  
Media   Festival   2013,   New   Mexico);;   Shunt   Vaults,   London,   2009;;   The  
Bluecoat,   Liverpool   (Poolside   Emergency,   2013)   etc.   The   idea   behind  my  
work   within   the   ‘aswespeakproject’   is   to   create   complex,   yet   simple  
scenographies-­installations   offering   a   number   of   stimuli   so   that   the  
audience–participants   generate   their   own   mental,   material   or   visceral  
connections   corresponding   to   the   complex   scenographic   environment,   the  
materials  on  offer  and  their  co-­audience–participants.    
I  will   give   below  an   example   of  my  work   through   the  aswespeakproject   in  
order   to   illuminate   the  reader  on  an  example  of   the   tacit  knowledge  I  bring  
into  this  research,  and  the  reasons  behind  pursuing  this  research  project  by  
practice.  Furthermore,  I  aim  to  show  what  brought  me  to  the  intersections  of  
performance,   scenography,   and   cognition  and  how  my  background  helped  
me  to  design  this  multi-­disciplinary  research  project.  
In  the  durational  piece  I  know  this,  I  do  this  all  the  time  (I  don’t  like  it  though)  
audience–participants’   drawings,   projected   live   on   the   performer's   visage,  
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are   collected  by   the  performer  and  gradually  overtake  her  private   territory,  
unearthing  patterns.    
             
                       
  
In   this   work,   the   scenographic   environment   fleshed   out   an   imaginative  
metaphor  of  how  the  brain-­self  might  communicate  with  other  brain-­selves.  I  
tried   to   create   scenographically   the   process   of   how   information   from   ‘the  
Other’  (another  person)  is  perceived  and  transformed,  accepted  or  rejected  
by  the  ‘I’-­self  (Figs.  1,  2,  3,  and  4).  
This  system  is  not  dissimilar  to  the  architectonic  schema  which  is  suggested  
by  Bakhtin  who  argues  that  identity  does  not  depend  only  on  the  individual  ‘I’  
but   is  co-­determined  by  how  others  view  the  ‘I’  and  it   is   therefore  a  shared  
process:  ‘I  -­for-­myself,  the  other-­for-­me,  and  I-­for-­the-­other’  (2010,  p.54).    
This  schema,  when  imaginatively  enacted  as  a  guide  for  a  live  performance,  
provided   a   subtle   code   of   conduct   between   the   audience–participants   and  
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4. I know this, I do this all the time (I don’t like it though) performance installation 
(2009). From Currents 2013, New Mexico, USA. Performer Kate Kita. 
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the   performer,   the  materials   (i.e.   pens   and  paper),   and   their   co-­audience–
participants.   In   order   to   enact   the   metaphorical   idea   of   communication  
between   the   self   and   ‘the   Other’   a   computational   schema   of   the   order   of  
representation,   process,   and   transformation   was   appropriated.   The  
performer   was   given   an   improvisational   score,   a   set   of   actions,   aimed   at  
fleshing  out  this   idea:  you  receive  something  that   is  created  on  the  spot  by  
someone   else   and   either   accept   it   as   it   is   (the   performer   would   hang   the  
original  drawing  on  the  wall),  try  to  understand  it  (the  performer  would  copy  
the  same  design  on   the  wall   and   repeat   it   several   times),   transform   it   (the  
performer  would  look  at  the  drawing  and  choose  a  part  of   it   to  copy  on  the  
wall),  or   reject   it   (the  performer  would   throw  the  drawing  on   the   floor).  The  
repetition  of  this  activity  for  up  to  five  hours  at  a  time  generated  patterns  of  
accumulated   paper   on   the   floor   and   drawings-­patterns   on   the   walls.  
Depending   on   the   ending   instruction   each   time   the   installation   was  
performed,  this  haptic  data  would  either  overflow  and  bury  the  performer,  or  
be   constantly   re-­arranged   in   the   small  white   room  by   the  performer   in   her  
attempt   to   find  a  point   of   balance   in   the   space.  This  process-­scenography  
defined   a   certain   being   from   the   audience–participants:   they   watched   the  
drawing  process,  waited  for  their  turn  to  draw,  reflected  on  the  experience  or  
walked   away.   Without   any   verbal   or   written   instructions   therefore   the  
audience–participants   picked   up   with   their   bodies   the   way   of   being   in  
relation  to  the  design  by  watching  what  others  did  and  by  trying  out  their  own  
ways.    
This  enactment  of  an   imaginative  model  of   thought  process,  a  construction  
of  what  I  called  a  ‘head-­space’,  initiated  for  me  a  hands-­on,  artistic  dialogue  
between   contemporary   performance   practice   and   worldviews   related   to  
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human  cognition,  through  a  number  of  works  (of  which  there  is  no  space  to  
go   onto  mentioning   here).   The   reason   I   am  mentioning   the   above  work   is  
because  it  also  generated  questions  regarding  the  immaterial  tools  that  can  
be  used   for  orchestrating  a  scenographic  environment,  and   the  audiences’  
response   i.e.   how   do   audience–participants   know   how   to   engage  with   the  
different   parts   of   the   work?   Further   questions   were   generated   related   to  
understanding   the   workings   of   these   scenographic   systems,   and  
understanding  the  audiences’  experience  of  these  scenographies  i.e.  where  
else,   apart   from   theatre   and   performance,   can   we   find   these   sort   of  
interrelational  structures,  and  aesthetics?  How  might   these  other  structures  
(i.e.   the   Internet,   neuronal   systems,   systems   thinking)   help   designers  with  
creating  experiential  participatory  environments  for  audiences?  
These  questions  led  to  the  design  of  this  research  project  here,  where  I  took  
up   the   idea   of   using   cognitive   architectures   of   consciousness   and  
perception.   Specifically   I   use   current   worldviews   of   consciousness  
imaginatively   as   scenographic   blueprint   mechanisms   to   orchestrate   the  
space.  The  reason  I  am  entering  this   imaginative  dialogue  is  because  as  a  
creative   researcher   I   am   looking   for   structures   in   order   to   contribute   to  
inventive  performance  design  and  practice  both  in  critical  and  artistic  terms,  
looking  at  hybrid  performance  that  breaks  away  from  traditional  methods  of  
attending.  As  argued  by  Umberto  Eco:    
The  moment  an  artist   realizes  that   the  system  of  communication  
at  his  [sic]  disposal  is  extraneous  to  the  historical  situation  he  [sic]  
wants   to  depict,  he   [sic]  must  also  understand   that   the  only  way  
he   [sic]   will   be   able   to   solve   his   [sic]   problem   is   through   the  
invention  of  new  formal  structures  that  will  embody  that  situation  
and  become  its  model  (1989,  p.143).  
  
-­  xxvi  -­  
I   argue   that   what   Eco   says   above   about   the   invention   of   new   formal  
structures   can   be   reflected   in   the   form   of   scenographic   contraptions   and  
contraption-­environments   which   can   be   informed   by   embodying   and   en-­
spacing   current   scientific   abstract   thought   (models   of   consciousness,  
perception).   I   will   refer   to   this   methodological   tool   extensively   in   my  
Methodology,  and  Performance  Experiments  section.    
Apart   from   the   imaginative  exchange  with  current   cognitive  architectures,   I  
am   also   drawing   from   current   4E   cognitive   theories   for   analysing  
scenographic   participation   and   interaction.   As   Nicola   Shaughnessy  
observes:   ‘[c]ontemporary   performance   involves   a   complex   fusion   of  
simultaneous  states  of  presence’,  and  goes  on  to  say  that  cognitive  theories  
of  performance  can  aid      ‘thinking  physically’  and   the   ‘felt  understanding’  of  
visual  auditory  and  bodily  experiences  (Shaughnessy  2013,  p.  13).  With  this  
project   I   am   exploring   how   the   above   thinking   and   understanding   can   be  
extended  to  space,  and  to  the  performance  environment,  and  how  it  can  be  
developed   towards   a   cognitive   theory   of   scenography,   that   may   help   us  
understand   the   ‘how’   of   the  workings   of   the   complex   simultaneous   states,  
the  multimodal  spatial   thinking,  and   the   felt  understanding  of  contemporary  
scenographies.  
My   transition   from   a   practitioner   to   practitioner-­researcher   brings   into   this  
research  a  number  of  methodological   tools   that   I  have  been  exploring  and  
using   as   creative  methods  while   a   practitioner.   I   will   refer   to   two   of   these  
briefly  here  that  have  been  brought  into  my  research  methodology  (and  will  
expand  further  throughout  this  research):  
Creative  method  1:  Scenographic  Contraptions.  The  use  of  ‘contraptions’  as  
scenographic   tools   is  an  original  method  that  has  been  applied   in  my  work  
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pre-­PhD  to  create  devices-­props  but  also  for  the  creation  of  environments  I  
referred   to   as   ‘contraption   environments’   related   to   concepts   of   process,  
rehearsal,  re-­enactment.  Their  aim  is  to  facilitate  the  interaction  between  the  
audience–participants   and   the   performance,   bringing   together   the  
fragmentary   actions   occurring   in   the   performance   space   towards   the  
production  of  meaning.  This  method  of   imaginatively   fleshing  out   concepts  
(like   communication,   memory,   time   etc)   in   the   form   of   ‘scenographic  
contraptions’   (Figs.   5   and   6)   or   ‘contraption   environments’   (Figs.   7   and   8)  
works  as  a  devising   tool   for  co-­authoring  performances  with   the  audience–
participants,   and   as   a   way   of   encouraging   a   scenographic   conversation  
between   the   audience–participant   and   the   work.   A   paper   I   presented   the  
year  before  starting  this  research  project  Scenographic  Contraptions  –  in  Aid  
of   the  Body’s  Memory   (2013)   (see  Appendix  A)   set   the   foundations   of  my  
thinking   for   the   understanding   of   the   relation   between   brain,   body   and  




































Figures 5 and 6. Drawing contraption for I know this, I do this all the time (I don’t like it though) (2009 - 
ongoing). The audience use a hand-made video mapping device and watch their drawings being projected on 
the performer’s face in real-time. xristina penna +aswespeakproject. Performers Julieta Kilgelmann and Kate 
Kita.  
Figures 7 and 8. Uncovered. A 
‘contraption environment’. The 
audience entered a room and were 
invited to participate in a process 
(such as to answer a set of 
questions related to a piece of their 
clothing; trace out its shape; watch 
an impromptu dance; etc.). As part 
of Poolside Emergency, The 
Bluecoat, Liverpool. xristina penna 
+aswespeakproject. With Vanio 
Papadelli and Michael Picknett, 
2013.  Image© Jody Leach. 
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Creative  method   2:  Material   coming   from   the   audience.   In   both   the   above  
examples   the   audience–participants   were   invited   to   produce   drawings,   or  
doodles,  which  remained   in   the  space,  or  were  given   to   them  on   their  way  
out.   In  Uncovered   (Figs.   7   and   8)   we   asked   the   audience–participants   to  
take  off  one  item  of  clothing  behind  a  curtain,  and  leave  it  there;;  they  would  
then   put   on   a   robe   and   join   the   performer   in   uncovering   stories   regarding  
their  projected  clothes.  The  emerged  work  was  each  time  different  as  it  was  
dependent  on  the  shifting  material  the  audience–participant  agreed  to  bring  
into   the   work.   This   corresponding   environment   considers   the   audience’s  
participation  as  an  artistic  component  of   the  work  and   ‘as  art’   (White  2013,  
p.196),   and   generated   various   responses   from   the   audience   (resistance,  
crying,  indifference,  affection  etc.)  
Both  the  above  methods  have  been  employed  for  my  current  research.  The  
performance   installations   and   props   I   produce   for   my   practice-­research   I  
therefore   call   ‘scenographic   contraptions’.   I   analyse   the   audience–
participants’   interaction   with   the   materials,   space   and   their   co-­audience  
using   action-­oriented   and   agent-­environment   coupling   cognitive   theories  
(4Es).   The   work   produced   relies   on   the   material   from   the   audience–
participants  by  asking  them  to  share  their  experiences  live  on  a  microphone  
(WS   I),   mixing   pre-­recorded   footage   of   the   audience–participants’   voices  
(WS   II),   with   the   use   of   their   images,   videos   and   status   updates   from  
Facebook,  asking  them  to  draw  during  the  event  (WS  III),  etc.    
Having  outlined  above  my  particular  area  of  design  expertise  I  hope  I  have  
explained   to   the   reader   the   type   of   tacit   knowledge   I   am   bringing   to   this  
project:  a  scenographer’s  knowledge,  and  understanding   that  goes  beyond  
the   traditional   designing   of   sets   (without   however   excluding   these),   and  
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engages   with   orchestrating   immaterial   and   social   ingredients   of  
scenography.   I   also   hope   I   have   communicated   how   I   have   arrived   at   the  
beginning   of   this   investigation   of   the   intersections   between   scenography,  
participatory   performance   practice,   and   cognitive   science   using   practice-­
research.   A   further   analysis   of   how   I   have   navigated   from   this   entry   point  
onwards   one   can   find   in  my  Methodology   section   and   in  my  Performance  
Experiments   section.   For   this   research   project   I   am   taking   a   pause   from  
professional  practice  to  reflect  on  the  current  shifting  performance  landscape  
by   using   critical   practice-­experiments   in   order   to   speculate   on   what  
scenography  can  become,  recognising  that  this  work  wouldn’t  be  able  to  be  
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Research  Questions  
–   How   might   current   post-­cognitivist   theories   that   refer   to   the   mind   as  
embodied,  embedded,  enactive,  ecological,  and  affective  (known  as  4Es)  be  
used   as   critical   and   creative   frameworks   for   analysing   and   understanding  
the  multimodal  nature  of  scenographic  making  processes  and  participation?  
Sub-­questions:  
–   How   might   4Es   frameworks   and   specifically   radical   embodied  
cognitive  neuroscience  and  the  more  generally  applied  notions  of  encultured  
cognition   contribute   further   to   understanding   the   workings   of   dynamic  
scenographic   systems  within   the   current   landscape   of   hybrid,   participatory  
performance?  
–   How   might   the   empirical   metaphorical   models   of   consciousness   of  
Baars   (1988),   Dennett   (1991)   and   Edelman   and   Tononi   (2000)   and   the  
predictive   processing   framework   (Clark   2013b)   be   employed   and   applied  
imaginatively  as  creative  methods  for  developing  the  aesthetics  of  dynamic  
performance/scenography  systems?  
–   What   are   the   implications   of   the   findings   of   4Es,   and   embodied  
predictive  processing  (PP)  on  scenographic  making  processes?  
–   What   are   the   implications   of   the   findings   of   4Es,   and   predictive  
processing  on  scenographic  reception  research?  
–   In   what   ways   might   we   use   4Es   and   predictive   processing   to  
investigate  the  audiences’  experience  of  dynamic/scenographic  systems?  
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Part  I  
CONTEXT  
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Chapter  1  
The  Scenographic  Turn  Meets  the  Cognitive  Turn  
1.1  Shifting  Perceptions  and  the  Theatre  Space    
What  we  say  about  the  world  tells  us  as  much  about  ourselves  as  
it  does  about  the  world  (Varela  et  al.  1991,  p.142).  
  
A   number   of   performance   scholars   describe   the  ways   in  which   knowledge  
and   the   history   of   ideas   have   impacted   on   scenographic   reception   and  
production.   In   scenography   Arnold   Aronson   points   out   that   ‘the   stages   of  
every  society  are  different,  and  yet  each  of  those  societies  saw  its  theatres  
as   an   [sic]   reflection   of   its   world’   reflecting   thus   ‘its   particular   society’s  
understanding  of  space’    (2005,  p.104).  As  Trimingham  puts  it  ‘the  question  
of   how   a   performance   comes   to   ‘mean’   for   an   audience   is   intimately  
connected   with   the   how   the   world   itself   comes   to   ‘mean’   for   us’   (2013,  
p.229).  
Scholars  like  Demastes  (2002)  and  Di  Benedetto  (2010)  argue  that  scientific  
findings   and   our   cultural  worldviews  are   interdependent:  Demastes   argues  
that  there  is  a  fruitful  or  even  conspiratorial  synergy  between  contemporary  
theatre   and   contemporary   science   theories   such   as   quantum  physics,   and  
chaos   theory   in   order   to   challenge   the   linear   thought   of   ‘traditional  
reductionist’   science   and   ‘traditional’   theatre  making   and   spectating   (2002,  
p.6).   Di   Benedetto’s   work   focuses   on   contemporary   performance   and  
reflects   also   on   the   idea   that   ‘theatrical   form   is   an   expression   of  
contemporary   thought   processes’   (2010,   p.1).   In   a   similar   way   to   the  
previous   thinkers   Umberto   Eco   when   writing   in   the   1990s,   points   out   the  
importance  that  contemporary  science  has  on  artists:    
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[Contemporary   artists]   acknowledge   the   new   vision   of   both   the  
physical  and  psychological  universes  proposed  by  contemporary  
science,  and  realize  that  they  can  no  longer  speak  of  this  world  in  
the   same   formal   terms   that   were   used   to   speak   of   an   orderly  
cosmos  (Eco  1989,  p.142).    
  
The  post-­cognitivist  views  that  my  research  is  based  upon  draw  from  similar  
understandings   of   not   being   able   to   talk   about   the   world   as   an   orderly  
cosmos.  Varela  et  al.  admit  that  the  enactive  view  of  a  mutually  enfolded  life  
and  world   ‘results   in  a  sense  of  vertigo  due  to  the  collapse  of  what  we  had  
supposed  to  be  sure  and  stable  foundations’  (1991,  p.144)  and  refer  to  the  
enfolding   and   unfolding   of   organism   and   environment   as   a   ‘groundless’  
world.  They   further  agree  with  Hilary  Putnam  who  observes   that  science   is  
good  at  removing  foundations  without  providing  new  ones,  and  conclude  that  
our   historical   situation   ‘requires   not   only   that   we   give-­up   philosophical  
foundationalism   but   that   we   learn   to   live   in   a   world   without   foundations’.  
They   argue   therefore   that   this   unresolved   historical   situation   puts   us   in   a  
position  of  having  to  ‘philosophize  without  foundations’  (ibid.  1991,  p.218).    
Following   up   on   the   idea   of   the   co-­relation   between   the   making   of   our  
worldviews  and   the  making  of   the   stage,   the  questions   that   arise   from   the  
acceptance   that   our   world   is   groundless   can   be   considered   pertinent   to   a  
scenographer.  A   scenographer’s  work   in  hybrid  performance  environments  
entails   not   only   designing   something   that  will   be   built   but   also   figuring   out  
how   to   orchestrate   the   expanding   and   shifting   forms   of   the   audiences’  
mutual   enfolding   with   scenography   in   a   groundless   contemporary  
performance  landscape;;  where,  as  already  mentioned,  scenography  can  be  
invisible,  where  it  can  be  felt,  walked,  digested,  made,  ignored,  found,  but  it  
can  also  ‘make  us’  (Lotker  and  Gough,  2013).  This  groundless  scenography  
(if   we   borrow   the   words   from   the   enactivists),   the   scenography   in   which  
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audience   and   design   enfold   into   each   other   and   unfold   from   one   another,  
assumes   a   co-­originating   orchestration   between   audience,   design  
environment,   and   scenographer.   This   groundless   understanding   has   been  
tested   in   this   thesis   so   as   to   develop   ‘groundless’   methods,   ways,   and  
further  our  appreciation  of  the  role  of  scenography  in  the  current  groundless  
performance  landscape.  
On  another  level  this  groundless  understanding  brings  forth  further  questions  
regarding   immaterial   aspects   such   as   the   emotions,   and   feelings   that   this  
way  of  experiencing  and  making  of  the  work  generates.  The  ethics  related  to  
the   audiences’   experience   (including   their   physical   and   mental   safety   for  
example)  need   to  be   taken   into  account   into   this  orchestration  so  does   the  
meta-­experience  of   the  audience   (the   impact   the  experience  may  have  on  
them  post-­show).    
The   unsettling   feeling,   that   is   brought   to   a   person   by   the   feeling   of  
groundlessness,   has  been   coined  by  Richard  Bernstein   ‘Cartesian  anxiety’  
(Bernstein,   cited   in   Varela   et   al.   1991,   p.   140).   In   Continental   philosophy  
Derrida   refers   to   the   concept   of   centred   structure   as   the   concept   of   ‘a  
freeplay  based  on  fundamental  ground’  (1993,  p.224),  and  observes  that:  
with   this   certitude   anxiety   can   be   mastered,   for   anxiety   is  
invariably   the   result  of  a  certain  mode  of  being   implicated   in   the  
game,  of  being  caught  by  the  game,  of  being  as  it  were  from  the  
very  beginning  at  stake  in  the  game  (ibid.).  
  
Varela,   Thompson   and   Rosch   suggest   a   solution   for   tackling   the   anxiety  
caused  by   ‘taking  groundlessness  as  negative’.  This   is  not   the   finding  of  a  
new   ground   or   grounding,   or   the   return   to   an   older   ground   but   ‘to   find   a  
disciplined   and   genuine   means   to   pursue   groundlessness’   (Varela   et   al.  
1991,  p.253).    
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In  Western  culture  we  are  now  past  the  threshold  of  representation  and  have  
entered  the  stage  where  we  are  still  discovering  and  inventing  our  way  in  a  
post-­representational   world,   holding   with   one   hand   tightly   to   Cartesian  
dualism.   The   question   is   how   do   we   communicate   this   past-­the-­threshold  
moment?   I   argue   that   since  we   are   at   a  moment   in  Western   thinking   and  
sociocultural   conditions,   which   is   in   perpetual   transformation   and   co-­
origination,   the   notion   of   an   invention   in   its   inceptive   form   may   be  
appropriate   for   communicating   scenographically   and   conceptually   this  
moment  of  past-­the-­threshold.  The  notion  of   ‘contraption’  offers   the  form  or  
the   structure   of   an   organism,   like   a   process   with   lots   of   instruments   and  
problem   solving  mechanisms   that   are   co-­originating   and   are   resolved  with  
our   intervention.   This   intervention   involves   looking   at   other   people’s  
interventions  and  doings,  or  what  Varela  et  al.  call  ‘acknowledging  the  other  
with   whom   we   dependently   coordinate’   (ibid.   p.254).   Since   the   notion   of  
contraption   does   not   suggest   an   end   to   a   problem,   the   only   way  we  may  
resolve  the  perpetual  problems  is  by  working  with  others  not  necessarily  in  a  
binary  active-­passive  way  but  in  communion,  by  inventing,  reflecting,  talking,  
observing   etc..   A   contraption   does   not   guarantee   a   final   product,   and  
therefore  a  generation  of  different  contraptions  may  occur.  There  is  not  one  
cure   to   groundlessness,   there   is   no   telos,   but   enaction,   reflection,  
awareness,  critical  embodiment,  ecological,  and  emotional   intelligence,  and  
moments  of  clarity.    
When  talking  about  shifting  perceptions  and  theatre  space,  Bleeker  refers  to  
the  concept  of  perspective  as  an  ‘invention  of  the  early  Modern  period  of  art’  
(2008,  p.12,  my  italics)  later  adopted  by  theatre,  which  is  fundamental  to  the  
‘development   of   the   modern   scientific   world   view’(ibid.).   Bleeker   refers   to  
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Mieke   Bal’s   argument   that   ‘concepts   are   like  metaphors   replacing   a   story’  
(Bal   1994,   cited   in   Bleeker   2008,   p.14)   and   that   these   metaphors   are   so  
interweaved  within  our  collective  thinking  and  way  of  doing  things  that  soon  
the   story,   and   point   of   view   from   which   they   derive   is   forgotten   (Bleeker  
2008,   p.14),   and   argues   that   perspective   ‘is   such   a   metaphor   covering   a  
story’  (ibid.)  of  the  world  ‘as  it  is’  (ibid.  p.46)  (see  Fig.  9).  Following  the  above  
line   of   thought   in   the   now,   and   bringing   this   concept   to   scenography,   I  
suggest  that  to  cover  the  current  post-­representational  story  of  the  mutually  
enfolding   and   unfolding   world   and   agent   in   participatory   performance  
practice,   we   can   use   the   concept   metaphor   of   the   ‘scenographic  
contraption’.    
  
Adolphe  Appia  in  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century  said  that:    
once   the   paint   has   dried   upon   a   surface   it   is   static,   whereas  
dramatic   action   and   human   emotion   changes   and   grows.  
Concepts	  =	  Metaphors Covering	  a	  story
Metaphors	  interweaved	  within	  our	  collective	  thinking	  and	  doing
Perspective The	  world	  'seen	  as	  it	  is'Mind	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  natureIndependent	  	  outside	  world	  
RepresentationGround	  FoundationHierarchy
Contraption
The	  world	  experienced	  as	  shiftingMind	  as	  co-­‐‑determined	  with	  the	  worldA	  world	  co-­‐‑constructed	  with	  the	  agent
Self-­‐‑modifying	  processesGroundlessnessProcess,	  PredictionRhizome/brainweb
Figure 9. An initial conceptualisation attempt of the contraption metaphor following Bal and Bleeker. The 
structure of a contraption as the grammar for generating and navigating the language of groundlessness in 
contemporary performance. An updated diagram can be found on p.211. 
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Therefore,  placing  dramatic  action,  which  lives,  against  a  painted  
scene,   which   is   static,   is   nonsense   –   therefore,   abolish   painted  
scenery  (cited  in  Baugh  2013,  p.  58).      
  
However   the  notion  of   the  scenographic  contraption  tackles  this   ‘nonsense’  
by   accommodating   it,   by   allowing   something   that   lives   to   be   put   against  
somethig   static,   as   long   as   this   ‘nonsense’   doesn’t   dominate   the   sense-­
making  mechanisms  of  the  audience.    
The  scenographic  contraption  generates  different  viewing  rules  but  includes  
perspective  as  one  way  of  viewing.  What  the  contraption  does  I  argue  (Fig.9)  
is   that   it   situates   the  world  not  seen   ‘as   it   is’   but  experienced,   felt   or  even  
accepted   shifting   ‘as   it   happens’   for   each   audience–participant.   The   latter  
gives  the  audience–participant  the  same  status  at  times  as  that  of  the  artist-­
scenographer,  however  within  a  world  provided  by  the  artist-­scenographer.  
Philosophical   concepts   of   the   world   do   not   disappear   overnight   and   the  
Cartesian  model  is  so  ingrained  in  our  culture  that  is  often  hard  to  let  go  of  it,  
or   to  know  how  to   let  go,  because   it   is  part  of  our   ‘various  histories’  as  the  
enactivists  say.  Future  scholars  may  be  able  to  observe  clearer,  and  with  a  
clearer  perspective   (if   this  word   continues   to   be  used   in   the   future),  which  
are  the  ‘forgotten  stories’  (Bal  1994,  cited  in  Bleeker  2008,  p.14)  that   linger  
behind   today’s   metaphor-­concepts.   However,   enactive   cognitive   science  
aims   to  contribute   to  breaking   the   ‘bad  habits’   (Varela  et  al.  1991,  p.25)  of  
the   ‘dissociation  of  mind   from  body,  or  awareness   from  experience’   (ibid.).  
By  using  such  theories  of  cognition,  complementary  to  a  phenomenological  
understanding,  my  research  aims  to  suggest  new  approaches  and  habits  of  
embodied   and   ecological   audiencing   and   spectating,   working   with  
scenography  as  a  tool.    
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Aronson  suggests  a  series  of  useful  practical  questions  for  a  scenographer  
in   developing   spatial   insights:   ‘How   do   we   see   space   today?   How   do   we  
recognize   [sic]   it?   How   do   we   define   it?’   (2005,   p.105).   An   additional  
contemporary   question,   following   the   debate   in   the   field   today   I   suggest  
would   be:   How   does   space   define   us?   One   way   of   answering   the   above  
questions   is   through   critical   and   reflective   observation   of   the   everyday  
without   rejecting   the  past  altogether,  but  by  engaging  critically  with  notions  
from  our  histories,  which  need  to  be  looked  or  pushed  beyond  their  current  
boundaries.  Alongside   the  broader  worldview   ideas,   there  are  a  number  of  
interweaving   sociocultural   and   political   reasons   that   can   be   identified   as  
affecting  the  way  we  understand  space  today,  such  as  the  impact  of  digital  
technology   and   social  media   on   our   day-­to-­day   experience   of   privacy   and  
intimacy   within   urban   and   suburban   surroundings,   and   the   local,   made  
national,  made  global.    
In   the  contemporary  performance   landscape   in   the  West,  one  can  observe  
the   development   of   new   forms   of   hybrid,   ‘immersive’,   interactive   or  
participatory   dynamic   or   boundary-­shifting   performance   spaces   where   the  
public   and   private,   performance   space   and   audience   space   intertwine   or  
even  disappear,  suggesting  that  the  audience  can  choose  their  point  of  view  
and   positioning.   These   observations   point   to   the   fact   that   we   are  
experiencing  a  transient  phase  of  experimentation  in  the  field.  This  can  also  
be  observed  in  the  demand  from  the  part  of  the  audience  to  peer  behind  the  
scenes  of  creative  processes.  Not  only  has  the  audience’s  point  of  view  from  
a  unique,  hierarchical  perspective  of  experiencing  a  production  changed   to  
allow   them   to   choose   a   shifting   viewpoint   in   ‘immersive’,   site-­specific   and  
other   types  of  productions,  but   in  some  cases   there   is  an  expectation   from  
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the   part   of   the   audience   for   even   more   direct,   and   somehow   raw  
negotiations   in   the  process  of   the  artist/artwork/venue,   to  experience   the  
mechanism  that  is  involved  in  the  making  of  it.  For  example  a  current  trend  
is   for   national   theatres,   and   operas,   to   offer   to   their   audiences   the  
opportunity   to   attend   rehearsals,   and   therefore   see   how   the   work   is  
developed,   almost   like   showing  unfinished  drafts  of   a   script   to   the   readers  
before   the   final   draft.   Another   example   is   to   be   given   access,   in   National  
Galleries,  to  infrared  reflectography  devices  in  order  to  see  the  hidden  layers  
behind  paintings,  in  order  to  develop  a  unique  insight  into  the  work,  or  feed  
their  curiosity.    
Deconstruction  however,  creates  multiple  and  simultaneous  viewpoints  and  
ways   of   seeing,   and   the   impact   of   this   acceleration   of   opportunities   and  
access  to  processes  is  continuously  re-­wiring  our  worldviews  and  extending  
the  ways   in   which  we   engage  with   theatre   and   performance.   I   don’t   have  
much  space  in  this  study  to  expand  on  the  implications  of  these  trends,  but  I  
can  make   a   reference   to   participatory   performance  where,   in   a   sense   the  
whole   theatre   apparatus   is   exposed,   and   audiences   are   gradually   getting  
used  to  this  and  don’t  register  it  as  unusual.  
This   research   recognises   therefore   that   in   contemporary   participatory  
scenographic   practices,   the   viewer   is   free   to   move   and   assume   different  
viewing  positions,  but  agrees  with  Bleeker  that  this  does  not  constitute  them  
‘free  to  see  as  he  or  she  wishes’  (Bleeker  2008,  p.16).  It  also  acknowledges  
Adam   Alston’s   critique   of   immersive   performance;;   Alston   alerts   us   to   the  
dangers  of  neoliberal  consumerism  and  individualism,  and  the  ways  in  which  
their  narcissistic  effects  that  can  end  up   ‘prohibiting  an  equal  distribution  of  
participatory  opportunity’  (Alston  2013,  p.  137).  This  practice-­research  aims  
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to   contribute   to   the  making   of   participation   that   is   equally   distributed,   and  
point  out  the  habits  that  prohibit  this  equal  distribution.  
I  will  therefore  take  part  in  the  debate  of  the  ‘scenographic  turn’  (Collins  and  
Aronson  2015)  as  outlined  below,  and  will  aim  to  contribute  to  how  as  artists  
we   can   develop   nuanced   ways   in   which   we   can   engage   audiences   in  
distributed  ‘groundless’  participatory  environments.  In  order  to  achieve  this  I  
am  using  frameworks  from  cognitive  science  and  this  research  is  about  this  
‘how’.  
1.2  Contemporary  Scenography:  Expanded,  Invisible,  
Shared,  Layered,  Public,  a  Process,  a  Way  of  Thinking  
Although   the   question:   ‘What   is   scenography?’   has   been   posed   and  
answered   in  several  ways  by  scholars  and  practitioners   in   the   field,   it   feels  
appropriate  in  this  study  to  address  it  again  briefly.  I  am  referring  to  the  word  
‘scenography’   (as   used   in   the   English   language)   as   a   term   and   concept  
situated  in  contemporary  performance  and  theatre  in  the  West.  I  will  also  be  
using   the   term   ‘performance   design’   in   my   writings   because   of   practical  
reasons,  since   the  crossover  of  my  research  with   fields  outside   the   theatre  
spectrum  (i.e.  other  humanities   fields  and   the   field  of  science)   requires   the  
use  of  the  term  ‘theatre  and  performance  design’  which  is  better  understood  
in  these  fields;;  I  will   therefore  switch  between  both  terms  depending  on  the  
context  of  the  writing.      
The  aim  of   this  short   introduction   to  scenography   is   to  glance  briefly  at   the  
past  fifteen  years  with  reference  to  the  aesthetic,  social,  and  political  turns  of  
scenography,   known   currently   as   the   ‘scenographic   turn’   (Collins   and  
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Aronson  2015).  What  I  am  looking  at  in  this  brief  mapping  of  the  recent  past  
is  to  how  does  this  thesis  aim  to  contribute  to  this  scenographic  turn.  
Pamela   Howard   posed   the   question   ‘What   is   Scenography?’   (2002)   at   a  
timely  moment   to  point  out   the   lack  of  recognition  from  the  theatre   industry  
and  consequently  from  the  critics  and  the  audience  towards  the  contribution  
of   designers   in   performance   making.   Howard   goes   on   to   emphasise   the  
immaterial   dynamics   of   the   scenographic   experience   by   stating   that    
‘[s]cenography   is   always   incomplete   until   the   performer   steps   into   the  
playing  space  and  engages  with  the  audience’  (2002,  p.xix).  Arnold  Aronson  
suggests   in   2005   a   definition:   ‘Scenography’   he   argues   ‘carries   a  
connotation   of   an   all-­encompassing   visual-­spatial   construct   as   well   as   the  
process  of  change  and  transformation  that  is  an  inherent  part  of  the  physical  
vocabulary  of  the  stage’  (2005,  p.7).  The  idea  of  scenography  as  a  process  
rather   than   a   product   is   furthered   by   McKinney   who   suggests   that  
scenography   ‘is   a   process   of   thinking  which   oscillates   between   the   visual,  
the   haptic   and   the   cognitive’   (2008,   p.34).   This   thesis   elaborates   on   this  
view,   and   by   having   an   enactive,   embodied,   and   ecological   approach   to  
cognition  investigates  the  bidirectional  understanding  of  the  embodied  brain  
and  ‘stage’.    
The   immaterial   nature   of   creative   processes   and   its   orchestration   for   the  
making   of   a   theatrical   experience   is   a   common   discussion   in   theatre  
scholarship   (e.g.   McAuley   1999)   and   theatre   practice   (Machon   2009).  
McAuley   (1999,   p.12)   argues   that   every   performance   (theatre,   live-­art,  
performance   art)   is   ‘always   in   process’,   never   a   finished   product,   and   so  
‘performance   energy’   the   ‘something   more   that   is   always   present   in   the  
theatre’  is  a  quality  that  exists  in  all  theatre  and  performance  because  of  the  
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relation  between  the  performers  and  the  spectators  (ibid.  p.125).  The  tension  
between  the  real  and  not  real  is  always  present,  and  ‘it  can  be  argued  that  it  
is  precisely  the  dual  presence  of  the  real  and  the  not  real  that  is  constitutive  
of   theatre’   (ibid.   p.127).   This   thesis   argues   that   cognitive   science   can   aid  
scenographers  in  communicating  this  ‘something  more’  in-­between-­ness,  or  
between-­ness   by   using   the   enactivists   ‘Janus-­faced’   approach   of   thinking  
between   material-­immaterial.   This   methodological   tool   will   be   unpacked  
further  in  my  Methodology  section.  
Theories   of   new   materialism   that   argue   about   the   agency   of   matter   and  
address   the   non-­binary   complex   relationships   and   connections   between  
matter,   human,   non-­human,   material,   culture   have   been   used   in  
scenorgraphic   scholarship   by   Donald   (2014,   2016),   McKinney   (2015)   and  
Beer   (2016).   I   will   frame   here   some   of   the   insights   of   new  materialists   by  
referring  to  Barad  (2007)  who  uses  the  notion  of  ‘intra-­action’  to  develop  the  
understanding  of  a  co-­relation  between  differential  patterns  of  mattering  that  
extend  beyond  an  anthropocentric  view  of  meaning-­making.        Also  Bennett  
(2010)   who   argues   that   matter   is   vibrant   ‘an   actant’   and   refers   to   ‘thing  
power’      to  an  extend   that   the  environment  as  a  notion  becomes   irrelevant.  
She   proposes   her   interpretation   of   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   notion   of  
assemblages   as   ‘the   tendency   of   matter   to   conglomerate   or   form  
heterogeneous  groupings’  (Bennett  2010,  p.xvii).  My  thesis  is  consistent  with  
the   enactive   understanding   of   the   mutual   enfolding   and   unfolding   of   the  
environment   and   agent   and   the   idea   of   co-­emergence   (rather   than  
emergence).   What   Bennett   refers   to   as   ‘assemblage’   is   close   to   my  
understanding   of   ‘contraption’   (see   also   p.37   in   this   thesis)   and   post-­
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cognitivist  frameworks  have  helped  me  to  support  this  notion  as  is  outlined  in  
this  thesis.  
Play  theory  (Huizinga  1949;;  Cohen  1993;;  Izzo  1997;;  Caillois  2001)  has  been  
used  in  scenographic  scholarship  by  Bayliss,  Palmer  et  al.  (2009)  and  Popat  
and  Palmer   (2005)   as   a   research   tool   to   establish   a   collaborative   process  
between   performance   and   digital   disciplines   and   to   answer   research  
questions  such  as:  ‘how  a  designed  outcome  can  induce  play  for  participants  
and   how   play   can   be   embraced   within   an   open   system   of   design’   (2009,  
p.2).   These   studies   are   pertinent   to   this   project   alongside   literature   in   the  
cognitive  field  that  refers  to  play  (i.e.  Clark  2015a)    because  play  is  a  notion  
that  exists  in  all  the  Work  Spaces.  I  am  not  however  addressing  it  explicitly  
but   rather   exploring   it   conceptually  within   the  work,  meaning   that   I   am  not  
using  play  as  a  framework  of  analysis  in  this  study  as  it  would  have  taken  up  
valuable  space  and  focus  from  the  social  emphasis  that  was  my  intention  to  
explore  in  my  thesis.      
Since   Howard’s   timely   writings   in   2002   we   have   intentionally   and   willingly  
gone  a   long  way  on  an   international   level   in   the   field,  especially  during   the  
last   decade,   in   establishing   that   scenography   is   not   to   be   perceived   as  
‘being   in   ‘service’   to   the  written  play  and   to   the  director’   but   as   ‘an  artistic  
discipline  in  and  of  itself’  (Lotker  2015,  p.17).  Notions  such  as  ‘environmental  
theatre’  (Schechner  1973)  and  ‘environmental  scenography’  (Aronson  1981)  
have  been  coined  for  the  study  of  audience  and  space  in  performance.  In  his  
Environmental   Theatre   (1973)  Schechner   outlines   six   axioms   in   relation   to  
space,  text,  and  audiences.  In  these  axioms  his  understanding  of  a  theatrical  
event   is   a   set   of   related   transactions,   and   advocates   freeing   the   theatrical  
event  from  the  text  and  from  a  specific  space  and  place,  highlighting  at  the  
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same  time  the   importance  of  all   the  production  elements.  Aronson’s  (1981)  
work   includes   historical   examples   of   productions   that   have   used   found  
environments,  environments   in   the  context  of  happenings,  and   transformed  
spaces.  He  explores  works  in  which  the  formation  of  the  audience  changes  
depending   on   the   space   by   giving   examples   from   the   works   of   Arianne  
Mnouchkine,  Jerzy  Grotowski,  Allan  Kaprow  etc.    
In   2008   Hannah   and   Harsløf   explore   and   invite   other   researchers   to  
generate   new   vocabularies   that   will   reflect   the   current   expanding   theatre  
design  practice  when  ‘design  leaves  the  confines  of  the  stage  and  begins  to  
wander’   (2008,  p.12).  Through   this   invitation   they  address   the  need   for   the  
development  of  critical  and  creative  frameworks  for  exploring  and  developing  
engaging   performances   and   transformative   experiences   for   contemporary  
audiences  beyond  the  theatre  stage.  This  continuous  re-­consideration  of  the  
performance  environment   from  the  1960’s  onwards   invites  researchers  and  
performance   designers   to   investigate   ‘not   only   how   we   create  
scenography/place   but   also   how   the   scenography/place  makes   us’   (Lotker  
2015,  p.13).    
This  growing  shift  on  the  thinking  and  doing  of  scenography   is  reflected  on  
the   change,   in   2007,   of   the   title   of   the   scenographer’s   quadrennial  
international   exhibition   (PQ)   from   The   Prague   Quadrennial   International  
Exhibition   of   Stage   Design   and   Theatre   Architecture   to   the   more   concise    
The  Prague  Quadrennial  of  Performance  Design  and  Space.  The  new   title  
introduces  a  more  assertive  identity  by  omitting  the  explanatory  ‘International  
Exhibition’,  and  inserts  the  broader  terms  ‘Performance  Design’  and  ‘Space’  
which   are   also   inclusive,   denoting   an   openness   to   contributions   (such   as  
installation   and   live-­art,   curation,   broader   ideas   of   hybrid   performance   and  
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architecture   design,   design   concepts,   etc.)   and   opens   the   PQ   ‘to   a  
contemporary  discourse  on  space  and  in  particular  toward  a  transdisciplinary  
engagement  with  performative  space  –  both  inside  and  outside  the  black  box  
and  both  inside  and  outside  the  white  cube’  (Brejzek  2011,  p.8).    
Since   the   beginning   of   this   research   project   in   October   2013,   there   have  
been  a  number  of  publications   that  map  and  stimulate   the  discourse   in   the  
field,  such  as  the  special  issue  On  Scenography  as  part  of  the  Performance  
Research   (Routledge   2013)   journal   edited   by   Sodja   Lotker   and   Richard  
Gough.   The   contributions   in   this   issue   are   from   an   eclectic   performance  
practice   and   scholarly   background,   not   limited   to   designers.   They  
communicate  a  variety  of  approaches  to  scenography  as  a  system,  a  way  of  
thinking  (i.e.   ten  Bosch;;  Nibbelink;;  Mann  &  Scholts),  as  activism  (i.e.  Sigrid  
Merx),   as   ecology   (i.e.   Gavin   Carver),   as   a   dining   experience   (Joshua  
Abrams)  etc.  and  contribute  in  establishing  the  expansion  of  scenography  as  
something  that  ‘can  be  built  or  it  can  be  found  or  it  can  be  a  combination  of  
the  two’  (Lotker  and  Gough  2013).    
Furthermore  a  new   journal   started  being  published   in  2014  The  Routledge  
Journal   of   Theatre   and   Performance   Design   (Routledge)   edited   by   Arnold  
Aronson   and   Jane   Collins.   It   publishes   both   scholarly   and   practice   work,  
including   interviews   with   contemporary   designers,   articles   on   influential  
figures  of   the  recent  past,  and  contributions  on  scenography  which  test   the  
boundaries   of   its   contemporary   expanding   aesthetics.   I   will   also  
acknowledge   here   the   recent   (July   2017)   publication   of   Scenography  
Expanded,  an   Introduction   to  Contemporary  Performance  Design  edited  by  
Joslin  McKinney  and  Scott  Palmer.  Specifically   the  scholarship  on  agency,  
audiences,  materials  is  useful  for  seeing  the  current  thinking  in  the  field,  and  
-­  16  -­  
situating   further  my  work  and  my  contribution   to   the   field  with   this  study;;   in  
particular  in  relation  to  Trimingham’s,  Di  Benedetto’s,  Shearing’s,  Bleeker’s,  
approaches   to   agency,   audiences,   materials,   distribution.   Another  
publication  a  monograph  by  Rachel  Hann  Beyond  Scenography,  Cultures  of  
Performance  Design  that  is  in  press  (2018)  has  been  helpful  for  a  renewed  
understanding  of   contemporary  performance  as  orientation,   and   for   setting  
some   parameters   in   the   terminology   i.e.   between   scenography   and  
scenographic1.  
The  richness  and  high  standard  of  the  growing  scholarly  material  published  
in  the  last  four  years  is  a  pointer  for  acknowledging  that  scenographers  are  
open  to  discourse  and  seek  to  claim,  elevate,  and  promote  the  scenographic  
turn  in  a  systematic  and  rigorous,  creative  and  dynamic  way.  However,  this  
turn   in  scenography  calls   for  more  contributions,  debates  and  provocations  
in  order  for  the  different  areas  to  be  investigated.  As  McKinney  and  Palmer  
write   in   their   introduction   referring   to   expanded   scenography   more   critical  
reflection  and  practice  is  needed  to  ‘examine  not  simply  what  it  is,  but  what  it  
does  and  how  it  does  it’  (McKinney  and  Palmer  2017,  p.19).      
Despite   therefore   the  growing   interest   in   the  study  of  scenography   the   last  
decade,  and  its  understanding  as  an  all-­encompassing  and  expanding  field,  
scholars  and  practitioners  agree   that   both  on  a   critical   theory  and  practice  
level  ‘[d]espite  the  richness  of  what  there  was  to  be  perceived,  the  language  
for   describing   the   spatiality,   visuality   and  materiality   of   performance   is   still  
rather  poor’  (ten  Bosch;;  Nibbelink;;  Mann  &  Scholts  2013,  p.95-­96).  Aronson  
admits  that   ‘[l]ive  theatre,   faced  with  the  unprecedented  challenge  of  digital  
                                                
1  I  would  like  to  take  the  opportunity  to  thank  Rachel  Hann  for  letting  me  read  the  first  chapters  of  the  
book  ahead  of  publication.    
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technologies  that  have  radically  altered  all  notions  of  time  and  space,  is  still  
attempting   to   understand   how   to   function   in   this   new   environment’   (2013,  
p.94).  While  more   recently  and  as  a   response   to   the  above  debate  Rachel  
Hann  argues:  
  If   scenography   is   to   fulfil   a   holistic   potential,   then,   as   with  
dramaturgy  and  choreography  before  it,  I  argue  that  we  require  a  
renewed   critical   articulation   beyond   conventional   and   material  
conceptions  of  design  (Hann,  in  press).  
  
As   outlined   above,   scenography   is   in   itself   a   contemporary   vibrant   notion,  
something   we   constantly   work   towards,   however   difficult   to   communicate  
with   inherited   vocabularies   and   understandings,   hence   the   need   for  
contributions   to   a   renewed   scenographic   vocabulary   and   language.   I   am  
arguing  in  this  thesis  that  4E  cognition  can  contribute  both  to  the  language,  
vocabulary   and   to   the   understanding   of   the   nature   of   contemporary  
scenography   and   scenographic   encounters,   and   that   the   notion   of   the  
scenographic   contraption   imbricated   within   cognitive   theory   can   contribute  
as  a  critical  practice  and   testing  of   scenographic  methods,  processes,  and  
theories.      It   can   contribute   alongside   the   theoretical   discussions,   debates  
and  critical  analysis  of  past  and  present  to  this  ‘renewed  critical  articulation’  
(Hann,  in  press)  of  scenography.  
At  the  heart  of  the  ‘scenographic  turn’  one  of  the  prominent  questions  is  how  
does  scenography  contribute  to  a  complex  live  performing  system  and  how  
does   it   engage   and   affect   audiences   in   contemporary   performance?   This  
research  project  aims   to  engage  on  a  critical  practice   level  with   the  above  
question  and  contribute  to  the  particular  scenographic  language  by  thinking-­
doing-­reflecting   using   cognitive   science   as   an   interpretive   tool,   and   by  
attempting  in  this  way  to  suggest  scenographic  making,  doing,  experiencing,  
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and   discoursing   that   are   beyond   representational   understanding.   This  
research   also   recognises   the   potential   of   scenography   as   an   apt  mediator  
between  performance  theory  and  practice,  science,  and  philosophy.  
McKinney  and  Butterworth  (2009)  have  produced  a  comprehensive  volume  
on   the   evolution   of   scenography   through   the   20th   century,   focusing   on   the  
pioneers.   They   assigned   a   separate   section   on   scenographic   reception  
drawing  from  contemporary  scholarship  in  the  field  of  scenographic  analysis  
up   to   2009   (when   their   work   was   published).   McKinney   (2008;;   2012);;  
McKinney  and  Butterworth   (2009);;  Trimingham   (2002;;  2013);;  Di  Benedetto  
(2010);;  Shearing  (2015);;  Beer  (2016)  address  specifically  the  importance  of  
the   reception   of   contemporary   scenography   in   their   writing   and   practical  
explorations.   This   research   project   aims   to   add   to   that   knowledge   through  
the  development  of  practical  experiments  and  by  applying  frameworks  of  4E  
cognition   and   social   cognition   for   illuminating   further   the  what   and   how   of  
scenographic  participation,  and  making  processes.  
Referring  to  the  recent  literature  I  have  outlined  the  multimodal,  multifaceted,  
and  expanding  nature  of  scenography  as  viewed  by  contemporary  practice  
and  scholarship  in  the  last  five  years.  I  will  go  now  on  to  mapping  the  other  
part  of  the  overarching  question  related  to  the  field  of  4E  cognition.  
1.3  Mapping  Post-­Cognitivism  
The   once   homogenous   framework   of   cognitivism   is   being  
replaced   by   a   multidimensional   analysis   of   cognition   as  
incorporating  our  brains,  bodies  and  environments  (Menary  2010,  
p.462).  
  
The   first   phase   of   cognitive   science,   known   as   cognitivist   or   classical  
computationalism,   understands   human   cognition   based   on   mental  
representations,  and  asserts  that  cognition  similarly  to  a  computer   is  based  
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on   inputs,   processing   functions,   and   outputs   without   taking   into  
consideration   its   embodied,   environmental   and   socially   extended   nature.  
The   second   generation   of   cognitive   science   (post   cognitivist),   develop  
theories   of   cognition,   perception,   and   action   that   avoid   mental  
representations.   Both   branches   (classical   computationalism,   and   4E  
cognition)  call   for  an   interdisciplinary  study  of  cognitive  science   inviting   the  
fields   of   philosophy,   linguistics,   neuroscience,   artificial   intelligence   (AI),  
psychology,   anthropology,   (and   in   some   cases   religion,   art,   and  
performance)   to   contribute   to   the   logic   and   concepts   for   interpreting   the  
empirical  evidence  for  the  understanding  of  cognition.      
There   has   certainly   been   a   leap   in   the   progress   of   grouping   the   various  
theories  branching  out  from  the  two  paths,  the  traditional  cognitivism  and  the  
post-­cognitivist   one.   Mark   Bishop   maps   the   current   landscape   in   a  
comprehensive  and  concise  way:    
The  neo-­classical  paths  (e.g.  GOFAI2);;  connectionism;;  dynamical  
theories  of  mind;;  swarm  intelligence  etc)  that  are  fundamentally  (i)  
dualistic  and   (ii)   essentially   formal  and   representational,   and   the  
more   radical   ‘Embodied,  Embedded,  Ecological,  Enactivist’   -­   the  
so  called  ‘4Es’-­framework  (Bishop  2014,  p.12).  
  
Despite  the  fact  that  these  two  different  approaches  create  two  ‘tidy’  groups  
this  does  not  prohibit  the  exchange  between  core  concepts  of  the  two  areas,  
as  will  be  outlined  at  the  end  of  this  section.  Furthermore,  each  theory  of  the  
4E   cognition   group   contains   ‘logically   independent’   (Ward   and   Stapleton  
2012,  p.90)  claims  on  cognition,  and  the  way  these  claims  are  modelled  and  
developed   is  not  always  a  homogenous  one.  This  non-­homogeneity  and   in  
cases   the   incompatibility  between   fields,  groups,  and  claims,   indicates   that  
                                                
2  GOFAI:  good  old-­fashioned  artificial  intelligence    
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another  type  of  organization  is  in  place  in  order  to  take  the  field  forward,  one  
that   is   more   complex   like   a   rhizome   for   example,   and   it   seems   inevitable  
since  as  Menary  writes  ‘(o)ur  cognitive  lives  are  rich  and  varied’  and  ‘simple  
homogenous   explanations   do   not   do   justice   to   the   complexity   of   cognitive  
phenomena’  (2010,  p.461).    Here  is  where  a  commonality  can  be  found  with  
contemporary   performance   (and   scenography   for   this   specific   study),   in  
terms   of   the   search   for   less   homogenous   critical   understandings   of   its  
complexity.  
According   to   the  4E   (or  4Es)   frameworks  human  cognition   is  enactive  and  
ecological   (Varela,  Thompson,  and  Rosch  1991;;  Thompson  2007;;  di  Paolo  
2005;;   O’Regan   and   Noë   2001),   embodied   (Clark   1997;;   Gallagher   2005),  
embedded   (Clark  1997;;  Hurley  1998),   and   in   some  cases  extended   (Clark  
and  Chalmers  1998);;   it   is  also  understood  as  affective  (Colombetti  2007).   I  
have   included  here  an   initial   representative   literature  of   these   ideas,  based  
on   Ward   and   Stapleton   (2012),   and   will   make   a   reference   to   further  
scholarship   in   relation   to  my  practice   in   the  chapters   to  come.  Below   I  am  
making  a  general  introduction  to  the  wider  principles  of  4E  cognition,  based  
mostly  on  enactivism,  and  embodied  cognition  in  order  to  map  the  territory.  
The  idea  of  an  ‘enactive’  cognitive  science  is  initiated  by  Varela,  Thompson  
and   Rosch   with   their   work   The   Embodied   Mind,   Cognitive   Science   and  
Human   Experience   (1991),   who   find   also   other   points   of   convergence   for  
their   study   such   as   phenomenology,   and   Buddhist   meditative   psychology.  
Enactive   and   embodied   cognition   originate   in   many   ways   from   Humberto  
Maturana’s   pioneering  work   on   ‘autopoiesis’   (self-­production),   which   is   the  
description   of   the   molecular   dynamics,   taking   place   internally   in   a   living  
system.   These   processes   within   the   system   produce   the   system’s  
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components  (self-­produce).  Furthermore  living  systems  exist  in  the  physical  
space,   within   a   world   and   they   are   structurally   coupled   with   their  
environment.  Maturana’s   research  as  he  states   in  1968  opened   in  him   ‘the  
possibility  of  changing  the  question  of  perception  from,  "how  do  I  see  what  is  
there"   to   "what  happens   that   I,   as  a  structure  determined  system,  can  say  
that   there   is  something  there?"’  (Maturana  2002,  p.19).  This   is   important   to  
point   out   in   this   thesis,   in   terms   of   embodied   perception,   as   Maturana’s  
question  rejects  inputs  and  outputs,  by  accepting  that  all   living  systems  are  
structurally   determined;;   therefore   what   happens   ‘in   them   or   to   them,  
happens  determined  in  their  structure’  (Maturana  2002,  p.24).  If  for  example  
an   agent   acts   and   indeed   changes   the   structure   of   the   system,   they   (the  
agent)  are  by  no  means  an  input  because  they  are  not  telling  something  to  
the   living  system  about   itself  or  about   the  environment   this   living  system   is  
in.   Similarly   there   are   no   outputs   as   the   living   system   in   relation   to   its  
medium  does  not  tell  anything  to  the  medium  about  the  external  part  of  the  
system,   they   cannot   enter   the   knowings   of   the   system   with   computations  
and   representations   but   instead   ‘maintain   a   kind   of   adaptively   potent  
equilibrium   that   couples   the   agent   and   the   world   together’   (Clark   1999,  
p.346).  The  system  is  therefore  autonomous  and  it  can  affect,  or  be  affected  
by  another  system,  or  the  environment  but  there  is  no  representation  of  any  
sort,  no   inputs-­outputs,   there   is  rather  enaction.  Likewise  the  scenographer  
cannot   enter   the   knowings   of   the   system   of   the   audience,   but   they   can  
generate  an  adaptive  scenography   that  couples  or  uncouples   the  audience  
and  the  work  for  generating  a  work  of  art.  
The  thesis  of  autopoiesis  was  developed  further  by  Maturana  together  with  
Francisco   Varela,   and   they   conclude   that:   ‘Living   systems   are   cognitive  
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systems,   and   living   as   a   process   is   a   process   of   cognition’   (1980,   p.13).  
When   articulating   their   theory   of   enactivism,   in   their   work   The   Embodied  
Mind,  Cognitive  Science  and  Human  Experience  (1991),  Varela  et  al.  bridge  
continental   thinking   with   scientific   pragmatism,   and   argue   for   a   world  
‘enacted   by   various   histories   of   structural   coupling’   (1991,   p.218).   They  
recognise  that  in  Continental  philosophy  thinkers  such  as  Martin  Heidegger,  
and  Maurice  Merleau-­Ponty  accept  knowledge  as  dependent   ‘on  being  in  a  
world   that   is   inseparable   from   our   bodies,   our   language,   and   our   social  
history-­in  short,   from  our  embodiment’   (ibid.  p.149).  Varela  et  al.  also  point  
out,   agreeing  with  Mark   Johnson,   that   Anglo-­American   analytic   philosophy  
resists  this  notion  of  cognition  as  embodied  (ibid.,  p.149).  On  the  other  hand,  
they  continue,  Continental  discussions  have  not  taken  into  account  cognitive  
science   research   (with   exception,   the   early   work   of   Merleau-­Ponty),   and  
therefore  their  aim  is  on  one  hand  to  bring  this  valuable  empirical  research  
on  human  cognition   into  Continental   thinking,  and  on   the  other  hand  using  
Continental  thinking  to  shake  the  belief  of  the  part  of  cognitive  scientists  who  
insist   on   supporting   that   there   is   an   independent   outside  world.   Since   the  
claims   on   enactivism   in   1991   by   Varela   et   al.,   frameworks   that   suggest   a  
reciprocal   relationship   between   brain,   body,   and  world   (phenomenology   in  
particular)   have   been   recognised   as   valuable   sources   to   be   taken   into  
account  by  4E  cognitive  science  for  the  interpretation  of  empirical  data.  We  
have      ‘a   picture   of   how   the  mind   works   that   fits   remarkably   well   with   the  
descriptions  of  human  existence  to  be  found  in  phenomenology’  (2017)  says  
contemporary  cognitive  philosopher  Julian  Kiverstein.   I  am   taking  on  board  
the   part   of   the   enactivists’   proposition   for   approaching   groundlessness,   in  
which   ‘cognitive   science   and   phenomenology   need   to   be   pursued   in   a  
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complementary  and  mutually  informing  way’  (Thompson  2005,  p.407),  and  I  
will   add   other   frameworks   of   dynamic   systems,   Baysian   brain   (prediction),  
and  Continental  thinking  (deconstruction).  
Thompson  gives   five   core  concepts  of   the  enactive  approach   that   concern  
this  project:    
i)  living  beings  are  autonomous  agents,  meaning  that  they  make  choices  in  a  
world  which  is  not  pre-­specified  but  it  is  enacted  by  the  autonomous  agents’  
coupling  with  the  environment      
ii)   the   nervous   system   is   an   autonomous   system  which   ‘does   not   process  
information  in  the  computationalist  sense,  but  creates  meaning’    
iii)  cognition  is  a  form  of  embodied  action    
iv)   similarly   to   phenomenology   ‘a   cognitive   being’s   world   is   not   a   pre-­
specified,  external  realm,  represented  internally  by  its  brain,  but  a  relational  
domain   enacted   or   brought   forth   by   that   being’s   autonomous   agency   and  
mode  of  coupling  with  the  environment’    
v)  experience   is  central   to   the  understanding  of   the  mind,  and  needs   to  be  
investigated  in  ‘a  careful  phenomenological  manner’  (2005,  p.407).    
One   criticism   regarding   enactivism   is   for   ‘failing   to   acknowledge   the  
important   role   that   the   brain   plays   in   cognition’   (Dewhurst   2016,   p.   24).  
However,   and   this   is   the   reason   why   I   am   expanding   on   enactivism  
throughout   the   study,   it   does   set   the   foundations   for   post-­cognitivism,  
providing   thus   a   framework   that   can   incorporate   many   new   approaches  
relating  to  embodied  and  even  social  cognition  which  interest  this  project.    
Sensorimotor   contingency   theory   (SMCT)  developed  by  O’Regan  and  Noë  
(2001)   is  a   theory   tied   to  enactivism,  since   it  also  conceives   ‘perception  as  
essentially  implicating  capacities  for  skilful  (sic)  activity’  (Ward  and  Stapleton  
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2012,   p.94).   It   suggests   that   perception,   and   specifically   seeing,   is  
fundamentally   related   to   action,   therefore   cognition   is   something   that   a  
person  does   rather   than  something   that  happens   to   them.  SMCT   therefore  
rejects   the   representational   understanding   of   perception   as   an   input   from  
world  to  mind,  where  cognition  is  participating  in  the  processing  of  that  input  
so  as  to  render  it  useful  to  the  subject;;  they  explain  it  in  an  enactive  way,  not  
with  internal  representational  models  but  ‘by  considering  the  environment  as  
its  own  best  representation’  (Maye  and  Engel  2013,  p.424).  Recognising  an  
object   does   not   mean   that   this   object   is   represented   inside   the   head   by  
matching   internally   stored   pictures   or   memories   to   that   object;;   it   rather  
means  ‘to  master  sets  of  sensorimotor  skills  and  possible  actions  that  can  be  
chosen   to   explore   or   utilize   the   object’   (Engel   et   al.   2013,   p.206).   Action-­
oriented  cognition  forms  the   ‘pragmatic  turn’  (Engel  2010)  of  cognition,  and  
recognises   the  architecture   of   cognitive   systems   ‘as   being  highly   dynamic,  
context-­sensitive,   and   captured   best   by   holistic   approaches’   (Engel   2010,  
p.222).  What  was  once  a  concept-­theory,   the  action-­oriented  paradigm  can  
now  be  supported  by  experimental,  practical  evidence  (Engel  et  al.  2013)  to  
the   extent   that   researchers   reword  Descartes’   ‘I   think   therefore   I   am’   as   ‘I  
move  therefore  I  am’  (Garbarini  cited  in  BBC,  2016).  
The  enactivist  theory  therefore  supports  the  continuity  between  life  and  mind  
(Menary  2010,  p.459)  and  helps  us  understand  perception  and  experience  
without  using  a  representational  system,   justifying  conscious  experience  as  
structural   coupling,   and   a   co-­constitution  with   the  world.   For   this   research  
enactive,  embodied,  and  ecological   frameworks  form  the  central  part  of  my  
research   enquiry,   especially   ones   integrating   embodied   cognition,  
phenomenology,   ecological   psychology   (affordances),   and   dynamical  
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systems  theory.  I  will  be  referring  to  these  and  providing  more  information  in  
relation  to  my  practice  in  later  chapters.    
A   theory   I   am   also   drawing   from   (particularly   in   my   third   practice)   is   the  
predictive  processing   (PP)  paradigm   that  accepts  a  mild  computationalism.  
The   brain   in   this   theory   is   perceived   as   a   probabilistic   prediction  machine  
(Friston,  2010;;  Howhy,  2013;;  Clark,  2013b,  2016)  that  is  set  to  minimize  the  
errors  between  what   it   expects   the  world   to  be   like,   and  what   the  world   is  
actually   like,   so   there   is   a   constant   co-­ordination   of   the   inner   and   outer  
worlds  by   real-­time  adjustments.  According   to  Andy  Clark  PP  constitutes  a  
model  of  brain   function   that   is  conceptually   rich,   that  bridges  neuroscience  
and  computational  models,  and  that  is  especially  well  suited  to  the  demands  
of  real-­world,  real-­time  learning  and  action  (2013).  
Finally   I   will   make   a   short   reference   to   recent   scholars   who   assert   that  
computational   cognitive   frameworks   are   not   representational   (Dewhurst  
2016;;   Villalobos   and   Dewhust   2017)   by   proving   that   ‘an   analogy   can   be  
drawn   between   computing  mechanisms   and   autopoietic   systems,   focusing  
on  the  status  of  representations  in  both  kinds  of  system’  (Dewhurst  2016,  p.  
17).   Dewhurst   and   Villalobos   (2017)   argue   that   a   beneficial   combination  
between   enactivism   and   computationalism   is   possible   (ibid.).   This   is  
particularly  useful  for  my  scenographic  contraption  paradigm  because  in  my  
three  performance  experiments   I  am  also   turning   to  computational   theories  
(see  p.55-­59  in  this  thesis),  which  draw  from  model  based  representations  of  
consciousness.   After   enacting   these   computational   input-­output  
architectures   imaginatively   I   came   to   a   similar   understanding   that  
computational  models  entail  many  characteristics  within  their  structure  much  
the  same  as  self-­organising  living  systems.  I  will  expand  on  this  imaginative  
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method  in  the  following  chapter.  
1.4  The  Cognitive  Turn  in  Theatre  and  Performance  
The   need   to   address   the   complexity,   multimodality   and   hybridity   of  
contemporary   theatre   and   performance   by   applying   theories   of   cognitive  
processes   which   are   equally   hybrid   (Blair   and   Cook   2016,   p.9)   is   a  
contemporary  one  and  this  research  is  part  of  the  debate  and  thinking  in  the  
field.    
I  have  attended  and  presented  in  several  symposia  and  conferences  on  the  
intersections  between  theatre,  performance  and  cognition  (see  Appendix  A)  
in   order   to   keep   up   with   current   views,   discussions   and   debates   on   the  
subject.   On   these   occasions   I   have   encountered   a   core   community   of  
researchers,  academics  and  scholars  who  contribute  actively  to  the  field  with  
publications  and  presentations,  but  also  a  growing  and  eclectic  mix  of  early  
career  performance  researchers  who  find  this  a  fruitful  area  of  investigation  
–  especially   the  application  of   the  4E  cognition   frameworks   to  performance  
practice.   Furthermore   during   the   time   of   the   four   years   of   my   research   a  
steadily   growing   volume   of   literature   has   emerged   as   part   of   this   interest,  
and   as   a   result   of   the   international   and   national   (UK)   gatherings   on   the  
subject.    
The   importance   of   the   social   aspect   of   having   these   gatherings   and   the  
benefit  of  the  thought  exchange  that  takes  place  during  the  communities  that  
are  created  during  these  gatherings,  is  outlined  in  the  preface  of  one  of  the  
most   recent   publications  Theatre   and  Cognitive  Neuroscience   (2016):   ‘We  
are  not  presenting  a  simple  collection  of  essays  but  the  result  of  a  series  of  
encounters,  collaborations,  and  mutual   influences  between  research  hailing  
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from   different   geographical   and   disciplinary   contexts’   (Falletti,   Sofia,   and  
Jacono  2016,  p.xiv).    
Empirical  understanding  of   the  embodiment  of  cognition  and   the  exchange  
between  brain,  body  and  world  are  rooted  in  the  language,  the  making  and  
the   experience   of   theatre   and   performance.   Artists   in   the   field   have   been  
aware  of   the  complex  perceptual  paths   that  are   involved   in  communicating  
their  thinking  to  their  audiences.  The  subtle  communication  tactics  of  artists  
of   theatre  and  performance   include   their   bodies  and  breath,   the  materials-­
props,  the  environment,  also  emotions  to  convey  a  narrative  or  to  generate  
an  experience  for   their  audiences.   In  stage  design  or  puppetry  for  example  
artists  and  craftspeople  are  aware  of  using  materials,  such  as  different  types  
of  wood,  fabrics  of  a  variety  of  colours,  textures  etc.  as  an  extension  of  their  
brains,  and  are  aware  by  trade  of  the  interrelation  between  brain,  body,  and  
world.   Artists   develop   with   practice   an   awareness   of   the   impact   that   the  
materials  themselves,  the  crafting  of  these  materials,  and  their  relation  to  the  
surrounding  environments,  have  on  their  audiences’  emotions,  thinking,  and  
meaning  making.  This  coupling  extending  between  the  artist,   the  audience,  
the   materials,   and   the   environment   suggest   that   embodied   understanding  
and   the  ecologically   extended  mind  are  not   new  ways  of   perceiving   in   the  
world   of   theatre   and   performance   art.   This   understanding   is   indeed  
something   that   I   personally   bring   into   this   project   with   my   ‘Know-­How’  
(Nelson  2013),  and  I  hope  that  in  the  future  I  will  be  able  to  contribute  also  to  
the  cognitive  field  with  this  Know-­How.    
The   implications   for  knowledge  of   the  4E  view  of   the  brain  have  generated  
interest  among  theatre  and  performance  scholars  who  recognise  ‘embodied  
cognition   as   one   aspect   of   the   uniqueness   of   theatre   that   must   now   be  
-­  28  -­  
considered  alongside  cultural  and  historical  determinants’  (McConachie  and  
Hart   2006,   p.15).   McConachie   and   Hart   advocate   strongly   for   the   use   of  
cognitive  theories  in  performance,  justifying  their  arguments  for  doing  so  on  
the   falsifiability   of   good   science.   They   argue   about   the   problematic  
approaches  of  researching  spectatorship  in  theatre  and  performance  based  
for  example  on  language  theories,  which  see  the  spectator  ‘as  a  reader’  and  
limit  our  ‘understanding  of  audience  response’  (McConachie  and  Hart  2006,  
p.5).  However  their  view  of  the  importance  of  using  cognitive  theories  based  
on   their   falsifiability   has   been   critiqued   (Shaughnessy   2013;;  Reason   et   al.  
2013;;  May  2015).  Shaughnessy  argues  that  performance  finds  an  interest  in  
cognitive   theories   that   contribute   to   the      ‘‘felt   understanding’   through   the  
interplay   between   visual,   auditory   and   bodily   experience’   (Shaughnessy  
2013,   p.13)   and   not   so   much   in   the   falsifiability   of   the   science.   Reason,  
Reynolds,   Grosbras,   and   Pollick   argue   for   the   need   of   the   inclusion   of   a-­
scientific   perspectives   for   a   ‘truly   mixed-­methodological   ecology’   that   can  
‘challenge   the   absoluteness   of   the   positivism   paradigm   (2013,   p.55).   May  
critiques   the   ‘slightly   imperialist’   (2015,  p.7)  suggestion  of  McConachie  and  
Hart   regarding   the  superiority  of   falsifiable   cognitive  approaches  compared  
to  other   frameworks  applied   to   theatre  and  performance  scholarship.   In  his  
work  he  proposes   that  philosophical   frameworks  can  and  should  contribute  
critically  to  current  cognitive  approaches  of  performance  studies.    
I  am  adopting  a  hybrid  approach  as  I  will  outline  in  my  methodology  section  
using  practice-­research,  and  I  understand  performance  processes  as  hybrid  
and   therefore   find   in   the   action-­oriented   and   ecologically   framed   cognition  
paradigms  a  useful   tool.   I   find   that   theories  of   the   ‘pragmatic   turn’   (Engels  
2010)   of   neuroscience   that   embrace   action-­centred   frameworks   of  
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perception   can   enrich   the   already   empirical   knowledge   of   scenographers.  
Nevertheless   certain   philosophical   theories   should   be   integrated,   or   cross  
checked   in   the   frameworks   in   order   to   keep   track   of   the   logic   behind   the  
claims  made  by  the  cognitive  theories.    
Present-­day   performance   scholars   understand   performances   as   not   one-­
way   delivery   systems   (McConachie   2013)   and   contemporary   scenography  
research   is   in   line   with   this   understanding   (McKinney   2008;;   Di   Benedetto  
2010;;  Trimingham  2013,  etc.).  Di  Benedetto  is  approaching  the  field  from  a  
theoretical   perspective   and   his   case   studies   draw   from   his   personal  
experience   as   a   spectator   of   post-­dramatic   work   focusing   on   the  
scenographic.  By   looking   through   the   lens  of   neurology,   cognitive   science,  
and  phenomenology  Di  Benedetto  argues  that  theatrical  practice  can  benefit  
greatly   from   an   understanding   of   contemporary   neuroscience   discoveries  
e.g.  the  visual  system,  and  goes  on  to  argue  further  the  role  our  senses  play  
in  our   interpretation  of   the  theatrical  event.  He  also  points  out   the  power  of  
theatre   practice   to   affect   human  behaviour   and   its   potential   to   change  our  
ability   to  perceive   the  world   in  a  new  way   (2010),  as  mentioned  before.  Di  
Benedetto’s   own   language   of   how   the   findings   of   cognitive   research   have  
impacted  theatre  spectatorship,  has  been  influential  to  this  thesis.  However,  
I  am  exploring  much  of   this  understanding   through  my  own  practice,  using  
tacit  forms  of  knowledge  and  focusing  on  developing  and  improving  methods  
of  generating,  experiencing,  and  understanding  participatory  scenography.  
Germano   in   Between   Stage,   Brain,   and   Body   (2013)   has   used   cognitive  
science  and  Bleeker’s  relational  approach  to  visuality  in  the  theatre  exploring  
the  embodied  act  of  looking  in  spectatorship.  Her  insights  are  very  valuable,  
however  she  uses  a  limited  spectrum  of  cognitive  theory  focusing  mostly  on  
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Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  conceptual  metaphor  theory  (CMT),  and  because  her  
research  was  published  in  2013  she  misses  the  debate  between  humanities  
and  cognition  that  had  started  at  the  time.    
Melissa   Trimingham’s   writing   (2011;;   2013;;   2017)   and   practice-­research  
employs   mainly   affordances,   distributed   cognition,   and   folk   psychology  
(common  sense)   to  explore  affect,  and   the  social  embeddedness  of  props,  
materials,   and   costume   working   with   autistic   children   in   multisensory  
participatory  environments.  Her  body  of  work   is  of  particular   interest   to   this  
project   in   terms   of   how   these   theories   are   used   for  writing   about   complex  
and  intricate  brain-­world  interactions.  The  emphasis  of  the  research  however  
is  different  to  this  one,  as  her  insights  are  focused  on  Imagining  Autism;;  an  
interdisciplinary  project  developed  to  explore  how  performance  can  facilitate  
communication,  social  interaction,  and  imagination  in  children  with  autism.    
McConachie   (2008;;   2013)   explores   how   cognitive   theories   of   perception,  
(conceptual  blending)  and  the  ecologically  extended  cognition  (affordances)  
can  be  applied  to  spectatorship  processes.  He  points  out  that  performances  
energise   people   to   make   hundreds,   even   thousands,   of   blends   and  
meanings.   Drawing   on   Fauconnier   and   Turner’s   (2002)   term   ‘conceptual  
blending’   he   explains   how   ‘conceptual   integration’   is   a   key   function   of  
attending  a   theatrical   event.  McConachie  places  his   focus  on   the  blending  
that   the   spectator   does   when   seeing   an   actor   on   stage   but   also   on   the  
actor’s   integration   between   them   and   the   character.   McConachie’s   work  
came   at   an   appropriate   time   in   the   scholarly   understanding   of   the   link  
between   cognitive   science  and   spectatorship.  So   far   though,   it   focuses   on  
traditional   theatre   environments   and   practice   and   leaves   out   a   big   part   of  
contemporary  performance  practice,  which  this  research  is  addressing.    
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There  are  a  number  of  other  scholars  who  have  written  on  the  intersection,  
and  who  focus  like  McConachie  mostly  on  acting,  actor  training,  and  the  text.  
‘Conceptual   blending’   theory   is   used   by   Amy   Cook   (2009)   who   poses  
questions   about   the   experience   of   theatre   and   audiences’   perception   also  
with   the   theories   of   embodied   and   embedded   cognition   and   empathy   has  
developed  a  methodology  to  analyse  drama  and  performance  (like  Wooster  
Group’s  Hamlet).  Cook  says  that  ‘an  application  of  blending  theory  to  theatre  
and  performance  confronts   the  complexity  of  a  meaning-­making  event   that  
includes  the  bodies  of  the  participants,  unlike  literature,  for  example,  where  
the   character’s   body   remains   constructed   out   of  words’   (Cook   2013,   p.88-­
89).   I   am   furthering   the   above   argument   by   adding   to   the   ‘bodies   of   the  
participants’   the  space  and  the  objects,  however  I  am  not  using  conceptual  
blending.  Using  cognitive  neuroscience  and  specifically  conceptual  blending,  
compression  and  research  on  empathy,  director  and  performer  Rhonda  Blair  
investigates  the  actor’s  developing  of  a  character  and  also  when  ‘in  partner  
work  with  another  actor’   (2009,  p.93).  Other  key  contributors   in   the   field  of  
actor   processes/training   and   embodiment   are   John   Lutterbie   (2011),   Rick  
Kemp  (2012),  and  Maiya  Murphy  (2016).    
As  the  editor  of  Affective  Performance  and  Cognitive  Science:  Body,  Brain,  
and  Being   (2013),  Shaughnessy  reviews  in  her   introduction  the   literature   in  
the  field.  She  insists  on  the  importance  of  new  ways  with  which  bridges  can  
be  built  to  achieve  a  two-­way  communication  between  art  and  science.  She  
argues,   like   all   the   contributors   in   the   book,   about   ‘the   importance,  
relevance,  and  applications  of  cognitive  science   to   the  equally  multifaceted  
modes   of   theatre   and   performance’   (2013,   p7).   Shaughnessy   makes   a  
critique   on   how   the   complexity   of   both   the   fields   of   cognitive   science   and  
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theatre   do   not   allow   for   straightforward   analogies   between   ‘hard’   science  
and  ‘soft’  performance  and  draws  the  attention  to  scholars  and  practitioners  
to   take   extra   care   to   avoid   false   assumptions   and  misappropriating   (2013,  
p.11).    
Another   book   contribution   in   the   same   series,   Theatre,   Performance   and  
Cognition:   Languages,   Bodies   and   Ecologies   (2016)   edited   by   Blair   and  
Cook,   comes   to   complement   previous   literature   with   a   more   focused  
introduction   in   the   field.   Language,   bodies,   and   ecologies   in   theatre   and  
performance   are   explored   through   embodied,   enactive,   embedded,   and  
ecological  approaches,  rather  than  linguistic  frameworks  for  example.  There  
is   a   section   in   the   book   dedicated   to   interviews   with   performance  
practitioners  outlining  their  way  of  using  notions  such  as  space  and  ecology  
(dreamthinkspeak),   training   and   science   (Catherine   Fitzmaurice),   that  
signifies   an   understanding   of   the   importance   of   practice   in   the   field,   and  
marks   an   area,   the   interest   in   practice-­led   research,   where   this   research  
could  prove  a  useful  addition  to  the  debate.    
Josephine   Machon’s   theory   of   (syn)aesthetics   explores   the   space-­in-­
between   the   performance   work   and   the   audience’s   reflection   on   the   work  
shifting  between  the  sensual  and  intellectual,   the  somatic  and  the  semantic  
(2009,  p.4).  This  work  draws  on  neuroscience  research  on  synaesthesia   to  
describe  the  experiential  nature  of  certain  performance  practices,  where  the  
senses  are  combined.   It   is  an   influential  case   for   this  study   in   terms  of   the  
creation   of   new   vocabularies   and   terminology   to   describe   certain   visceral  
performance  experiences,  and  it  has  been  very  useful  in  informing  my  use  of  
the  term  ‘scenographic  contraptions’  as  I  am  explaining   in  my  methodology  
section  on  p.80.    
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Employing  the  4E  frameworks  as  a  way  of  studying  scenography  adds  to  the  
existing   semiotic   (Birch,   in   McKinney   and   Iball   2011),   phenomenological,  
somatosensory  and  embodied  understanding  (Trimingham  2001;;  McKinney,  
2008;;  Di  Benedetto  2010;;  Hannah   in  McKinney  and  Iball,  2011),  ecological  
(Trimingham   2011;;   Shearing   2014;;   McKinney   2015;;   Beer   2016)   scholarly  
modes  of  analysis,  which  have  been  employed  in  scenographic  research  as  
non-­linear   and   as   post-­anthropocentric   approaches   of   investigating  
scenography.   Furthermore   it   adds   to   other   cognitive   approaches   i.e.  
kinaesthetic  empathy  (McKinney  2012)  and  cognitive  approaches  to  autism  
and  puppetry  using  affordances  and  extended  cognition  (Trimingham  2011;;  
2013),   which   have   been   employed   recently   in   the   field.   Alongside   other  
scholars   in   the   field   (Di  Benedetto   2010)   this   study   suggests   that   present-­
day   findings   in   the  multimodal   cognitive   field   (especially   in   the   field   of   4E  
cognitive   science)   are   currently   appropriate   complementary   methods   for  
approaching  the  multimodal  and  dynamic  spatial  and  somatosensory  nature  
of  scenography.  My  work  is  contributing  to  the  variety  of  creative  strategies,  
methodologies,   and   aesthetics   of   what   scenography   can   become   in   the  
‘scenographic  turn’.  
4E   cognitive   frameworks   have   been   recognized   as   a   valid   approach   for  
analyzing   the   nature   of   theatre   and   performance   by   scholars   (see  
Shaughnessy   2013;;   also   McConachie   and   Hart   2006;;   McConachie   2008;;  
Paavolainen  2009;;  Di  Benedetto  2010;;  Bleeker  &  Germano  2014),  and  I  will  
add   to   these   approaches.   I   am   also   using   the   predictive   processing  
framework,   which   has   not   yet   been   used   for   the   analysis   of   scenographic  
reception   and   operations   through   practice-­research   focusing   on   hybrid,  
participatory  performance  practice.  
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Therefore  consciousness  and  'stage',  affordances,  perception  as  action  and  
prediction,   social   and   encultured   cognition   are   the   wide   key   areas  
investigated   in   this  study.  These  are  explored   in  relation   to   the  experience,  
and   making   processes   of   scenography   in   contemporary   performance  
practice  and  the  shift  from  representational  ways  of  staging  to  more  process  
driven  and  participatory,  corresponding  environments.  
1.5  Situating  the  Work  Within  a  Context  of  Participatory  
Practice  and  Scholarship    
When  talking  about  hybrid  contemporary  performance  culture,   I  refer   to  the  
area  of  theatre  and  performance  which  is   in  dialogue  with  the  processes  of  
contemporary  performance  and   live-­art,  and  has   its  main  characteristic   the  
audience’s   participation   in   some   form.   The   dramatic   shift   from  a   top-­down  
approach  to  a  more  participatory  and  distributed,  horizontal  way  of  exchange  
in   contemporary   theatre  and  performance  has  created  questions   regarding  
the  nature  of   the  audience’s  experience  and  engagement   in  productions  of  
interactive,   ‘one-­to-­one’,   ‘one-­on-­one’,   ‘immersive’   and   other   forms   of  
participatory   theatre   and   performance   such   as   socially   engaged   theatre,  
network  art,  experience  design,  etc.    
In   participatory   art   Bishop   calls   for   the   need   to   find   a   more   ‘nuanced  
language’   for   talking   about   it   (2012,   p.18),   critiquing   the   form   as   ‘artificial  
hells’,  borrowing  a  term  from  André  Breton.  Although  my  work  in  the  last  ten  
years   or   so   has   focused   on   participatory   formats   (interactive,   immersive,  
one-­on-­one)  I  too  share  the  critical  stance  of  Bishop,  and  one  of  the  reasons  
that   triggered   this   project   is   an   attempt   to   contribute   to   the   nuanced  
language,  the  aesthetics,  and  practice  in  the  field.  The  varied  contemporary  
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performance   landscape   of   hybrid,   participatory   performance   culture   is  met  
with   much   excitement   by   the   audience   in   recent   years   (2004-­2018),  
demonstrated   by   the   growing   and   eclectic   production   of   such   work   by  
companies   like   Shunt,   Blast   Theory,   Rimini   Protokoll,   dreamthinkspeak,  
Punchdrunk,  Lundhal  and  Seitl,  etc.  I  am  particularly  interested  in  how,  when  
the  excitement  of  the  novelty  of  an  experience  fades  out,  we  can  still  keep  a  
genuine   relationship  between   the   space  and   the  audience.   I   am   turning   to  
the   findings   of   post-­cognitivist   frameworks   to   help   me   in   designing  
scenographic  making  processes  for  generating  relationships  between  space,  
the  audience,   the  audience  members  between   them,  myself   (as   the  artist–
scenographer)  and  myself  and  the  rest  of  the  artistic  team  involved.  
The  way   spatial   ideas   of   the   brain,  mind,   neurons,   and   embodiment   have  
been   applied   by   other   researchers   and   practitioners   can   be   viewed   in   the  
following  examples:  
In  scenography  Di  Benedetto  argues  in  a  spirited  language,  that:    
[U]nderstanding   deeper   biological   and   neurological   levels   of  
scenographic   processes   are   our   pathway   to   understanding   the  
creation   of   context   and   the   creation   of   the   visible,   spatial   and  
temporal   world;;   if   scenography   takes   up   the   challenges   of  
neurobiology,   the   potential   for   novel   multiverses   are   infinite   (Di  
Benedetto  2013,  p.190).  
  
The   theatre   company  Reckless   Sleepers   have  made   the   link   between   the  
black  box  (theatre  space)  and  the  brain:  they  have  built  the  space  of  a  black  
box   to   use   both   for   rehearsals   and   for   the   performance   of   Schrödinger  
(2011).  When  talking  about  this  scenographic  apparatus,  Wetherell  explains:  
‘…its   rules   produce   emotional   content   without   the   necessity   for   acting  
emotional   content’   (cited   in   Shaughnessy   2013,   p.15).   This   emotional  
content,  which   rises   from   the   rules  of   the   space   is   in   line  with  how   I   have  
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used   schematic   models   of   consciousness,   as   will   be   outlined   in   the   next  
chapter.  However,  I  am  using  architectures  that  relate  to  the  more  distributed  
understanding  of  cognition  than  that  of  Reckless  Sleepers’  ‘black  box’,  which  
underpins   a   more   dualistic   view   of   the   brain,   a   black   box-­mind   that   is  
isolated.    
Antonin  Artaud  envisions  a  holistic  approach  to  theatre  by  making  a  case  in  
The  Theatre  and  its  Double  (1958)  for  an  embodied  relation  between  theatre  
and   audience.   He   talks   about   rediscovering   a   ‘unique   language,   half   way  
between  gesture  and  thought’  (Artaud  1958,  p.89)  and  he  uses  an  example  
of  the  ‘nerves’  foreseeing.  He  adds  that  in  the  theatre  of  his  time,  ‘digestive  
theater’,   the   nerves,   that   is   to   say   ‘a   certain   physiological   sensitivity,   are  
deliberately  left  aside,  abandoned  to  the  individual  anarchy  of  the  spectator’.  
He  proposes  instead  the  ‘theater  of  cruelty’,  which  intends  to  ‘reassert  all  the  
time-­tested   magical   means   of   capturing   the   sensibility’   (1958,   p.125).    
Artaud’s  understanding  of  this  capturing  of  the  sensibility  could  be  related  to  
this  project’s  understanding  of  embodying  cognitive  architectures,  similarly  to  
Wetherell’s  comments  above.  
The  above  practices  and   theoretical  propositions   refer   to   the  exploration  of  
ludic  rules,  the  generation  and  the  emergence  of  embodied  experiences,  the  
engagement  with  neurobiology  and   theories   ‘between  gesture  and   thought’  
in   producing   novel   perceptual   experiences   for   the   audience.   My   focus  
remains   on   non-­representational,   and   embodied,   embedded,   and   enactive  
modes   of   exploration,   with   my   practice   situated   within   current   trends   of  
participatory  performance,  live-­art  and  devising  performance  culture.    
In  immersive  performance  scholarship  Gareth  White  explores  the  aesthetics  
of   audiences’   participation,   treating   audience   participation   as   art   (2013,  
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p.196).   He   is   addressing   audiences’   experience   using   embodied   and  
enactive  cognition  and  affordances:      
Accepting   an   invitation   means   moving   into   a   horizon   of  
participation  where   temporality  and  spatiality  are  reconfigured  as  
affordances  that  press  upon  the  participant,  initiating  and  shaping  
responsive   activity.   We   experience   it   as   an   atmosphere,   and  
perceive  it  according  to  our  mood,  as  much  as  we  understand  it  in  
response  (White  2013,  p.168).    
  
I   am   particularly   focusing   on   the   use   of   affordances   with   ecological   and  
sociocultural  cognitive  frameworks  to  investigate  in  depth  the  understanding  
of   how   spatiality   but   also   social   encounters   and   communication   are  
developed  within  my  proposed  scenographies.  
Participation   as   invitation   is   a   focused   approach,   and   it   forms   a   key  
approach   in   my   practice-­research,   however   with   my   current   thinking   and  
doing  I  aim  to  contribute  to  the  ‘messier’  understanding  of  participation  of  the  
‘palpable  move  away  from  understanding  participation  as  an  invitation  and  a  
response  and  towards  a  recognition  of  participation  as  an  ecology  of  mutual  
doings   and   beings’   (Harpin   and   Nicholson   2017,   p.   14).   Focusing   on  
participatory   scenography   I   aim   to   contribute   with   practice   to   Harpin   and  
Nicholson’s   understanding   where   participation   is   understood   not   ‘as   an  
action   or   activity   but   as   an   assemblage   of   peoples,   objects   and  
environments’   (Harpin  and  Nicholson  2017,  p.12).  My  understanding  of   the  
‘assemblage’  however  looks  more  like  the  ‘contraption’.  The  ‘contraption  as  
participation’   I   am   coining   here,   admits   that   participation   is   not   a   finished  
product,  but  a  work  in  progress,  a  process,  a  shifting  apparatus,  a  network,  a  
bridge,   a   rehearsal,   a   montage,   a   misappropriation,   a   monster.   The  
audience  are   in  the  process  of  decoding  the  complexity,  and  assume  a  co-­
authoring  role,  or  a  sensorimotor  understanding  within  the  scenography.    
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As   this   co-­authorship   has   become   the   norm   in   contemporary   culture,   the  
audience–participants   seek   more   hands-­on   involvement   within   events   i.e.  
attending   works-­in-­progress   and   having   their   say,   sharing   their   personal  
stories   etc.   On   another   level   the   landscape   is   currently   at   an   infantile  
experimental   stage   of   how   we   mediate   ourselves   through   social   media  
platforms   given   the   ease   with   which   an   individual   for   example   can  
manipulate  digital  data.  We  are  therefore  experiencing  I  argue  the  time  of  a  
larger   network-­contraption,   and   a   playground   in   which   individuals  
experiment,   with   various   creative,   ethical,   moral,   and   social   results   or  
consequences  in  the  current  post-­truth  socio-­political  landscape.  
I  am  also   investigating  the   ‘Janus-­faced  audience–participant’,  a  term  I  use  
to   communicate   the   non-­binary   active   and   passive,   agreeing   again   that   it  
makes   ‘no   sense   to  make   sharp   distinctions   between   participation   (active,  
rebellious,  critical)  and  non-­participation  (passive,  receptive,  docile)’  (Harpin  
and  Nicolson  2017,  p.4).    
My   work   is   therefore   situated   in   the   in-­betweens   of   scenographic   and  
participatory   performance   practice,   and   adds   with   4E   cognition   in  
understanding   perception   as   an   interrelational   connection   between   body,  
brain,  and  world.    
I   will   refer   to   a   limited   number   of   representative   scenographic   examples  
below   as   a   reference   to   the   aesthetics   and   cultures   I   am   engaging   with.  
These  examples  relate  to  the  innovative  and  complex  intersections  between  
contemporary  art  and  performance,  with  the  tendency  to  incorporate  material  
(objects/images/bodies/stories)  originating  from  the  audience.  This  tendency  
can   be   traced   to   the   pioneering   ‘happenings’   of   John   Cage   (e.g.  Untitled  
Event,   1952)   and   Allan   Kaprow   (e.g.   Fluids,   1967)   and   this   research  
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project’s   interest   lies   on   the   notion   of   ‘happening’   as   found   in   the  
intersections  between  media  (including  the  use  of  social  media),  space  and  
audience   and   how   these   intersections   impact   on   the   notion   of   the  
‘scenographic  contraption’.          
In  Rimini  Protokoll’s,  Evros  Walk  Water  (2015)  the  audience  re-­create  John  
Cage’s   piece   Water   Walk   (1959)   given   instructions   by   the   pre-­recorded  
voices  of  fifteen  refugee  teenagers  who  have  now  left  the  refugee  camps  in  
Greece,  and  have  found  a  home  in  other  EU  countries.  The  enactment  of  the  
stories  by  the  audience–participants  happened  with  the  use  of  props  related  
to   the   individual   refugees’   stories  of   their   journey   to  Europe,   their   families,  
the  relationship  between  them,  and  the   joys  and  hardships  they  have  been  





In   fine   art   a   characteristic   example   is   the   work   of   Tino   Sehgal   and  
particularly   his   work   at   Palais   de   Tokyo   Carte   Blanche   to   Tino   Sehgal  
(2016),  where  he  created  a  piece  using  his  past  work,  and  also  by   inviting  
other   artists:   Daniel   Buren,  James   Coleman,  Félix   González-­Torres,  Pierre  
Huyghe,   Isabel   Lewis,   and  Philippe   Parreno.   These   artist   share   similar  
methods   of   working   across   media,   artforms   and   science   in   creating   non-­
linear  experiences  for  the  audience.  For  this  piece,  Sehgal  therefore  created  
Figure 10. Evros Walk Water. 
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a  level  of  complexity  that  used  multiple  levels  of  interaction:  his  assemblage  
of   some  of   his   own  previous  works,  which  generated   interactions  between  
the   visitors   of   the   exhibition,   the   space,   and   the   performers   he   had  
orchestrated  in  the  space  (through  the  use  of  speech,  dance,  song),  but  also  
his  own  social  interaction  with  other  artists  whom  he  invited  to  be  part  of  the  
work.    
In   festivals  and  events   there   is  a  growing   tendency  of  using   the  audience–
participants’   social   media,   or   own  material   for   creating   large-­scale   shared  
experiences.  For  example  at  the  Manchester  International  Festival  (MIF)  this  
year  (2017)  the  work  What  is  the  City  but  the  People?  created  by  the  people  
of  Manchester,  based  on  an  idea  by  Jeremy  Deller  and  directed  by  Richard  
Gregory  (Quarantine)  comprised  a  raised  catwalk  on  which  150  people  from  
‘doctors,  to  dog-­walkers,  protesters,  and  preachers’  paraded  their  stories.  
In  popular  culture  for  example  Aphex  Twin’s  recent  live  performance  (2017)  
included   the   scenographic   element   of   the   live   mixing   of   images   from   the  





A   recent   publication  Perform,   Experience,  Relive   (2017)   published   by   The  
Tate  Modern  is  a  collection  of  thoughts  including  writings  from  theatre  artists  
and   thinkers   such   as   Jen  Harvie,  Helen  Paris,   and  Tim  Etchells   and  work  
Figure 11. Aphex Twin, Field 
Day, London, 3rd June 2017 
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that  focuses  on  the  important  role  performance  has  played  in  the  last  decade  
in  almost  all  artistic  forms.  A  reason  behind  this  expansion  of  performance  is  
because  it  makes  a  good  match  with  participatory  formats,  and  this  project  is  
contributing  to  this  shifting  field  addressing  it  through  the  scenographic  turn  
and  the  cognitive  turn.    
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Chapter  2:  Methodology  
2.1  Practice-­research  and  the  Meeting  Point  with  Other  
Modes  of  Analysis  in  the  Field  of  Scenography  
The   cognitive   field   is   cross-­disciplinary   and,   as   already   mentioned,  
contrasting,   considering   it   brings   into   dialogue   or   debate   five   different  
disciplines   –   psychology,   neuroscience,   artificial   intelligence   (AI),  
anthropology  and  philosophy  –  and,  recently,  art,   theatre  and  performance,  
and   religion.   Furthermore   within   the   above   disciplines,   there   are   scholars  
following  the  ‘hard’  science  model  –  the  ‘miner’  –  and  others  more  akin  to  a  
‘soft’  science  model  –   ‘the  traveller’  (Kvale  2006).  The  ‘miner’,   for  example,  
will  support  that  material  is  there  to  be  found  and  recorded  objectively,  while  
the   ‘traveller’  will  argue   that   there   is   ‘not  a   fixed  world  but  one  of  meaning  
created  by  actors  within  it’  (Dunne  et  al.  2005,  p.15).    
When   theatre   and   performance   studies   engage   in   an   interdisciplinary  
knowledge  discourse  with   science,   like   in   the   case  of   the   cognitive   turn   in  
theatre   and   performance,   Blair   and   Cook   stress   that   there   is   no   need   to  
follow  scientific  methodologies  in  performance  research  and  that  ‘a  cognitive  
approach   to   performance   need   not   be   empirical’   (2016,   p.2).   Their  
understanding   is   that   research   may   benefit   from   ‘making   connections  
between  empirical  work  in  one  discipline  and  theoretical  work  in  another,  or  
in  appropriating  the  science  actually  or  metaphorically  for  applications  in  the  
studio’   (ibid.).  However,  Blair  and  Cook  draw  attention   to   the  differences   in  
the   ‘processes  and  perspectives’   (2016,  p.11)  within   the  cognitive   field,   for  
example   of   cognitive   linguists   and   neuroscientists,   and   note   that   using  
science  as  an  igniting  point  can  be  very  rich  both  creatively  and  intellectually  
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for  artists–scholars  but  this  is  ‘different  than  making  a  claim  that  what  we  do  
has  the  efficacy  or  ‘truth’  of  science’  (ibid.  p.11).  They  write  that  performance  
scholars   in  the  field  should  be  ‘mindful  of  being  non-­expert   in  the  sciences’  
(ibid.   p.5)   and   later   say   that   they   need   to   be   cautious   about   their  
‘applications   –   even   appropriations   –   of   the   science   and   honest   about   our  
motives   for   doing   so’   (2016,   p.10).   Their   suggestion   is   to   engage   or  
acknowledge   the   ‘competing   claims’   that   arise   in   the   field   and   keep   up   to  
date   with   the   literature   through   articles   in   recognised   journals   (ibid.).  
Shaughnessy  admits:  ‘As  I  am  not  a  trained  scientist,  much  of  the  discussion  
involves   what   Tim   Etchells   refers   to   in   his   practice   as   creative   borrowing’  
(Shaughnessy   2012,   p.xvii).   Tribble   and  Sutton   add   that   the   aim   is   ‘not   to  
become   an   expert   but   to   gain   a   sense   of   the   shape   and   contours   of   the  
target  discipline’  (2013,  p.31).    
In  his  work  Rethinking  Practice  as  Research  and  the  Cognitive  Turn,  Shaun  
May  emphasises  the  importance  of  being  critical  of  the  cognitive  turn  on  both  
‘empirical   grounds   and   logical   grounds’   (2015,   p.   22).   He   addresses   ‘the  
logic   of   the   cognitive   turn’   (ibid.),   asserting   that   logic   (rehearsed   through  
analytical  philosophy)  needs  to  be  used  when  talking  about  science,  in  order  
to  avoid   fallacies.  He  argues   that   scholars   in   the  cognitive   turn  sometimes  
cite   scientists’   or   philosophers’   conclusions   ‘without   rehearsing   the  
arguments   or   outlining   the   empirical   evidence   that   led   to   the   conclusion’  
(ibid.   p.3).   He   finds   this   problematic,   because   sometimes   scholars   in   the  
cognitive   turn   in  performance  may  take  the  assumptions  or   the  work  of   the  
philosophers  and  scientists  as  a  given,  without  outlining  and  questioning  the  
foundations   that   these   theories   are   based   upon.   This   can   be   problematic  
because  as  May  points  out,   the  conclusions  of  a  philosopher  or  a  scientist  
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whom  one  uses  are   ‘only  as   valid  as   the  premises   they  are   supported  by’  
(ibid.).  May  goes  on  to  give  examples  of  three  of  the  fallacies  that  have  been  
brought   about   in   the   field   because   of   the   lack   of   scrutinising   the   logic   of  
theories,   and   because,   I   add,   of   the   exciting   possibilities,   and   novel  
narratives   that   neuroscience   may   offer,   which   may   temporarily   make   a  
theatre  researcher  not  see  the  fallacy.  He  talks  about  ‘[c]onfusing  correlation  
with   causation’   and   brings   as   a   common   example   cases   where   neuronal  
understandings   have   been   applied   for   marking   aesthetic   value,   whereas  
there   is  no  sufficient   logic   for  doing  so.  He  goes  on   to  point  out   that  some  
researchers   in   the   field   are   ‘inadequately   distinguishing   necessary   from  
sufficient   conditions’   (ibid.   p.22),  which  may   lead   to   stating   the  obvious  by  
wrapping   it   in   ‘neurological   specificity’   (ibid.   p.25).   Finally,   he  points   to   the  
‘homunculus   fallacy’   which   is   the   assumption   that   information   is   stored   in  
different  places   in  one’s  brain  and   is  being   retrieved  and  processed   in  one  
area  when  needed,  like  having  a  little  person  inside  our  heads.  This  theory,  
when  tested  on  philosophical  grounds,   is  paradoxical,  because  the  need  of  
one   homunculus,   if   followed   up   logically,   creates   a   mise   en   abyme   of  
homunculus.  May’s  precautions  have  helped  me  in  being  honest,  I  hope,  on  
my   motives   of   using   cognitive   frameworks   for   practice-­research.   I   have  
therefore   tried   to   engage   with   the   logic   of   the   literature,   and   trace   the  
premises   on   which   the   literature   I   use   lies   upon,   especially   when   in  
foundational   writings   and   notions   related   to   enactive   cognition   (i.e.  
groundlessness,  autonomy,  languaging  etc.).    
I  have  used  my  empirical  skills  as  a  performance  practitioner   to  create  my  
research  questions  and   I  make  sure   to  keep  updated  on   the   literature  and  
debates   in   the  areas  of  cognition   that   I  am  bringing   to   this  work.  However,  
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the  literature  on  its  own  can  be  daunting  and  hard  to  follow,  especially  in  the  
beginning   of   this   project   when   I   had   very   limited   knowledge   of   cognitive  
science.   During   this   project,   reading   about   a   theory   without   having   been  
through  the  foundational  understanding  of  this  theory  by  having  studied  it  in  
the  same  way,  and  during   the  same  stretch  of   time  as   I   have  studied  and  
practiced   theatre   and   performance,   led  my   initial   enthusiasm   to   often   turn  
into   questioning   my   suitability   in   realising   this   project.      Therefore,   the  
literature   on   the   intersections   of   theatre/performance   and   cognition   I   have  
mentioned   above   has   been   very   helpful   in   setting   a   frame   of  my   role   and  
trusting   the   process.   Following   Tribble,   Sutton,   and   May’s   suggestions  
above,  I  have  made  connections  with  experts  in  the  cognitive  science  field  of  
my   interest,   through   conferences   and   personal   communication   (see  
Appendix   A),   in   order   to   be   able   to   ask   direct   questions   in   clarifying   and  
untangling   concepts   in   the   area,   and   to   gain   a   sense   of   the   shape   of   the  
discipline  and  the  foundations  that  the  theories  are  based  upon  as  much  as  I  
can.    
In  November  2015  I  was  invited  to  a  colloquium–workshop  organised  at  The  
School   of   Philosophy,   Psychology   and   Language   Sciences,   University   of  
Edinburgh,   to   contribute   a   presentation   of   my   work   on   scenographic  
contraptions  and  4E  cognition.   I  had   the  chance   to  attend   to  conversations  
and  debates   related   to  enactive  approaches  and  PP.  This  was  particularly  
useful  because  seeing  scholars  from  the  cognitive  field  in  action  gave  me  a  
feel  of  the  type  of  discussions  around  and  put  into  context  many  of  the  ideas  
that   I   was   reading   about   in   books   and   journals.   I   could   then   return   to   the  
cognitive   literature  with   a   refreshed  understanding,   and   to  a  more   focused  
area   of   reading.   This   process   needed   time   and   developed   (and   is   still  
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developing)   like   a   relationship  with   the   field   of   cognition,   including   various  
stages   of   enthusiasm,   doubt,   critique,   excitement,   misunderstandings,  
revisions,  etc.  This  ongoing  dialogue   is  what  has  elucidated   the   insights   in  
this   work;;   because   of   its   empirical   base,   it   does   fit   the   nature   of  
scenography,  and  I  aim  to  continue  this  conversation  with  the  cognitive  field  
beyond  this  present  research.  
This   study   therefore   tries   to   have   a   constant   overview   of   the   two   fields   of  
cognitive   theory   and   performance   research   (scenography)   and   to   find   a  
balance   so   as   not   to   misappropriate   and   to   know   what   and   how   these  
theories   are   contributing   to   scenographic   knowledge.   Following   May’s  
example,   when   using   a   cognitive   theory   for   my   analysis   –in   the   specific  
study  enactive  cognition–,   I  make  sure   to  outline   the   foundations  on  which  
the   enactivists’   claims   are   made.   The   premises   on   which   the   enactive  
arguments  and  conclusions  are  made  are  equally  useful  for  the  conclusions  I  
come   to   and   to   the   context   of   this   study.   The   project’s   intention   to   use  
science  in  order  to  analyse  performance  puts  me  in  the  position  of  ‘mediator  
of   languages’   (Blaikie   2000,   p.52)   between   the   cognitive   field   and  
performance.    
The  overarching  strategy  I  am  following  is  practice  as  research  (PaR),  or  as  
recently   referred   to   practice-­research.  Rachel   Hann   (2015)   has   introduced  
the  term  practice-­research  to  denote  the  moving  away  from  the  micro-­politics  
of  practice  as/though/based/led  and  to  instead  focus  on  the  wider  issues  of  
knowledge  generated  through  practice.  Therefore,  with  performance  practice  
I  bring  insights  to  this  research  inquiry,  and  through  practice  this  study  aims  
to  add  to  knowledge  in  the  field.  In  his  Manifesto  for  Performative  Research  
Haseman   points   out   the   problems   arising   from   the   failure   of   established  
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quantitative  and  qualitative  paradigms   to   ‘meet   the  needs  of   an   increasing  
number   of   practice-­led   researchers’   (2006,   p.98).   Due   to   this   lack   or  
insufficiency   of   an   established   methodology   in   the   field,   practitioner–
researchers  draw  from  various  existing  methodologies  and  devise  their  own.  
Therefore,   practice-­research   is   ‘a   diverse   range   of   cross-­disciplinary  
approaches  that  position  arts  making  as  a  methodological  research  practice’  
(Reason   2012,   p.195).   This   kind   of   research   generates   particular   types   of  
knowledge   in   between   the  making  and   the   reflection  on   the  making  of   the  
work.  As  Smith  and  Dean  put  it:  ‘Coming  to  understand  the  interconnections  
among  visual  forms,  patterns  of  inquiry  and  different  perspectives  offers  the  
possibility   of  making   intuitive   and   intellectual   leaps   towards   the   creation  of  
new  knowledge’  (2009,  p.43).    
As   a   result   this   research   project   does   not   follow   one   specific   practice-­
research  methodological  route  but  borrows  from  different  models,  generates  
its   own  methodological   tools,   and   acknowledges   the   overlapping   areas   on  
the  way.    
As   a   base   I   have   used   Nelson’s   epistemological   model   of   PaR   (Fig.   12),  
where  the  ‘arts  praxis’,  meaning  the  ‘integration  of  theory  into  (professional)  
practice’   (Nelson   2013,   p.80),   is   found   in   the   dynamic   centre   of   the  
reciprocal   process   between   the   different   types   of   knowledge:   the   ‘Know-­
How’,  the  ‘Know-­That’,  and  the  ‘Know-­What’.  
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As  outlined  in  the  introduction  I  am  drawing  from  my  professional  experience  
in   performance   design   (‘Know-­How’)   ranging   from   design   for   theatre,  
performance  and  short  film,  to  events  and  site-­specific  design,  and  my  own  
performance   practice   through   my   company   the   aswespeakproject.   This  
experience   has   contributed   significantly   to   this   study   as   it   enables   me   to  
devise   tacit   methodological   tools   for   investigating   my   research   topic.   For  
example  my  ‘scenographic  contraption’  method  (which  has  been  introduced  
briefly  earlier  and  will  be  developed  throughout  this  thesis)  is  brought  to  the  
centre  of  my  ‘arts  praxis’  and  works  as  a  critical  practice  tool  for  generating  
different   forms  of   participation  between   the  audience  and   the  performance  
Figure 12. PaR model  as suggested by Nelson (2013, p.37) 
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environment;;  these  ways  of  participation  form  the  base  of  the  scenographic  
dramaturgy   of   the   performance   and   produce   insights   regarding   the  
audiences’  experience.  Scenography  is  considered  a  system,  where  I  set  the  
conditions   for   events–experiments,   aiming   to   devise   new   outcomes   and  
concepts   suitable   for   thinking   about   scenography   in   relation   to   post-­
representational,   contemporary   performance   culture   and   participation.   My  
role  as  a  researcher  within  my  practice  experiments  is  that  of  an  ‘empathetic  
observer’  and  a  ‘dialogic  facilitator’  (Blaikie  2000,  p.52),  a  composer  who  is  
relying  on  the  participators’  involvement  for  the  research  to  bear  fruit.  
The   ‘Know-­That’   mode   consists   of   my   scholarly   readings   on   my   area   of  
interest;;  on  the  intersection  between  performance  and  cognitive  science;;  on  
the  role  of  the  audience  in  these  practices;;  and  on  the  overview  of  the  socio-­
political   context   of   the   time   of   the   study.   In   the   ‘Know-­That’   I   am   also  
including   my   attendance   and   presentations   at   targeted   conferences   and  
symposia   (as  mentioned   earlier).   These   have   helped  me   keep   up   to   date  
with  current  debates  and  knowledge  on  the  intersections  between  cognitive  
science,  humanities,  and  art  and  to  discover  and  learn  more  about  subjects  
in  the  field,  such  as  computational  creativity  (these  areas  will  not  be  explored  
in  this  research;;  however  they  inform  my  understanding  of  the  contours  and  
extensions   of   the   cognitive   science   field).   With   my   Know-­That   I   am   also  
tackling  one  of  the  core  propositions  of  the  Cognitive  Futures  in  the  Arts  and  
Humanities  network,  which  aims  to  ‘evolve  new  knowledge  and  practices  for  
the   analysis   of   culture   and   cultural   objects,   through   engagement   with   the  
cognitive  sciences’  (Stony  Brook  University  2016).  In  this  research  I  analyse  
audiences’   interaction  with   the  materials,  space  and  co-­audience  members  
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using   action-­oriented,   agent-­environment   coupling,   social   cognition,   and  
embodied  predictive  processing  cognitive  theories  (4Es).    
Finally,   the   ‘Know-­What’   is  where  I  render  the   ‘tacit’   ‘explicit’   (Nelson  2013,  
p.43).   This   happens   through   observation   and   critical   reflection   on   the  
process,  my  strategies  and  methods  and  the  project  itself  (at  each  stage  of  
the   reflection   process).   In   order   to   facilitate   and   systematise   the   critical  
reflection,   I  have  documented  each  performance  experiment.  For   this   I  am  
drawing   on   McKinney’s   (2008)   methods   of   gathering   and   analysing  
audiences’   responses,   using   post-­show   discussions.   I   agree   with  
McKinney’s   view   that   no   single   method   of   gathering   responses   is  
‘comprehensive’  (McKinney  2008,  p.32)  because  the  multimodal,  ephemeral,  
simultaneous,   and   experiential   nature   of   this   kind   of   research   can   be  
challenging   to   capture.   Likewise   I   have   put   several   methods   in   place   for  
gathering   material   in   each   performance–experiment.   These   include  
questionnaires  given  out   to   the  audience–participants,   the   recording  of   the  
performances   with   different   media   (photography,   video   recordings,   sound  
recording),  and  situating  myself  strategically  during  the  work  for  observing  or  
facilitating.  In  my  last  piece  (Work  Space  III)  I  also  devised  a  way  to  receive  
information   from   the  participants  during   their  experience   in   the  space.  This  
happened   with   the   use   of   Skype,   where   the   audience–participants   talked  
with  a  number  of  people  known  to  me  (my  friends  and  family  members),  who  
had   a   scripted   role   in   asking   them  what   the   performance  was   about.   The  
responses   of   the   audience–participants   were   recorded   and   formed   part   of  
my  data.  A  further  outline  of  the  methods  used  and  a  critique  of  my  approach  
will  be  included  in  each  practice  analysis,  so  I  will  not  expand  on  this  further  
here.    
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I   will   note,   however,   that   the   majority   of   the   audience-­participants   were  
‘savvy’   audience  members  who  were  either   affiliated  with   the  University   of  
Leeds  or  had  an  art  background/knowledge.  Furthermore,  the  material  used  
in   my   analysis   of   the   practice   focuses   mostly   on   content   from   post-­show  
interviews   I   conducted   with   invited   individuals   from   this   specific   pool   of  
people.   The   decision   of   using   ‘savvy   participants’   as   part   of   my   research  
design   follows   the   qualitative   nature   of   the   work,   as,   due   to   their   prior  
knowledge   and/or   experience,   I   was   able   to   draw   from   their   own  
knowledgeable   sense   of   the   work.   I   made   sure   to   include   in   my   pool   of  
participants  individuals  coming  from  both  performance  and  fine  art  because  
of  my  interest  in  the  intersections  of  these  two  fields.  
For   referring   to   my   audiences   I   have   opted   for   the   term   ‘audience-­
participants’.   Machon   attributes   the   use   of   this   name   to   Adrian   Howell   (in  
Machon   2016,   p.38),   and   whilst   my   work   includes   intimate   moments   and  
care   for   the  audience,   it   is  not   in   the  same  way  as   in  Howell’s  work.   I   am  
taking  up  this  name  for  my  audience  in  order  to  accentuate  their  dual,  non-­
binary   role   of   being   both   attendants   and  makers   of   the   work.   For  me   the  
audience  in  my  work  are  more  than  ‘visitors’,  the  term  used  by  Lundahl  and  
Seitl  (in  Machon  2016,  p.38),  or  ‘guest  performers’  according  to  Rotozaza’s  
way   of   referring   to   them   (ibid.).   I   could   identify   with   Coney’s   ‘playing  
audience’   (ibid.)   but   the   work   I   make   focuses   particularly   on   the   social  
participatory  aspect  and  therefore  I  chose  the  word  ‘audience-­participants’.  
Although   I   am   bringing   into   this   research   project   my   professional   design  
practice   experience,   the   format   of   this   research   allows   me   to   employ   an  
experiment-­approach   to   the  work  within   the   ‘safe’  space  of  academia.  This  
does   not   mean   that   the   performance   experiments   I   conduct   are   scientific  
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experiments  and  need  empirical  verification.  The  reason  they  are  referred  to  
as   ‘performance   experiments’   is   similar   to   Hannah’s   methodological  
approach  where  the  outcomes  cannot  be  predicted  and  ‘failure  is  productive’  
and   where,   from   time   to   time,   moments   of   ‘great   beauty,   insight   and  
communality’   emerge   from   the   confusion   (Hannah   2007,   p.143   cited   in  
McKinney  and  Iball  2013,  p.120).  Adding  to  the  above,  I  would  therefore  say  
that  the  three  pieces  of  practice  I  am  using  in  this  study  are  artistic  products;;  
however,   they  are  specifically   targeted   for  answering  my   research,  and   if   I  
were   to   make   work   as   a   commissioned   artist,   for   example,   I   would   have  
taken  a  different  approach  in  the  making,  marketing,  and  presentation  of  the  
work.  
As  outlined,   therefore,  my   investigation   into   the  complex  cognitive  systems  
and   theories   in   relation   to   the  equally  dynamic  nature  of  scenography  calls  
for   my   borrowing   of   different   methodologies   and   the   use   of   several  
methodological  tools.  I  am  combining  Nelson’s  model  with  the  ‘hermeneutic  
interpretative’   spiral   model,   which   is   based   on   a   process   of   renewed  
understanding.  This  model  was  originally  introduced  by  Kurt  Lewin  in  1948.  
Kurt   Lewin   introduced   the   term   ‘action   research’   (AR)   as   an   ‘iterative  
process,   coupling  a  body  of   research  with   its   outcome   through  a   spiralling  
cycle   of   planning,   action,   and   fact   finding’   (Yasuda   2009,   p.125).   Like  
Trimingham  (2002),  I  engage  with  the  model’s  cycle  of  discovery,  planning,  
testing,   evaluating   and   re-­planning   (I   am   doing   this   in   three   cycles)   as   a  
practitioner  within   the  model  rather   than  a  detached  observer  (Trimingham,  
2002,   p.59).   This   hermeneutic   spiral   of   renewed   understanding   is   also  
adopted   in   practice-­research   by   McKinney   (2008),   Shearing   (2015),   and  
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Beer  (2016),  who  have  also  used  an  iterative  approach  of  doing-­thinking  to  
generate  scenographic  knowledge.    
I   will   also   refer   to   ‘enactivism   as   methodology’   here   briefly   in   making   a  
particular   point   about   acknowledging   the   social   context   of   the   research.  
Enactivism  has  been  used   in  psychology  of  mathematics  education  by   ‘the  
Enactive   Research   Group’   (Reid   1996),   which   understands   enactivism   as  
‘both  the  theoretical  framework  and  the  methodology  for  our  research’  (1996,  
p.1).   I   situate   its   usefulness   for   practice-­research,   in   recognising   that   the  
results  produced  from  the  research  are  my  own  constructions,  and  that  I  am  
further   acknowledging   the   social   context   within   which   these   results   were  
created.   In  many  ways   enactivism   shares   roots   with   hermeneutics;;   before  
1986  when  he  started  calling  this  understanding  ‘enactive’,  Varela  was  using  
the  term  ‘the  hermeneutic  approach’  (Thompson  2005,  p.15).  
My   interest   lies   in   my   subject’s   (scenography   research)   interest   in   the  
enactive  ideas  of  the  exchange  between  mind  and  world,  and  particularly  in  
scenography  the  mutual  unfolding  and  enfolding  of  the  world  (scenography)  
and   agent   (audience–participant),   but   also   of   the   enfolding   between   the  
devised  world  (scenography)  and  agent  (the  researcher–deviser).  In  this  way  
I,  as  an  enactivist  researcher  during  my  practice-­research  projects,  am  also  
learning   about   my   work,   entering   a   reciprocal   dialogue   with   cognitive  
science,   and  with  my   audience,   finding   new  ways   of  making   sense   of   the  
research  material   and   questioning   the   outcomes.   I   analyse   the   audiences’  
interaction  with  the  materials,  space  and  co-­audiences  using  action-­oriented  
and  agent-­environment  coupling  cognitive  theories  (4Es),  of  which  I  am  not  
an  expert,  but  about  which   I  have   learned  during   the   research  process,  as  
well   as   learning   about   the   practice   itself.   In   this   way   I   am   developing   a  
-­  54  -­  
perpetual   pursuit   of   knowledge   related   to   the   ‘scene’   (the   ‘stage’   and   the  
‘staging’   of),   and   drawing   from   philosophy   and   science   in   order   to   find  
answers  to  my  questions  regarding  performance  environments,  to  generate  
more  questions,  and  devise   iterations  between  the  practical  experiments.   It  
is   a   process   of   both   finding   out   and   learning,   but   also   of   learning   how   to  
learn,  creating  new  researcher  roles  for  myself  by  going  through  this  iterative  
process  and  by  reflecting  on  the  process.  I  have  therefore  named  each  node  
of   my   learning-­doing-­thinking   iteration   as   follows:   the   Ignorant  
Scenographer,   the   Janus-­faced   Scenographer,   and   the   Predictive  
Scenographer   (Fig.   13   below),   and   I   outline   these   roles   in   the   following  
section.    
This   iterative   process   poses   the   problem   of   when   the   research   ends,   and  
when  does  a  PhD  end?  A  comforting  answer   to   this  question  came  for  me  
from  a  workshop  on  practice-­research   I  attended   in  June  2017,  which  was  
led   by   Roberta   Mock,   who   said   that   ‘PhDs   are   never   finished.   They   are  
stopped  at  the  least  damaging  stage’  (2017).  
  




The  above  model  suggests  the  three  different  performance  experiments  (WS  
I,  WS   II,   and  WS   III)   as   labyrinths.  This   labyrinth   centre  of   each   'cognitive  
scenography'  (a  term  I  will  elaborate  on  later  in  this  thesis)  is  not  an  end  but  
sprouts  other   labyrinths  available   to  other   researchers  or  practitioners  who  
would  like  to  navigate  these.  If  we  take  that  practice-­research  develops  ‘in  a  
way   that   is   not   rule-­bound   activity,   but   a   theoretical   process   continually  
exploring  and  engaging’  (Malague  2009,  p.205),  then  the  practice  generated  
for   this   thesis   will   continue   to   generate   insights,   debates,   and   methods  
beyond  the  end  of  this  project.  
Figure 13. My practice-research iterations 
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I  have  developed  pieces  of  practice,  which  follow  a  trajectory  (spiral)  line  of  
inquiry.   My   enactive   ecology   and   line   of   enquiry   focus   on   the   non-­binary  
understanding   between   material   (i.e.   objects,   materials,   bodies)   and  
immaterial  (i.e.  space,  audience’s  experience,  feelings,  interaction,  audience  
relations)  qualities  of  scenography,  using  frameworks  from  4E  cognition  and  
predictive   processing   related   to   the   social.   The  practice   experiments  Work  
Space   I,  Work   Space   II,   and  Work   Space   III   are   dynamic   scenographic  
environments,   which   generate   original   insights   in   answering   my   research  
questions,   or   expand   insights   generated   by   other   researchers   in  
scenography   as   mentioned   earlier   (Trimingham,   McKinney,   Di   Benedetto,  
Hannah,  Lotker,  Irwin,  Hann,  Shearing,  etc.).    
In   terms   of   researching   audiences,   entering   someone’s   cognitive   state   for  
the  sake  of  analysis  is  an  impossible  task.  However,  the  study  of  what  it  is  to  
be  human  can  be  a  good  entry  point  not  into  someone’s  state  of  cognising,  
but  into  the  ‘how’  of  the  workings  of  cognition/cognising.  I  mention  this  so  as  
to  avoid  any  universalisms.  In  considering  the  importance  of  past  experience  
in  cognition,  this  type  of  practice-­research  may  have  to  start  asking  what   is  
also   the   Know-­How   of   the   audience–participants.   As   this   is   also   an  
impossible   task   due   to   the   difference   in   the   Know-­How   of   each   audience,  
what  is  used  as  a  methodological  tool   in  this  research  as  the  Know-­How  of  
the  audience–participants  is  an  enactive  view  of  ‘common  sense’:  
Indeed,  if  we  wish  to  recover  common  sense,  then  we  must  
invert  the  representationist  attitude  by  treating  context-­dependent  
know-­how   not   as   a   residual   artifact   that   can   be   progressively  
eliminated  by  the  discovery  of  more  sophisticated  rules  but  as,  in  
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How  this   is  approached   in   this  research   is  with   the  use   in   the  studio  of   the  
metaphorical   appropriation   of   cognitive   theories   related   to   consciousness  
and  the  generation  of  ‘scenographic  contraptions’,  which  embody,  as  will  be  
explained  later  in  this  work,  consciousness,  and    creative  cognition.    
2.2  Methodological  Tools:    
2.2.1  Scenography  in  the  flesh3:  a  poetic  approach  of  fleshing  out  
scientific  metaphors  for  generating  critical  embodied  
scenographic  practice    
 
Understanding   consciousness   is   a   real   key,   I   think,   both   to      
understanding   the   universe   and   to   understanding   ourselves.   It  
may  just  take  the  right  crazy  idea  (Chalmers  2014,  18:29).  
  
One  of  my  entry  points  for  this  practice-­research,  as  mentioned  earlier,  is  the  
observation  of  the  analogies  between  the  ‘making’  of  our  worldviews  and  the  
‘making’  of   the  stage.  The  worldview   I  am  borrowing   from   imaginatively   for  
entering  this  making  investigation  is  consciousness  as  a  process  ‘explained’  
(Dennett  1991)   in   recent   theories  arising   ‘from  certain  arrangements   in   the  
material  order  of   the  brain’  (Edelman  and  Tononi  2000,  p.219).  Below  I  will  
further  outline  the  rationale  of  this  line  of  thought.  My  interest  lies  in  the  way  
science  uses  metaphors  as  ‘tools  of  thought’    (Dennett  1991,  p.455)  and  as  
a  way  to  ‘organize  existing  evidence’  (Baars  1998,  p.59).  It  makes  a  hands-­
on  link  through  practice  with  how  scenography  may  use  metaphors  as  tools  
of   thinking-­doing  and  as  a  way  to  organise  spatially   its  communication  with  
the  audience.  
Starting   from  Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  Conceptual  Metaphor  Theory   (CMT)   in  
combination  with   the  work   of  Raymond  Gibbs   outlined   below   I  will   explain  
                                                
3
 Following the title Philosophy in the Flesh (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
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my   use   of   scientific   metaphors   as   part   of   my   methodology   for   creating  
participatory  performance  environments.  Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  theories  have  
been  challenged  by  scholars  in  the  cognitive  field  who  argue  that  CMT  ‘has  
a  rather  limited  view  of  the  body’  (Tribble  and  Sutton  2013,  p.31),  because  it  
is  weighted  towards  the  linguistic  tradition.  
Lakoff  and  Johnson  argue  that  ‘[a]bstract  concepts  are  largely  metaphorical’  
(1999,   p.3)   and   because   they   are   mostly   metaphorical   this   means   that  
‘answers   to  philosophical  questions  have  always  been,  and  always  will  be,  
mostly  metaphorical’   (ibid.   p.7).   In   relation   to   the   above,   one   can   say   that  
metaphors  can  be  seen  as  a   rhetorical   tool;;   for  example,  when  wanting   to  
make   a   hypothetical   argument   we   use   the   metaphor   ‘as   if’.   Metaphor   is  
further  connected  with  the  theatre’s  ‘as  if’,  not  so  much  as  a  rhetorical  tool,  
but  as  a  creative   tool,  one   that   theatre  artists  use   to  engage  and   transport  
their   audiences   both   mentally   but   also   in   a   sensorimotor   way.   I   will   use  
Lakoff   and   Johnson’s   (1999)   understanding   together   with   Gibb’s   (2006)  
experiments  on  how  humans  embody  metaphors  in  order  to  corroborate  on  
this   sensorimotor   and   felt   understanding   of  metaphors.  Before   doing   this   I  
will  outline  the  metaphors  I  am  fleshing  out  in  my  Work  Spaces.    
During   his   talk  The  hard   problem  of   consciousness  at  TED2014,   cognitive  
philosopher   David   Chalmers   refers   to   consciousness   as   a   fundamental  
(similar  to  time,  space,  etc.)  and  calls  for  ‘it’  to  be  approached  as  a  scientific  
phenomenon  where  we  can  find  the  fundamental  laws  that  govern  it  (2014).  
A  number  of  neuroscientists  and  philosophers  of  cognition  based  on  imaging  
studies   and  other   cognitive   empirical   evidence  have  outlined   their   abstract  
understanding   of   consciousness   using  metaphors   to   explain   their   theories.  
The   metaphors   I   am   fleshing   out   in   my   practice-­research   are   related   to  
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current   connectionist   theories   which   try   to   explain   consciousness   by  
asserting  that  it  has  an  integrative  function,  what  Varela  and  colleagues  call  
the  ‘brainweb’  (Varela  et  al.  2001).  They  are  as  follows:  
A.  Global  workspace  theory  
The  global  workspace  theory  (GWT)  (Baars  1988)  is  a  cognitive  architecture  
using   the   metaphor   of   a   particular   view   of   a   theatre.   In   this   theatre   of  
consciousness,   there   is   an   actor   on   a   central   stage,   while   the   backstage  
crew   of   specialists   and   the   audience   who   are   in   the   dark   have   access   to  
what  is  happening  on  the  central  stage  and  are  allowed  to  enter  the  ‘central  
spotlight’  space  of  the  actor  and  add  or  contribute  to  what  the  main  actor  is  
saying  or  doing.  In  this  way  an  ongoing  stream  of  consciousness  is  created.    
B.  Multiple  drafts  theory  
Daniel  Dennett   ‘explains’   consciousness   (1991)   using   two  metaphors.   The  
first   is  the  ‘multiple  drafts  model’,  which  explains  consciousness  as  multiple  
drafts   of   a   narrative   ‘at   various   stages   of   editing   in   various   places   in   the  
brain’   (Dennett  1991,  p.113).  This   theory  rejects   the  view  that   there   is   ‘one  
narrative’,  one  place  where  it  all  comes  together.  He  then  uses  an  additional  
metaphor  of   ‘fame   in   the  brain’   (1996),   suggesting   that   consciousness  can  
be  better  explained  by  the  notion  of  fame  rather  than  a  draft,  which  suggests  
a   ‘thing’.   Fame   is   ephemeral,   and   it   is   not   a   thing   but   a   condition,   which  
prioritises   exposure   depending   on   the   importance   of   the   reason   behind  
fame.   Dennett   goes   even   further   with   his   ‘fame   in   the   brain’   example   by  
using  yet  another  metaphor:  that  of  clout  (2001,  p.224).  
C.  The  dynamic  core  and  integration  of  information  (Φ)    
A  dynamic  core  example  of   consciousness   is  also  described  as  a  process  
rather   than   a   thing.   A   ‘dynamic   core’   refers   to   a   ‘spatially   distributed’   and  
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‘changing   in   composition’   process,   which   is   not   localised   in   one   place  
(Edelman   and   Tononi   2000,   p.144).   Edelman   and   Tononi   take   a   different  
stance   to   Baars’   example   of   a   small   stage   with   a   large   audience   of  
specialists  and  suggest  the  metaphor  of  ‘a  riotous  parliament  trying  to  make  
decisions’  (2000,  p.  245).    
Another   current   view   largely   initiated   by   neuroscientist/psychiatrist   Tononi  
(2012)   is   that   ‘wherever   there's   information   processing,   there's  
consciousness’  (Tononi  quoted  in  Chalmers  2014,  13:08).  This   idea  relates  
to   panpsychism   and   understands   all   systems   that   process   information  
(animate  or  inanimate)  to  have  a  certain  amount  of  consciousness.      
D.  The  free-­energy  principle  and  predictive  processing    
These  are  two  frameworks  used  together.  The  first  is  a  theory  that  helps  us  
understand   the  self-­organisation  of   the   living.   It   accepts   that   ‘the  statistical  
model   entailed   by   each   agent   includes   a   model   of   itself   as   part   of   that  
environment’   (Friston   2011)   and   helps   in   the   understanding   of   the   circular  
causality  of  an  embodied  scenographic  system  (exemplified   in  Work  Space  
III  in  particular).    
Predictive  processing  (Clark  2013b)  draws  from  the  computational  idea  that  
perception   is   prediction.   What   is   particularly   useful   for   my   contraption  
generation   from  this   theory   is   the   idea-­metaphor  of   ‘prediction  error’,  which  
drives  the  contraption  system  forward.  
How   might   the   metaphors   of   science   be   employed   in   creating   dynamic,  
participatory  scenographies?  And  why?  
In   order   to   answer   my   research   question   the   above   outlined   metaphor-­  
theories  are  for  me  a  starting  point  as  I  find  in  these  concepts  the  metaphors  
that   provide   a   playful   range   of   stage  material.   As   seen   earlier,   Thompson  
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suggests   that   ‘the   nervous   system   is   an   autonomous   system’   and   that   it  
‘does   not   process   information   in   the   computational   sense,   but   creates  
meaning’   (Thompson   2005,   p.407)   in   conversation   with   the   environment.  
Performance  scholar  Isis  Germano,  based  on  Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  theories  
of  embodiment,  refers  to  ‘  “meaning”  as  something  that  has  dimension  that  is  
physical,   sensual   and   aesthetic’   (2013,   p.41).   Cognitive   psychologist  
Raymond   Gibbs,   based   on   a   series   of   experiments   led   by   him   and   his  
colleagues,  adds  to  Lakoff  and  Johnson’s  ideas  that  the  imaginative  way  we  
understand  metaphors   is   contained   by   our   felt   experience   so  we   ‘recreate  
what   it  must  be   like   to  engage   in  similar  actions’   (Gibbs  2006,  p.438).  This  
sensorimotor   and   felt   understanding   of   ‘imagining   of  metaphorical   actions’  
applies  to  all  actions  in  metaphors,  even  physically  impossible  ones  (ibid.  p.  
444).  This  is  because  metaphors  have  a  ‘feel’   to  them  due  to  people’s  tacit  
understanding  ‘of  their  full-­bodied  meaning’  (ibid.  p.448).    
Therefore   with   this   methodological   tool   I   am   entering   an   imaginative  
dialogue  with  the  scientists-­inventors  who  came  up  with  these  metaphors,  or  
as  Gibbs  would  say  my  ‘metaphor  understanding’  allows  me  ‘to  imaginatively  
project’  myself   ‘into   other   people’s  minds   and  worlds’   (Gibbs   2006,   p.455;;  
Lakoff  and  Johnson  1980)  –   in   this  specific  case,   the  minds  and  worlds  of  
Baars,  Dennett,  Edelman,  Tononi,  Friston,  and  Clark  (and  in  other  cases  the  
metaphorical,  abstract  worlds  of  playwrights,  writers,  artists,  philosophers,  AI  
systems,  etc.).    
I   am   situating   this   dialogue   between   scientific   metaphorical   language,  
performance   space,   and   myself   (using   my   Know-­How);;   I   am   therefore  
embodying   these   world-­metaphors,   or   rather   en-­spacing   them,   in   an  
imaginative,   poetical   way,   in   order   to   create   the   basis   for   meaning.   My  
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collaborators,  and  later  the  audience  who  come  to  see  the  work,  will  in  turn  
engage   with   understanding   the   consciousness,   ‘brainweb’,   and   other  
metaphors   I  offer   them,  and   imaginatively  project   themselves   into  my  mind  
and  world,  bringing  forth  their  own  world  and  meaning.  This  understanding,  if  
we   take  what  Gibbs  says  about  metaphors,   is  not  only   intellectual  but  also  
sensorimotor.  
From   the  above   I   am  making   clear   that  my   intentions   are   not   to   enter   the  
debate  of  how  consciousness  is  explained,  and  I  agree  with  Fodor  who  says  
in  regards  to  ‘the  ultimate  metaphysical  mysteries;;  don’t  bet  on  anybody  ever  
solving  it’  (Fodor  1998,  p.  83).  My  aim  is  to  rather  ‘engage  with  the  minds’  of  
some  prominent   figures  of   this  contemporary  science  debate  and  generate  
an   embodied   (sensorimotor),   spatial,   poetic   dialogue   with   their   argument-­
metaphors.    
Likewise   for   my   investigation,   another   researcher   in   the   field   has   used  
cognitive   neuroscience   models   of   consciousness   as   a   starting   point   for  
investigating   performance4.   Blair   refers   to   connectionist   theories   such   as  
Edelman  and  Tononi’s  theory  of  the  dynamic  core  (2000)  and  goes  on  to  say  
that  what   these   theories  have   in   common   is   that   they  define  some  kind  of  
imagination  (Blair  2008,  p.19)  and  that   there   is  production  of  meaning  from  
‘the  spatial  arrangement  of   the  connectionist  architecture  and   the   temporal  
vicissitudes  of  the  activation  rules’  (ibid.  p.20).  Blair  writes  that  although  they  
seemed  like  a  good  entry  point,  these  theories  ‘failed  to  account  sufficiently  
                                                
4  This  is  something  I  came  across  after  having  made  the  connection  myself,  after  submitting  my  PhD  
proposal,  and  I  find  it  enhances  the  strength  of  this  idea  and  the  common  and  synchronized  
approach  to  performance  research.  
-­  63  -­  
for  the  complexity  of  human  response  and  of  our  biological  processes’  (ibid.  
p.19).      
However,  from  a  scenographer’s  point  of  view  and  as  a  performance-­making  
strategy   of   meaning-­making,   and   in   orchestrating   audiences,   these  
architectures  have  offered  me  a  valuable  basis  to  work  from  in  devising  and  
orchestrating   dynamic   scenographic   spaces,   where   power   is   distributed  
between   this   connectionist   architecture,   and   where   the   artistic   result   does  
not  ‘make  pronouncements’  (Eco  1989,  p.142).    
On   the   other   hand,   I   agree   with   Blair   that   these   architectures   are   not  
sufficient  for  a  deeper  understanding  when  researching  the  complexity  of  the  
relations   between   performance   and   audience,   as   these   theories   of  
consciousness  and  perception  provide  only  the  shell,  the  form,  and  therefore  
other   embodied   and   ecological   theories   are   of   help.   However,   the   spatial  
architectures   that   these   connectionist   theories   provide,   when   en-­spaced,  
produce  environments,  where  the  artist  does  not  pronounce  a  central  ‘stage’  
or   point,   and   where   there   is   not   a   stable   outside   world,   but   a   negotiated  
world  between  the  parts  of  the  environment,  the  bodies  of  the  audience,  and  
the  generation  of  various  emotions  and  feelings.  
What  I  am  suggesting  is  a  ‘scenography  in  the  flesh’:  similarly  to  Lakoff  and  
Johnson’s   understanding   of   the   importance   of   metaphor   in   language   and  
how  embodied  these  metaphors  are,  I  am  transferring  on  a  one-­to-­one  scale  
these   cognitive   dynamic   architectures   that   indicate   a   constant   process   of  
becoming.  As   these   ideas   (the   connectionist  metaphors   of   consciousness)  
are   intimately   tied   to   current   thinkers   who   have   an   impact   on   the   current  
understanding   of   how   consciousness   arises   or   ‘how   matter   becomes  
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imagination’   (Edelman   and   Tononi   2000),   they   entail   some   of   the   most  
formative  ideas  of  our  current  worldviews.    
These   ideas   are   also   structural.   What   I   am   doing   as   a   scenographer  
therefore   is   entering   into   a   ‘hands-­on’   aesthetic,   poetic,   embodied,   and  
ecological  dialogue  with   this  scientific   thinking,  which   is   reflected   in  current  
proposed  models   of   consciousness  and  perception.  These  models   are   not  
necessarily   representational   to   the   extent   of   accepting   the   homunculus  
fallacy,  but  are  schematic  and  structural   in  a  sense  that  they  ‘can  be  either  
mathematical/logical   or   verbal/conceptual’   (Seth   et   al.   2005).   My  
‘scenography  in  the  flesh’  paradigm  fleshes  out  these  metaphors  in  space  as  
a   creative   tool   for   telling   stories   about   the   world/the   self,   and   collective  
meaning-­making.   Edelman   and   Tononi,   for   example,   provide   their   view   of  
how  matter  becomes  imagination  using  their  theory  of  the  dynamic  core  (see  
p.59);;  I,  in  turn,  interpret  this  dynamical  core  and  test  it  through  an  ecological  
organisational   pattern.   This   organisational   pattern   creates   room   for   the  
audience  to  use  their  bodies,  their  common  sense,  their  emotions,  and  their  
feelings  to  navigate  the  scenographic  environment.  These  theories  help  me  
engage  with  abstract   thought  and  metaphorical   understanding  such  as   the  
‘invisible   but   decisive’   nature   (Lotker   2015,   p.13)   of   scenography   or   the  
‘nuanced  language’  (Bishop  2012)  of  contemporary  participatory  art  in  trying  
to   explore   them   through   embodied   practice.   How   this   is   done   will   be  
understood,   I   hope,   while   reading   this   thesis,   and   after   watching   the  
documentation.  
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2.2.2  The  ignorant,  the  Janus-­faced  and  the  predictive  
scenographer  
  
A.  The  ignorant  scenographer  
This  methodological  tool  was  developed  during  WS  I,  and  was  later  used  in  
the  other  Work  Spaces.    
Jacques  Rancière  writes  about   the   story  of   how  Joseph  Jacotot,   a  French  
schoolteacher,   tried   teaching   French   to   Flemish   students   without   knowing  
any   Flemish   himself   by   using   a   book   on   the   well-­known   story   of   the  
adventures  of  Telemachus.  The  students  had  both  versions  of  the  same  text  
in  Flemish  (their  mother  tongue)  and  in  French  (the  language  they  wanted  to  
learn)   and   through   comparison   and   repetition   of   the   two   scripts   they  
managed   to   succeed   in   their   language   learning   and   find   common   ground  
with  their  tutor.  After  this  experience  Jacotot  had  the  insight  that  ‘(b)y  leaving  
his  intelligence  out  of  the  picture,  he  had  allowed  the  students’  intelligence  to  
grapple  with  that  of  the  book’  (Rancière  1991,  p.13).    
In   the  Work  Spaces   I   assumed   the  position  of   the   ‘ignorant   scenographer’  
and   have   devised   a   strategy   that   is   the   reverse   of   Jacotot’s   because   the  
common   ground   I   am   establishing   with   the   audience–participants   is  
‘groundless’.  It  is  not  based  on  a  common  story  or  script,  like  the  one  of  the  
adventures  of  Telemachus  in  Rancière’s  example  of  Jacotot,  but  on  the  tacit  
dynamics   unfolding   between   the   audience–participants’   vocal   and   making  
skills,   and   their   haptic   understanding   of   the   structural   properties   of   the  
material-­immaterial   environment   and   what   this   affords.  My   role   is  more   of  
that  of   the   (willingly)   ignorant  scenographer,  because   I  know   the   rules   (the  
design).  However,  I  don’t  know  the  story;;  this  will  come  from  the  audience–
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participants.  
Gareth  White  argues  that   the  example  of   the  pedagogue,  which   is  used  by  
Rancière  (White  2013,  p.22)   in  comparison  to  contemporary  artists   is  weak  
because,   as   he   understands,   contemporary   artists   are   not   interested   in  
communicating  a  specific  manifesto  or  thesis  to  their  audiences  as  Rancière  
suggests.   I  agree  with  White’s  argument  and,  as   I  have  explained  above,   I  
have   replaced   the   ‘manifesto’   to   which   White   is   referring   with  
‘groundlessness’.   I   find   that   the   ‘ignorant   schoolmaster’s’   (Rancière   1991)  
position   fits  with  what   I   am   doing   as   a   practitioner,   not   because   I  want   to  
teach  the  audience  a  specific  subject,  but  because  the  example  of  Jacotot’s  
language  is  a  very  apt  one  to  describe  what  I  am  doing,  following  up  from  my  
analysis   of   the   poetic   fleshing   out   of  metaphorical   language  as   outlined   in  
the  ‘scenography  in  the  flesh’.  
What   Rancière’s   example   brings   forth,   which   is   in   line   with   my   enactive  
understanding  of  a  groundless  scenography  is  the  view  that  common  sense  
is  employed  when  one  needs  to  understand  the  world.    
Common  sense   is  none  other   than  our  bodily  and  social  history,  
then   the   inevitable   conclusion   is   that   knower   and   known,   mind  
and   world,   stand   in   relation   to   each   other   through   mutual  
specification   or   dependent   coorigination   (Varela   et   al.   1991,  
p.150).    
  
Therefore   in   the  Work  Spaces   this   idea  of  grappling   is   the  use  of  common  
sense   to   establish   common   ground,   and   like   the   enactivist   understanding,  
the   meaning   is   co-­discovered   between   the   ‘scenographer’   and   the  
‘audience–participants’.    
Finally,   I   would   like   to   add   that   in   the   case   of   an   artist–creator,   the  
assumption   of   ignorance   is   not   only   a   pretence,   but   a   reality,   as   art   critic  
Harold  Rosenberg  observes:  ‘[n]o  matter  how  cultivated  he  is,  every  creator  
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is   in   some   degree   a   naïf,   a   primitive,   and   relies   on   his   particular   gift   of  
ignorance’   (cited   in   Schwabsky   2016,   location   5422).   With   this   project,   I  
critically   investigate  my  research  questions  and  generate  knowledge,  but  at  
the   same   time   the   creator’s   tool   of   ignorance   is   valid   for   generating   the  
practice  itself.    
B.  The  Janus-­faced  scenographer  
Referring   to   computational   and   connectionist   representational   models,  
Chalmers   has   addressed   the   ‘easy’   problem   and   the   ‘hard’   problem   of  
consciousness:  examples   that   form  part  of   the  easy  problem  are  related   to  
the  functional  aspects  of  consciousness,  such  as  ‘the  focus  of  attention’,  ‘the  
difference   between   wakefulness   and   sleep’,   ‘the   ability   to   discriminate,  
categorize,   and   react   to   environmental   stimuli’,   etc.   (Chalmers   2010,   p.4).  
Chalmers   calls   these   ‘easy’   because   they  are   functional   and  as   such   they  
are  easier  to  explain  through  empirical  research  and  in  time:  one  can  apply  
neural   examples   or   computational   ones   for   their   analysis.   Such   examples  
are   the  architectural  models   of  Baars  or  Edelman  and  Tononi,  which   I   am  
using  imaginatively  in  my  installation-­contraptions;;  they  attempt  to  tackle  the  
‘easy’  phenomena  of  consciousness,  such  as  the  ‘integration  of   information  
by   a   cognitive   system’,   for   example.   Conscious   experience,   however,   as  
Chalmers  puts  it,  is  hard  to  explain  because  ‘it  goes  beyond  problems  about  
the  performance  of  functions’  (2010,  p.8).    Experience      does  not  come  down  
only   to   the   processing   of   information   but   also   the   combination   of   this  
‘processing’  with  a  subjective  aspect.    
Assuming  Chalmer’s  argument  and  applying  it  imaginatively  to  performance,  
I   am   arguing   that   there   is   the   ‘easy   problem’   of   scenography,   which   is  
related   to  material   function   –   the   structure,   the  materials,   the   shapes,   the  
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set,  the  projections,  the  costume,  the  positioning  of  the  audience,  etc.  –  and  
a  ‘hard  problem’  –  that  of  the  experience  of  scenography  and  the  processes  
and  concepts  that  underpin  it.  With  my  performance  experiments  though,  in  
a  similar  way  to  a  number  of  scholars  in  the  field  (McAuley  1999;;  Oddey  and  
White   2006),   I   accept   that   these   two   ‘problems’   are   inseparable   and   non-­
binary   (let   alone   ‘easy’   or   ‘hard’),   meaning   that   they   cannot   be   explored  
separately   but   only   in   a   reciprocal   relation   to   one   another   and   to   their  
relation  within  the  social.    
The  way  this  Janus-­faced  analogy  is  used  here  is  not  intended  to  divide  the  
scenographic   function   and   reception,   supporting   thus   the   Cartesian   divide  
between   the   immaterial   (mental)   and  material   (physical)   or   the   active   and  
passive.  It  is  rather  used  for  expressing  the  simultaneous  operations  and  the  
structural  correspondence  between  the  material  and  immaterial  properties  of  
scenography  within  a  performance  system  and  to  point  out  to   ‘the  meaning  
that  is  made  between  these  dualisms’  (Shaughnessy  2013,  p.4;;  p.18)  by  the  
audience–participants.  My  approach  is  not  thinking  in  threes  but  I  assume  a  
multiple-­meanings   approach.   For   example,   the   meaning(s)   that   could   be  
made   between   the   material   and   immaterial   are   multiple,   or   simultaneous  
depending   on   the   occasion:   action,   invention,   encounter,   perception,  
performance-­rehearsal,  etc.  In  investigating  this  coupling  between  the  agent  
(audience   and   artists)   and   the   world   (performance   environment)   is   where  
theories  of   the  4Es  that  understand  the  continuation  between  mind  and   life  
are  helpful.  
Therefore,   I   argue   that   the   analogy   of   the   Janus-­faced   quality   (behaviour-­
experience)   used   by   the   enactivists   is   also   appropriate   for   describing   the  
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nature  of  scenography,  and  that  this  view  can  contribute  significantly  to  the  
vocabulary  of  what  a  scenographer  does  and  how  they  do  it:  
Cognitive   science   is   Janus-­faced,   looking   down   both   roads   of  
cognition   at   once:   ‘one   of   its   faces   is   turned   toward   nature   and  
sees   cognitive   processes   as   behaviour.   The   other   is   turned  
toward  the  human  world  (or  what  phenomenologists  call  the  “life-­
world”)   and   sees   cognition   as   experience   (Varela   et   al.   1991,  
p.13).    
  
Scenography  is  a  Janus-­faced  art  looking  down  both  roads  at  once:  both  ‘the  
real   and   not   real’   (McAuley   1999);;   the   material   world   that   understands  
scenographic   processes   as   structure   and   form   (the   set,   the   props,   the  
materials,   the   projections,   the   positioning   of   the   audience,   etc.),   and   the  
immaterial  world  that  is  turned  towards  the  feeling  of  the  scenographic  world  
and  sees  scenographic  processes  as  experience,  a  way  of  thinking  and  as  a  
spiritual  experience.  White  acknowledges  that  ‘theatregoing  is  such  a  social  
process,   where   audience   behaviour   is   guided   as   well   as   audience  
perception’  (2013,  p.57).  These  two,  however,  cannot  be  studied  individually  
but   in   relation   to   each   other,   and   this   is   something   I   have   explored   in  my  
Work  Spaces.  
This  research  project  design  is  also  Janus-­faced  looking  down  both  roads  of  
cognition  and  scenography  as:    
1.   structure/metaphor/form/computation/neuronal   networks   (the  
consciousness  metaphors   I   use   as   blueprints   imaginatively   to   scaffold   the  
participatory  performance  experiments  WS  I,  WS  II,  and  WS  III);;  and    
2.  embodied,  enactive,  embedded,  ecological  enactment  and  the  world  (the  
analysis  of   the  audiences’  experience  and  engagement  with  the  work).   It   is  
situated  within  the  'cognitive  turn'  and  the  'scenographic  turn'  exploring  post-­
representational   ways   of   making   and   audiencing   scenography   in  
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participatory  performance.  
Furthermore,  my  position  between  the  two  thinking  cultures,  Continental  and  
Anglo-­American  (being  Greek,  and  having  lived  and  studied  in  that  particular  
culture,  and   then  studying  and   living   in   the  UK),  makes  me  what   I   call   the  
‘Janus-­faced   researcher’,   who   is   trying   to   think   in   both   directions  
simultaneously,  and  4E  cognition  –  by  bridging  these  two  thinking  cultures  –  
is  suited  to  both  my  ontological  and  epistemological  understanding.  
C.  The  predictive  scenographer  
With   this   methodological   tool   I   argue   that   a   scenographer   in   participatory  
and   hybrid   performance   is   not   one  who   ‘writes   the   stage’   in   advance,   i.e.  
their  work   is   finished  in  advance  of   the  show,  and  the  work   is  presented  to  
the  audience,  but  one  who  is  caught  up  in  the  writing  during  the  staging  in  a  
mediated   world,   a   kind   of   disembodied   presence   (although   there   are  
instances  where  this  presence  is  embodied,  e.g.  Tadeusz  Kantor  used  to  be  
on   stage   and   would   orchestrate   the   experience   by   watching   and   also  
intervening  in  the  performance  to  give  further  guidance).    
The   scenographer   needs   to   therefore   have   this   sensibility   of   what   may  
happen  (I  will  further  develop  the  idea  of  the  predictive  scenographer  in  WS  
III),   and   take   into   account   when   designing-­thinking   the   vibrancy   of   the  
resulting   scenography:   like   an   invisible  Kantor   the   scenographer   is   always  
present   in   the   work.   This   is   not   easy   to   achieve,   because   for   this  
understanding  the  scenographer  is  dependent  on  the  audience,  and  it  is  not  
possible  to  know  the  audience.  So  this  event  of  writing-­scripting-­doing  of  the  
scenographer   is   largely  mediated  by  the  knowledge  (the  Know-­How)  of   the  
audience,   and   therefore   a   language   is   generated   between   the   absent  
scenographer  and  the  unknown  audience.    
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In   ancient   Greek   mythology   the   Delphi   Oracle   was   devoted   to   the   god  
Apollo.   The   predictions   given   by   the  Pythia,   the   priestess   of   the  Oracle   of  
Delphi,   not   unlike   the   predictions   of   many   oracles,   were   ambiguous   and  
demanded   the   interpretation   and   input   of   the   person   who   asked   for   the  
prediction.  They  were   interestingly,   therefore,  similar   to   the  predictive  brain  
analogy   providing   complex   predictions,   which   matched   onto   the   incoming  
flow   of   information   of   their   ‘clients’.      One   of   the   names   given   to   the   god  
Apollo  was   ‘Loxias’,  which  means   ‘ambiguous’.  According   to   the  predictive  
processing   paradigm   our   predictive   brains   don’t   make   straightforward  
predictions,  hence  the  analogy  used  for  the  predictive  scenographer,  who  is  
also   ambiguous.   Like   the   Oracle,   the   predictive   scenographer   provides  
complex   environments-­predictions   but   these   predictive   scenographies,   the  
contraption-­scenographies,   are   not   linear   and   straightforward   but  
ambiguous,   uncertain   and   in   addition   need   the   audience–participants   to  
match   their   own   expectations,   emotions,   prior-­knowledge,   desires,   etc.   to  
them.    
In   short   the   predictive   scenographer   tries   to   predict   their   audience’s  
response  states  through  the  way  they  design  the  ethics  of  the  space,  as  will  
be   outlined   in  WS   II,   generating   thus   a   ‘groundless   scenography’   found  
between   the   top-­down   prediction   (scenographer   and   art   team)   and   the  
bottom-­up   error   (audience–participants).   The   audience–participants  
themselves  embody   in   their   turn   this  hierarchical  model,  so   their  embodied  
brains  are  the  top-­down  prediction  flow  and  the  ‘surprisal’  (Bruineberg  et  al.  
2016)   coming   from   the   contraption   environment   are   the   bottom-­up   linear  
sensory   inputs.   I   will   expand   on   this   circular   causality   tool   and   its  
applications  in  chapter  5.  
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2.2.3  Scenographic  contraptions  (part  1):  ‘stage’  as  
consciousness-­perception  
The   OED’s   definition   of   ‘contraption’   is   ‘a   contrivance,   a   device   (with  
suggestion   of   ingenuity   rather   than   effectiveness)’   (OED   2016).   A  
contraption   is   therefore  a   kind  of   a  prototype   invention,   and   in  order   to  be  
named   a   contraption   something   needs   to   ‘feel/look   strange,   awkward   or  
unnecessarily   complicated’   and   ‘often   badly  made   or   unsafe’   (New  Oxford  
American   Dictionary   2016)   to   the   viewer.   I   will   also   add   to   the   above   the  
notion  of  ambiguity,  as  the  contraption  opens  up  for  multiple  interpretations.  
An  example  of  what  contraptions  are  broadly  understood  to  look  like  can  be  











In   the   above   image   one’s   attention   may   be   drawn   to   the   process   of   the  
making  of  the  depicted  contraption  and  may  engage  with  the  explicit  logic  of  
the   actual   image   in  multiple   levels   (visual,   sensorimotor,   intellectual,   etc.),  
and  the  questions  this  complexity  raises.  How  does  this  thing  work?  What  is  
the  function  of  its  different  parts?  Why  did  the  person  in  the  illustration  make  
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this   apparatus   the  way  he  has?  This   is   silly,   funny,   or   cruel.   This   looks  or  
feels  very  complicated;;  why  did   the  person   in   the   illustration  not   just   throw  
water  on   the  cats   (depending  on  our  sensitivity  on   the  matter  we  may   feel  
angry  with  the  action  itself)?,  etc.      
This  communication  may  also  be  extended  between  the  viewer  and  the  artist  
who  created   the   complex  work,   for   instance   in   the  below  examples,  which  
you  can  experience  first-­hand  between  yourself  (the  viewer)  and  the  creator  
















  Figure 15. Examples of Chindogu 
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Questions  that  may  occur  by  looking  at  the  above  images  are:  Who  thought  
of  this?  What  do  they  want  me  to  do  with  it?  What  do  they  want  to  achieve  
here,  (laughter,  maybe?).  
Chindogu   means   an   unusual   or   ‘weird   tool’   in   Japanese.   These   ‘unusual  
tools’  are  defined  as  non-­useless  inventions,  meaning  that  these  inventions  
are  created  with  solving  a  problem  in  mind  but  instead,  by  putting  them  into  
use,   they   create   other   problems,   therefore   prioritising   ingenuity   over  
efficiency,   and   for   this   they   are   rendered   unnecessary.   To   qualify   as  
Chindogu,  as  rule  #2  of  the  Chindogu  manifesto  states,  the  creator  must  be  
able   to   hold   the   item   in   his   or   her   hand   and   think,   ‘I   can   actually   imagine  
someone  using  this.  Almost’  (in  Kawakami  2015).  
By  looking  at  the  Chindogu  images,  one  may  instinctively  react  with  laughter  
or   puzzlement   as   they   encounter   the   absurdity   of   this   object’s   operation.  
Contraptions   are   good   at   breaking   an   anticipated   pattern   by   producing  
nonsensical  formations.  According  to  Cappucio  and  Froese:    
If  non-­sense  often  turns  out  to  be  just  funny,  rather  than  upsetting,  
is   because   humor   [sic]   and   non-­sense   share   similar   cognitive  
systems  of  reaction.  Humor  [sic]  involves  surprising  associations,  
bizarre   juxtapositions   that   stimulate   novel   paths   of   thought   by  
violating  the  audience’s  expectations  (2014,  p.16).  
  
Chindogu,  and  by  extension  contraptions,  are  deliberately  designed  in  such  
a  way   so   as   to   partly   alienate   the   viewer   or   user   and   engage   them   in   an  
exploration   and   questioning   of   the   number   of   novel   possibilities   for  
interaction  with   the   specific   object,   an  exploration   that   it   is   also  embodied.  
The  capacity  to  move,  the  capacity  to  touch,   the  capacity  to  smell,  and  our  
sensory   and   motor-­nuanced   pathways   are   involved   in   our   experience   of  
seeing,   and   therefore   we   engage   in   a   sensorimotor   conversation   and  
correspondence  with  what  we  choose  to  see.  This  is  an  understanding  that  
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has  been  backed  up  by  empirical  evidence  in  cognitive  science,  giving  way  
to  cognitive  philosophers  such  as  Alva  Noë  to  support  that  all  perception  is  
action  (2004).  
Furthermore   the  action  of      ‘sense  making   is   an  ongoing  activity   and  not   a  
final   state   of   equilibrium   between   internal   goals   and   external   conditions.  
There   is   always   something   else   to   be   made   sense   of’,   say   Dotov   and  
Chemero   (2014,   p.57),   assuming   an   enactive   view   of   sense-­making.   In  
terms  of  how  non-­sense  is  used  by  artists,  in  enactive  cognition  the  capacity  
that  art  and   literature  have   in   ‘unleashing   the  power  of  non-­sense’  has  not  
gone   unobserved,   say   Cappucio   and   Froese   (referring   particularly   to   the  
surrealists),   and   they   add   that   ‘[a]rtists   and   playwriters   know  well   that   it   is  
possible  to  play  with  this  coupling,  intentionally  manipulating  it  to  free  certain  
desired   effects’   (Cappucio   and   Froese   2014,   p.28).   Theatre   scholar   Di  
Benedetto  observes  that  ‘when  artists  make  use  of  patterns,  they  can  attract  
the  brain’s  attention  by  violating  that  pattern’  (2010,  p.11).  
This  violation  of  the  audience’s  expectations,  for  the  creation  of  meaning  and  
context,  is  at  the  centre  of  my  performance  praxis  for  generating  landscapes  
of   tension,  governed  by   the  notion  of   contraptions   that  are  uncanny,   resist  
signification,   and   offer   a   ‘disciplined’   surprise.   However,   Cappucio   and  
Froese   rightly   observe   that   ‘failing   to   recognize   an   object’s   use   and  
perceiving   it   as   unfamiliar   or   surprisingly   absurd   are   two   different  
experiences   that   do   not   imply   one   another’   (ibid.   2014,   p.18).   Therefore,  
care  needs  to  be  taken  when  generating  and  investigating  ways  with  which  
this  negotiation  between  audience–participant  and  performance  environment  
could  be  orchestrated  as  part  of  the  scenographic  contraption  experience,  so  
that  the  audience–participant  does  not  completely  fail  to  recognise  the  work,  
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and   therefore   ignore   it   altogether,   but   engages   with   its   absurdness   and  
unfamiliarity.  There  are  other  notions  that  contraptions  relate  to  such  as  that  
of  the  montage  and  the  scaffold,  which  I  will  mention  in  later  chapters.  
I  have  also   referred  earlier   to  contraption-­environments  and   the   idea  of  an  
invisible   contraption-­concept   in   theatre   and   performance,   rather   than   an  
evident   structural   one.   But   before   going   into   what   contraptions   do,   and  
generate   in   theatre   and   performance   with   my   performance   experiments,   I  
will  first  briefly  outline  three  examples  of  what  contraptions  look  like  in  avant-­
garde  theatre  and  performance  of  the  previous  century  as  this  may  help  with  
giving  a  historical   perspective   to   this  notion   I   am  putting   forth.  First,   in   the  
Constructivist   theatre   of   the   early   twentieth   century   in   Russia,   Varvara  
Stepanova’s   set   for  The  Death   of   Tarelkin   directed   by  Meyerhold   in   1922,  
included   different   individual   apparatuses   on   stage   as   can   be   seen   in   the  
image   below.   Meaning   was   created   by   the   interaction   between   the  
performers  and  these  obscure  contraptions  (Fig.  16).  
  
  
Second,   in   the  USA  Robert   Rauschenberg’s   ‘combines’   (circa   1954)   were  
sculptural   montages   including   ordinary   everyday   objects   sourced   locally,  
which  informed  his  performance  work  (and  vice  versa).  Below  is  an  image  of  
Figure 16. Varvara 
Stepanova. Models and 
furniture for Alexander 
Sukhovo-Kobylin’s play The 
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one  of  his  own  performance  shows,  where  his  method  of  ‘combines’  finds  its  








Third,   Polish   artist   Tadeusz   Kantor   practiced   the   idea   of   ‘emballages’  
(wrappings),   where   he   also,   similarly   to   Rauschenberg,   incorporated  
discarded   objects   in   his   canvases   and   sculptural   works;;   however,   his  
technique   involved   wrapping   these   with   fabric.   His   performances   involved  
assemblages-­props   (what   he   referred   to   as   ‘bio-­objects’),   which   embodied  










of the Last 
Judgement
, 1979.  
 
Figure 17. Elgin Tie, 1964. Rauschenberg performing 
his Elgin Tie, Five New York Evenings, Moderna 
Museet, Stockholm, September 13, 1964. Photo© Hans 
Malmberg.  
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For   the   three   visual   artists   above   who   actively   engaged   with   theatre   and  
performance  (and  who  therefore  can  be  referred  to  as  scenographers)  there  
was   a   common   need,   when   embarking   on   a   theatre   and   performance  
production,   to   create  apparatuses   that   conveyed  complex   visual   stimuli,   or  
were  bricollaged  with  bodies,  or  both.  My  interest  lies  in  the  why  of  this  need,  
and   in   tracing   this   need   also   to   contemporary   forms   of   performance  
(immersive,  multimedia,   interactive,   events),   including  my  work,   where   the  
element   of   the   audience   as   participant   is   added   to   the   assemblage.   My  
understanding   is   that   with   these   assemblages,   the   specific   artists,   when  
faced   with   escaping   the   canvas   (as   they   are   all   three   creating   between  
canvas  and   ‘stage’),  are  communicating  a  similar  sensibility   regarding   their  
expression   of   a   certain   perception.   The   way   they   express   this   is   by  
navigating   away   from   strict   representational   forms   of   depiction   aiming   to  
flesh   out   process   and   non-­linear   perception   of   simultaneity  where   objects,  
bodies,  world,  audiences  are  in  perpetual  conversation.  
Bleeker   suggests   that   there   is   a   dialogic   relation   between   the   theatrical  
apparatus  and  perception  in  that  ‘the  theatrical  apparatus  provides  a  kind  of  
experimental   set-­up   that   can   reveal   how   perception  works’   (Bleeker   2005,  
cited   in  Germano  2013,  p.41).  This  occurs   in   theatre,  also  as  an  embodied  
experience:   ‘addressing   the   audience   through   different   senses  
simultaneously,  can  provide  'a  kind  of  experimental  setup'  through  which  we  
can  explore   how   the  body   is   involved   in   perceiving  and  understanding   the  
world’   (Bleeker   2005,   p.110,   cited   in  Germano  2013,   p.3).   The  addressing  
through  different  senses  simultaneously  of  the  audience–participants,  within  
an  experimental  setup  in  the  case  of  the  contraption  theory,  is  understood  as  
a  sensorimotor  unfolding  in  space.  Therefore,   the  contraption  (and  similarly  
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the   contraptions   in   the   examples   of   the   three   aforementioned   artists)  
provides   a   compressed   meaning,   which   needs   to   be   decompressed   in   a  
non-­linear   manner   by   the   audiences–participants’   embodied   minds.   Each  
audience–participant   is   therefore   invited   to   unfold   a   unique   rhizomic  
meaning  from  this  complex  experimental  setup  and  simultaneously  navigate  
it;;   this   mentally   navigated   experience   is,   as   outlined   earlier,   also   a  
sensorimotor   one,   despite   the   fact   that   the   audience   are   not   physically  
participating.  Furthermore,  exploring  how  the  body   is   involved   in  perceiving  
and  understanding  of  the  world  to  which  Bleeker  and  later  Germano  refer  to  
can  be  extended  at  the  same  time  to  involve  their  co-­audience–participants.    
By   studying   the   contemporary   theories   that   suggest   how   perception   and  
consciousness  work   in   contemporary   philosophy   and   science,   I   argue   that  
we   can   create   environments   that   address   the   audience   through   different  
senses   simultaneously.   The   metaphors   of   consciousness,   as   outlined   by  
current  scientists-­philosophers  (Baars,  Edelman  and  Tononi,  Dennett,  etc.),  
are  contraptions,  characterised  by  ingenuity,  however  inefficient  in  relation  to  
what   we   consider   efficient   in   our   culture   (e.g.   a   linear   structure   with   a  
beginning,  a  middle,  and  an  end)  and  open  to  more  than  one  interpretation.  
Maurice   Merleau-­Ponty   admits   in   relation   to   the   phenomenologist’s  
understanding   of   consciousness:   ‘consciousness,  which   is   taken   to   be   the  
seat  of  clear  thinking,  is  on  the  contrary  the  very  abode  of  ambiguity’  (2002,  
p.  298).  Consciousness  and  perception  metaphors,   therefore,  and   the  way  
they  are  outlined  by  current  thinkers,  can  help  me  with  the  conceptualisation  
and   the   creation   of   my   scenographic   contraption   practice-­research,   which  
embodies  prediction,  ambiguity,  experimentation,  and  other  notions,  which  I  
will  be  outlining  throughout  this  project.  It  also  helps  me  on  an  aesthetic  level  
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to  deviate  from  the  Victorian  steam-­punk  machine  aesthetic  of  a  contraption,  
and   relate   it   to   a   more   general,   processual,   rhizomic,   and   participatory  
performance   aesthetic,   and   a   general   theory   of   scenographic   contraptions  
oscillating  between  the  material,  the  immaterial,  and  the  social.    
Merleau-­Ponty   adds   that   ‘this   ambiguity   is   not   some   imperfection   of  
consciousness   or   existence,   but   the   definition   of   them’   (2002,   p.   298).  
Likewise,  the  ambiguity  of  the  scenographic  contraption  is  its  definition,  and  
therefore   I   situate  consciousness   (and  perception)   in   the  centre  of  my  arts  
praxis  as  a  contraption  structure.  
Machon   refers   to   the   ambiguous   and   multidimensional   nature   of   a  
(syn)aesthetic   hybrid   in   immersive   theatre   extending   Susan   Broadhurst’s  
(1999)   understanding   of   the   ‘complex   simultaneity   of   stage   processes  
leading   to   the   impossibility   of   producing   a   single   interpretation’   (cited   in  
Machon  2009,  p.61).  This  situates  the  audience  as  ‘active  participants  in  the  
performance  experience  and   the  process  of  meaning-­making  as  a  result  of  
the   interplay   of   the   various   layers   of   the   (syn)aesthetic   hybrid’   (Machon  
2009,   p.61).   As   mentioned   earlier,   Machon’s   understanding   informs   the  
scenographic  contraption;;  however,  the  idea  of  the  scenographic  contraption  
focuses   primarily   on   the   sensorimotor   understanding   of   perceiving  
scenographic   participation.   These   contraptions,   with   their   unfinished,  
inefficient   aesthetic,   aim   to   invite   the   audience   to   question,   explore,   and  
add/contribute,   and   in   some   cases   collaborate   or   compete.   There   isn’t  
something   particular   that   is   missing   from   the   contraption;;   rather   there   are  
different  ways  of  using  them,  enhancing  the  structural  coupling  between  the  
contraption   and   the   agent.   The   contraption   explores   how   we   can   design  
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performance   environments   that   shape   the   attendant’s   ability   to   create,  
emote,  imagine,  and  empathise.  
As  already  mentioned  a  contraption  in  this  study  is  understood  not  so  much  
as  a  machine,  but  as  consciousness,  a  process,  and  an  en-­spaced  network.  
By   fleshing   out   poetically   the   inner   logic   that   one   can   trace   in   this  
metaphorical   thinking  of   consciousness  and  perception,   and   reflect   upon   it  
(what   I   earlier   referred   to   as   ‘scenography   in   the   flesh’),   one   can   develop  
structurally   determined   scenographic   systems   that   embody   elements   from  
contemporary   thinking   of   consciousness   and   perception   for   developing  
scenographic   participation   and   expanded   scenographies.   In   order   to   avoid  
universalisms   again,   I   will   say   that   this   method   is   deeply   cultural   and  
personal   with   regards   to   the   audience–participants,   and   to   the   artist–
scenographer’s   interpretation   of   the   theories   of   consciousness;;   in   this  
particular  research,  the  dialogue  is  generated  between  me  and  the  specified  
consciousness   and   perception   theories   in   the  West,  my   collaborators,   and  
the   audience–participants   who   happen   to   come   to   the   performance  
experiments  I  have  designed.  As  shown  in  the  below  diagram,  I   investigate  
how  a  non-­binary  understanding  of   the  scenographic  aesthetics  of  material  
and   immaterial   can   be   achieved   in   relation   to   cognitive   frameworks   of   4E  
cognition  that  also  stress  the  social.      





el  Hann  (in  press)  proposes  that  the  term  ‘scenographic’   is  critically  distinct  
to   scenography   in   that   an   object   or   event   can   impart   a   scenographic   trait  
without   necessarily   being   considered   scenography.   Hann’s   distinction  
between  scenography  and  the  scenographic  has  helped  me  in  my  framing  of  
scenographic   contraptions   as   a   scenographic   tool,   and   as   such   related   to  
the   stage,   situated   within   current   hybrid,   participatory   performance   culture  
but  able  to  be  applied  ‘to  artistic  and  social  scenarios  beyond  theatre’  (ibid.).    
Figure 19. A non-binary understanding of scenographic contraptions oscillating between the 
material, the immaterial, and the social.  
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2.3  A  Depiction  of  My  Methodological  Approach    
Cognitive  theories  of  consciousness  metaphors,  and  4E  cognition  imbricated  
within   my   arts   praxis   (scenographic   contraptions),   can   lead   to   new  
knowledge   in  relation  to  ways  of   thinking  about,  generating,  and  navigating  
‘groundless’  scenographies.  
This  understanding  has  been  enriched  and  a   further  systematic  application  
of   4E   cognitive   theories   has   been   developed   with   reference   to   my  
performance  experiments   in  chapters  3,  4,  and  5.  This   is  where  I  am  using  
specific  examples  from  the  performance  experiments  to  illustrate  the  ways  in  
which   this   method   has   been   used   and   developed   as   part   of   my   practice-­
research.  
The  aesthetic  result  of  the  practice  relates  to  my  particular  style  through  the  
aswespeakproject   (although   I   have   to   note   here   that   the   work   produced  
during   this   research   is   at   an   early   experimental   stage,   and   has   been  
produced   with   the   particular   research   questions   in   mind   and   with   a   small  
budget).  
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Figure 20. My practice-research scenography ecosystem for answering my overarching question: How 
might 4E cognition theory, and specifically radical embodied cognitive neuroscience and the more generally 
applied notions of social cognition, contribute further to understanding the workings of dynamic 
scenographic systems within the current landscape of hybrid participatory performance? 
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Part  II  
PERFORMANCE  EXPERIMENTS  
Linking  Structure,  Language,  and  Event-­Space  in  Continental  
Thinking  and  Cognitive  Science    
Before  I  proceed  to  Work  Space  I  (WS  I)  I  will  introduce  here  the  concepts  in  
this  chapter  title  that  are  found  throughout  the  three  practice  experiments.  I  
will  also  address  several   insights   that  have  occurred  after   reflecting  on   the  
practice  but  it  is  important  to  introduce  these  terms  here  for  clarity.    
In   scenography   research   the   use   of   phenomenological   frameworks   (i.e.  
McKinney   2008)   has   taken   our   understanding   forward   in   terms   of  
investigating   the   operations   of   scenography   and   the   nature   of   the  
communication   between   scenography   and   audiences.   I   argue   that   the  
common   understanding   of   the   bidirectional   relationship   between   the  
embodied   brain   and   the   world   found   in   Continental   thinking   and   post-­
cognitivist  thinking  is  useful  in  adding  to  the  above  scenographic  knowledge.  
While   the   4Es   understanding   is   based   on   empirical   data,   it   transcends  
Anglo-­American  analytical  philosophy  of  a  stable  relationship  between  brain  
and   world,   and   embraces   groundlessness,   thus   post-­structuralist   thinking,  
and  therefore  can  generate  insights  on  notions  beyond  representationalism.  
Below   I   will   demonstrate   how   this   bridging   is   valuable   for   scenographic  
research  and  how  it  has  been  useful  for  reflecting  on  my  practice.  
Derrida   refers   to   the   word   ‘event’   as   a   ‘rapture’   and   a   ‘redoubling’   (1993,  
p.223),   and   argues   that   ‘structure   –   or   rather   the   structurality   of   structure’  
(ibid.)   ‘up  until   the  event’  has  been   reduced  by  being  given  a  centre  or  by  
being   referred   to   in   relation   to   a   ‘fixed  origin’   (ibid.   p.224).   This   centre,   he  
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continues,  is  not  only  used  for  orientation  but  also  for  limiting  the  freeplay  of  
the  structure,  asserting  that  once  a  structure  has  a  centre,  this  centre  orients  
and  organises  the  freeplay  of   ‘its  elements  inside  the  total  form’  (ibid.).  The  
paradox   with   this   centre   is   that   it   is   within   the   structure   and   outside   it,  
because  although  the  centre  is  at  the  centre  of  the  totality  it  does  not  belong  
to  the  totality.  He  explains  that  the  history  of  the  West  is  the  history  of  these  
metaphors  and  metonymies  of   this  centre  and   further   relates   this  centre   to  
the  constant  of  a  presence,  e.g.  telos,  arche,  God,  man,  etc.  This  presence  
has  now  been  replaced  by  language,  argues  Derrida,  and  he  goes  on  to  say  
that  what  happened  to  this  centre  when  language  came  into  play   is   that   ‘in  
the  absence  of  a  centre  or  origin  everything  became  discourse’  (ibid.  p.225).  
I  argue  that  similarly  in  contemporary  scenography  the  idea  of  a  centre  has  
been   replaced   by   the   ‘contraption’.   I   will   now   go   onto   making   the   link  
between  post-­structuralist  thinking,  enactivism,  and  the  contraption.  
Maturana  sees  language  as  a  biological  phenomenon  and  the  understanding  
of   language   as   a   verb   (languaging)   rooted   in   the   mesh   of   sociocultural  
practices:  
We   human   beings   language   while   operating   in   the   domain   of  
structural  coupling  in  which  we  coexist  as  languaging  beings  with  
other   languaging   beings.   As   we   language,   objects   arise   as  
aspects   of   our   languaging   with   others,   they   do   not   exist   by  
themselves.  (Maturana  2002,  p.28)  
  
There   is   a   similarity   in   this   thinking   with   the   post-­structuralist   view   of  
language  as  being  perpetually  caught  up  in  its  own  nature  and  therefore  not  
being   organised   around   one   centre.   In   addition,   language,   discourse,  
speech,  etc.  in  the  Work  Spaces  is  understood  ‘to  mean  any  significant  unit  
or  synthesis,  whether  verbal  or  visual  […]  even  objects  will  become  speech,  
if  they  mean  something’  (Barthes  1972,  p.  109).  
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In   architecture   Bernard   Tschumi’s   notion   of   disjunction   refers   to   the  
discourse   between   event   and   space.   Disjunction   in   architecture   implies  
‘constant,  mechanical  operations  that  systematically  produce  dissociation  in  
space  and   time,  where  an  architectural   element   only   functions  by   colliding  
with  a  programatic  [sic]  element,  with  the  movement  of  bodies,  or  whatever’  
(1996,   p.213).      Tschumi,   when   talking   about   contemporary   architecture,  
considers  the  relationship  between  ‘the  concept  of  space  and  the  experience  
of   space’   as   ‘mutually   exclusive’   (Tschumi   1996,   p.16);;   he   explains   that  
although  there  is  an  inevitable  co-­habitation  between  space  and  event,  there  
is   also   a   disjunction   between   the   two   (ibid.   p.18),   and   he   asserts   that   this  
‘means   that   architecture   is   constantly   unstable,   constantly   on   the   verge   of  
change’   (ibid.   p.19).  What   Tschumi   suggests  with   his   theory   of   disjunction  
resonates  with  what   the  enactivists   refer   to  as  groundlessness.  Tschumi   is  
not  talking  about  structural  coupling  but  disjunction;;  disjunction,  however,  in  
logics   is   a   connecting   term,   referring   to   the   relation   between   terms   ‘of  
disjunctive  proposition’  (OED)  a  critical  coupling,  therefore,  where  one  notion  
is  juxtaposed  with  the  other  and  they  remain  in  a  an  enfolding  and  unfolding  
discursive  relationship.    
‘There   is  no  space  without  event,’  writes  Tschumi  (1996,  p.139)  and  Dorita  
Hannah,   thinking   between   architecture   and   performance   design,   extends  
Tschumi’s  notion  of  an  event-­space  to  a  space  that  performs,  asserting  that  
‘space   –   whether   a   suspended   pause,   a   blank   area,   an   empty   room   or   a  
limitless  cosmos  –  performs’  (Hannah  2011,  p.54).  Furthermore,  as  Derrida  
suggests  during  his  conversations  with  Tschumi,   the  word   ‘event’  shares  a  
root  with  the  word  ‘invention’  (Tschumi  1996,  p.257).  Taking  into  account  the  
inventive,  processual  nature  of  my  methodological   tool  of  contraptions,  and  
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drawing  from  what  I  have  outlined  above  in  regards  to  Tschumi  and  Hannah,  
I   am  making   a   case   for   focusing   on   that   aspect   of   the   performing   event-­
space  that  is  related  to  invention.    
Scenographic   contraptions   flesh   out   process   and   generate   a   groundless,  
and   inventive,   participatory   space,   which,   in   line   with   Derrida’s  
understanding,   is  never  to  be  achieved,  but  we  as  emancipated  and  critical  
audience–participants  need  to  work  towards.  The  way  we  navigate  an  event-­
space   (Tschumi)   that   performs   (Hannah)   in   participatory   performance  
environments  is  following  the  above  line  of  thought,  an  inventive  process.    
Inventive   processes   are   governed   by   trial   and   error;;   therefore,   repetition  
and,   in   the   case   of   theatre   and   performance,   trial   and   error   are   intrinsic  
components   of   a   rehearsal.   While   Hannah   suggests   that   the   space  
performs,   I   additionally   suggest   that   in   these  particular  hybrid  performance  
situations   and   environments,   the   space   simultaneously   performs   and  
rehearses.  This  idea  stems  from  a  paper  I  presented  at  the  Critical  Costume  
2013   conference   (see   Appendix   A).   I   extended  Rachel   Hann’s   and   Sidsel  
Bech’s  conference  call,  which  posited  that  ‘the  costume  performs’,  following  
Hannah’s      view   that   the   space   performs,   to   suggest   that   in   order   for   the  
costume  to  perform  it  needs  to  rehearse.    
I  am  now  introducing  the  idea  of  a  space,  which  rehearses  together  with  the  
agent(s),  and  that,  when  agent(s)  and  environment  are  attuned,  both  space  
and   agent(s)   perform.  What   are   the   implications   of   the   space   performing-­
rehearsing?  Rehearsal  entails  the  notion  of  immersion,  in  a  sense  that  when  
one  rehearses  or   improvises,  they  are  caught   in  a  different  space  than  one  
in  which   they  perform:  when   rehearsing  one   is   implicated   in   the  game,   the  
process.   However,   this   rehearsal-­performance   is   occurring   simultaneously  
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within  a  hybrid  performance-­installation  space  because   there   isn’t  only  one  
privileged  position  of  an  audience–participant  or  similarly  one  central  event.  
In   a  hybrid   performance   space   the   viewing  and  experiencing  positions  are  
many,  and  shifting,  resulting  in  a  multifaceted  event  (so,  for  example,  where  
the   space  may   perform   for   one   agent   (audience–participant),   it  may   be   in  
rehearsal   with   the   other),   and   again   because   these   are   happening  
simultaneously   there   is   a   perpetual   disjunction   between   performance   and  
rehearsal,   which   needs   an   inventive,   or   emotionally   shifting,   ranging   from  
rapture  to  boredom,  approach  in  order  to  be  navigated.    
On   entering   the   thinking   of   contemporary   interpretations   of   scenography  
based   on   the   etymology   of   the   word   (Baugh   2011;;   Hann   forthcoming),   I  
argue   that   the  word   ‘scenography’  entails   in   itself   the  notion  of  disjunction,  
the   event-­space   discourse,   as   it   embodies   as   a   word   in   itself   the   tension  
between   the  space   (stage,  σκηνή)   and   the  event   (of  writing,  γραφή)  within  
this  space.  There  is  a  perpetual  discourse  between  the  stage  (scene)  as  the  
space   and   the   writing   of/within/about   the   stage   as   an   event,   a   doing  
(orchestrating/directing/authoring/co-­authoring/rehearsing),   especially   in  
hybrid  performance  environments:  a  simultaneous  understanding  of  a  space  
(stage)  and  a  doing  within  this  space  (the  event  of  writing).  Drawing  from  my  
previous   analysis   on   space   as   performing-­rehearsing,   I   am   arguing   for   a  
contemporary   scenography   ‘as   contraption’:   a   process,   a   language   that   is  
caught  up  in  its  systemic  nature  between  space  and  event  in  line  with  a  post-­
structuralist   understanding,   but   an   embodied   one   as   understood   by   post-­
cognitivist  theories  of  cognition  (Maturana).    
This   disjunction   within   scenography   shows   the   difficulty   we   as  
scenographers   find   in   explaining   in   a   straightforward   way   to   a   lay-­person  
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what   we   do,   what   scenography   does,   and   why   we   need   to   use   so   many  
different  names,  in  comparison  to  choreography  or  dramaturgy,  for  example  
(performance   design,   spatial   design,   stage   design,   scenography,  
performance   design   and   practice,   theatre   design).  When   scenographer  Es  
Devlin  tries  to  explain  what  her  work  is  about  in  a  recent  interview,  she  says:    
I  do  all  this  work  and  nothing  physical  remains.  So  what  I’m  really  
designing   are   mental   structures,   as   opposed   to   physical   ones.  
Memories  are  solid,  and  that’s  what  I’m  trying  to  build  (in  O’Hagan  
2016).  
  
Although   Devlin   describes   what   she   does,   it   does   not   seem   easy   to  
communicate;;   she   talks   about   designing   mental   structures,   and   that  
memories   are   solid;;   however,   memories   are   not   solid.   Perhaps   if   Devlin  
were   to  describe  how  a  scale  model   is  made  out  of  card,   for  example,  her  
vocabulary  would  have  been  more  specific,  and  the  nuances  in  the  language  
would   have   also   communicated   with   more   precision   to   a   hypothetical  
reader/listener.   Josephine   Machon   addresses   ‘the   dilemma   of   verbally  
analysing   experiential   performance   work   in   order   to   foreground   the  
significance  of   this  style   (immersive)   in   theatre  –  historically,  culturally,  and  
in  terms  of  academic  study  and  individual  interpretation’  (2013a,  p.3).  
Therefore   in  answering  my  research  question   that   is   related   to   the  ways   in  
which  we  might  use  4E  cognition  and  cognitive  neuroscience  to   investigate  
an   audience’s   experience   of   dynamic   scenographic   systems,   and   the  
implications   of   the   findings   of   4E   cognition   on   scenographic   making  
processes,   I   am   suggesting   that   conceptualising   contraptions   can   not   only  
present   us   with   what   contemporary   scenography   may   look   like   but   also  
contribute  to  the  vocabularies  for  talking  about  what  scenography  does.    
The   conceptualisation   of   the   contraption   tool   here   has   been   tested  
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throughout  my  research  in  the  practice  experiments  WS  I,  WS  II,  and  WS  III  
in  order  to  critically  reflect  whether  or  how  useful  it  is  to  help  us  navigate  the  
groundless,  and  also  contribute  to  the  nuanced,  invisible  language  of  hybrid,  
participatory  performance  from  a  scenographic  lens.    
My  understanding  of  these  hybrid  performance  environments  as  performing-­
rehearsing  spaces  is  where  the  audience–participants  take  up  different  roles  
where  the  ‘spotlight  of  attention’  changes  depending  on  who  is  attending  and  
who   is   doing.   The   frames   are   not   linear   but   appear   simultaneously   during  
moments   of   attunement   where   the   performance   happens.   This   is   what   I  
tested  in  my  first  performance  experiment.    
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WORK  SPACE  I  
MATERIAL  
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3.1  Fleshing  Out  GWT  Imaginatively  for  the  Production  of  
Participatory  Scenography  
For   the   first   Performance   Experiment   Work   Space   I,   I   translated  
scenographically   Baars’   global   workspace   theory   (GWT)   and   used   this  
adaptation   as   a   guide   to   create   an   environment   within   which   participants  
were  able  to  grapple  with  materials  provided  in  the  space  and  thus  develop  a  
collectively  crafted  artefact.    
         
(Please  go  now  to  folder  WS  I  and  watch:  WS  I  (for  Mac).mov  or  WS  I  (for  PC).avi.  Sound  between  
02:28-­03:41  )  
  
Figure 22. The final stage of  WS I 
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I   led   this   half-­day   workshop,   so   I   was   steering   the   process   and   was  
responsible   for   explaining   the   way   the   system   worked   and   answering  
potential   questions   from   the   participants.   I   led   a   set   of  warm-­up   exercises  
and   there  were  a  number  of   instructions  provided  on  each   table   (the  rules,  
as  seen  in  the  video),  which  were  adapted  by  each  participant  depending  on  
their  skills  and  how  they  wanted  to  approach  these  instructions.  This  process  
put  me  at  the  centre  of  the  work,  and  at  times  I  felt  I  was  directing  part  of  the  
group,  but  I  also  felt  it  distracted  me  in  terms  of  my  observing  of  the  process.  
It  gave  me  the  role  of  the  ‘dialogic  facilitator’  (Blaikie  2000,  p.52),  which  felt  
close  to  the  educator,  especially  in  the  first  half  of  the  workshop  when  I  had  
to   respond   to   a   few  questions   from   the  participants   such  as:   ‘What   do  we  
have   to  do  now?’  Due   to  my  different   roles,   I   refer   to   the  attendees  of   this  
workshop  as   ‘participants’,  whereas   in  WS  II,  and  WS  III   I   refer   to   them  as  
‘audience–participants’.  
The   fourteen   participants   of   the   workshop   were   third-­year   undergraduate  
performance   students,   graduate   students,   and   members   of   staff   from   my  
school,   and   two   'participant–observers'   (a   postgraduate   graphic   design  
student   from  my  department,  and  a  sound  designer-­engineer  postgraduate  
student   from  the  University  of  York).  My  original   thought  when  devising  the  
workshop   was   to   involve   undergraduate   students   from   the   field   of  
scenography,   fine  art,   or   design,   so   that   the   result  would  have  been  more  
skilfully  managed,   from  a  designer   skills   point   of   view.  Later,   I   opened   the  
call   further   without   specifying   any   required   skills,   and   this   led   to   having  
mostly   participants   who   were   not   skilled   makers   or   designers,   something  
that  brought  forth  the  insight  of  the  ‘ignorant  scenographer’.    
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The  workshop  took  place  at  Alec  Clegg  (stage@leeds),  University  of  Leeds,  
on  14  May  2014.  My  methods  for  collecting  qualitative  data  focused  on  the  
use  of  video   (the  process  was   recorded   from  above   the  grid  using  a  video  
camera,  while  four  other  still  cameras  were  placed  in  the  four  corners  of  the  
studio).   The   video   recording   picked   up   sound   (voice)   from   what   the  
participants   talked   about   during   the   workshop;;   however,   this  material   was  
not   used   for   my   analysis.   Furthermore,   there   was   a   voice   recorder  
strategically   positioned   on   one   of   the   tables   (the   ‘Language’   table)   so   that  
the  participants  could   record   the  new   language   they  developed,  as  can  be  
seen  on  the  video  (02:28-­03:41).  In  addition,  I  gave  out  questionnaires  to  the  
participants   at   the   end   of   the   workshop   to   fill   in   and   had   a   short   post-­
workshop  discussion   (these  are  available   in   the  USB   folder  WS  I).  For   the  
analysis   of   the   workshop   I   used   the   above   qualitative   data   and   also  
observation   and   reflection,   drawing   from  my   own   experience   of   the   work,  
and  personal  notes  made  shortly  after  the  workshop.  
The  selection  of  materials  used  (wool,  fabric,  paper,  clay,  glue,  watercolours  
etc.)  was  made  according   to   their   texture,  colour,  and  my  personal  view  of  
the  potential  and   the  qualities   that   these   familiar  and  basic  materials  could  
afford.   I   also   considered   the   potential   ‘conversations’   that   I   thought   these  
materials  could  generate  with  the  participants,  along  with  the  ‘conversations’  
that  they  themselves  could  develop  with  each  other  using  these.  
Due  to  the  complexity  of  this  three-­hour  workshop  the  quantity  of  interactions  
produced  was  vast  and  it   is  not   the  aim  of   this  analysis  to  expand  to  every  
level  of  the  process.  I  am  focusing  therefore  on  ‘moments  of  insight’  (Nelson  
2013,  p.29)  I  have  captured  with  the  documentation  concerning  the  dynamic  
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exchange   between   the   participants   and   the   materials   and   I   will   not  
extensively  address  other  aspects  (voice/sound,  for  example).  
The  participants  in  hybrid  participatory  events  are  a  dynamic  element  of  the  
system  for  which  the  scenographer  has  to  account  for  but,  as  in  any  theatre  
or  performance  event,   they  cannot  predict   in  advance   the   intentions,  mood  
and   motivations   of   the   group   nor   of   its   individual   members.   In   traditional  
theatre  settings  the  above  design  challenge  is  solved  by  providing  a  seating  
area   for   the   audience;;   however,   in   hybrid   and   participatory   performance  
environments,   the  audience’s  position   constantly   shifts   and   this  affects   the  
scenography.   The   positioning   of   the   participants   in  WS   I   was   determined  
partly   by   the   arrangement   suggested   in   Baars’   GWT   diagram,   which   was  
used  imaginatively  as  a  ground  plan  for  generating  scenographic  interaction.  
My   contextualisation   of   the  metaphor   of  GWT  drew   from   the  metaphorical  
description  of  consciousness  achieved  by  a  distributed  society  of  specialists.  
As   seen   in   the   video,   according   to   Baars’   metaphor-­hypothesis,  
consciousness   is   about   something   and   that   something,   the   message,  
although   it   is   broadcasted   globally,   ‘it   is   interpreted   locally   in   the   mind   of  
each   audience  member’   (Baars   1998,   p.53).   A   specific   conscious   content,  
for  example  when  one  sees  a  coffee  cup,  depends  on   the   local   regions  of  
the   visual   cortex.   ‘But,   by   itself,   local   cortical   activity   is   not   conscious.  
Rather,   the   conscious   experience   of   a   coffee   cup   requires   both   local   and  


































Work   Space   I   consisted   of   a   participatory   space   that   simultaneously  
performed   and   rehearsed   as   already   mentioned,   depending   on   the  
participants’   different   wider   ‘roles’,   that   of   ‘an   actor’,   or   a   ‘backstage   crew  
Figure 23. The 2007 version 
of the theatre metaphor of 
the global workspace theory 
model (Baars 2007, p.957) 
(top) and its appropriation in 
WS I (bottom).  
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member’,   or   an   ‘audience   member’,   where   the   participants   were   situated  
within   the   space   according   to   the   diagram,   and   their   contribution.  
Furthermore,  as  already  argued,   this  shift  of   roles  did  not  occur   in  a   linear  
orderly   manner,   and   the   participants   were   not   necessarily   free   to   choose  
what   to  do  or  where   to   look,  but   they  were   instead  guided  by  a  number  of  
‘invisible’   unfolding  and  enfolding   relational   factors,   e.g.   the  affordances  of  
the   materials   on   offer,   their   co-­participants,   their   bodies   within   the   space,  
their  intentions,  etc.    
This   workshop   was   the   first   performance   experiment   helping   me   in  
developing   the   aesthetics   of   dynamic   scenographic   systems   by   entering   a  
creative   dialogue   with   contemporary   thinking   on   consciousness   and  
cognition.   However,   the   complexity   of   the   system   was   high   and   the  
usefulness  of  persisting  with  the  details  of  the  GWT,  I  realised,  were  not  as  
important  as  the  relations  generated  between  the  participants,  the  materials,  
and  their  co-­participants.  This  was  something  I  took  further  in  WS  II,  and  WS  
III.  
The   relational   dynamics   between   participants   and   the   materials   provided  
within  the  space,  which  comprised  part  of  this  ‘groundless  scenography’,  are  
the  elements  I  am  looking  at  closely  within  this  contraption-­environment,  and  
aiming   to  untangle,  as  much  as   I   can.  For   this,   I   am  employing  as  critical,  
conceptual   and   theoretical   frameworks   an   extended   understanding   of  
Gibson’s  ‘affordances’  by  Rietveld  and  Kiverstein  (2014)  and  Bruineberg  and  
Rietveld   (2014)   for   tackling   the  multimodal  process  nature  of  scenographic  
reception  and  operations  in  this  practice  investigation.    
The   above   theories   belong   to   4E   cognitive   science,   whereas   Baars’  GWT  
belongs   to   a   computational-­turning-­connectionist   theory,   and   below   I   will  
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demonstrate   the   usefulness   of   combining   the   two   different   approaches   for  
scenography  research  in  WS  I.    
According  to  connectionism,  and  as  enacted   in  WS  I,  cognition  emerges   in  
the  form  of  global  states  in  a  network  of  simple  components  and  is  achieved  
by  a  distributed  society  of  specialists.  In  WS  I  the  simple  components  were  
the   desks   with   the   materials,   while   the   specialists   were   the   participants.  
According  to  connectionism,  rules  are  used  for  the  operation  of  the  different  
components,   and   even  more   rules   ‘for   changes   in   the   connectivity   among  
the  elements’  (Varela  et  al.  on  connectionism  1991,  p.99).  In  WS  I  the  rules  
were  provided  on  each  desk  and  corresponded  to  the  action  that  needed  to  
be  done   in   the  specific   table,  whilst   the   ‘even  more   rules’  were  decided  by  
the   participants’   (the   specialists’)   actions   and   bodies   and   by   the   rules  
dictated  by  the  materials  (I  will  unpack  this  further  in  my  analysis  to  follow).  
Finally,   the   connectionist   model   understands   that   the   cognitive   system  
functions   well   when   the   result   ‘can   be   seen   to   correspond   to   a   specific  
cognitive   capacity   –   a   successful   solution   to   a   required   task’   (ibid.).   The  
required   task   (the   crafting   of   a   collective   artefact),   in   WS   I   however,  
accepted  all  solutions  as  ‘successful’.    
This   was   an   open   system,   which   allowed   each   one   of   the   participants   to  
have  access   to   the   ‘broadcasting  area’,   ‘the  spotlight  of  consciousness’,  at  
any   time:   the   participants   spoke   into   the  microphone,   and   what   they   said  
was  heard  by  everyone  in  the  studio,  and  what  they  made  with  the  materials  
and  wished  to  share  with  the  group  was  broadcast  to  all  the  participants  on  a  
large   screen.   The   aim   was   to   explore   how   the   written   rules   that   were  
provided   by   the   ‘ignorant   scenographer’   and   used   in   the   different  
components  (the  four  tables)  through  the  actions  of  the  participants,  worked  
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together   with   the   ‘invisible’   rules   (the   affordances   provided   by   the   raw  
materials   of   wool,   clay,   etc.)   to   generate   the   changes   in   the   connectivity  
among   the   elements   (the   participants   and   the   materials)   towards   the  
manufacturing  of  ‘something’,  ‘anything’.    
As   an   artist–scenographer   I   used,   in   the   specific   performance   experiment,  
GWT   to   develop   my   design   thinking   for   spatially   contextualising   the  




convergence  zones,    
integration,    
dynamic  system,    
process,    
complexity      
simultaneity    
Indeed,   this   connectionist-­computational   vocabulary   is   a   shared   one   with  
contemporary   scenography   and   performance   as   it   is   useful   for  
communicating   the   subtle   dynamic   aesthetics   found   in   the   contemporary  
performance  landscape.  ‘Emergence’  for  example  is  a  term  commonly  used  
both   in   the   industry   and   in   contemporary   scholarship   of   performance,  
replacing  in  many  occasions  the  word  ‘appearing’.    
What   is   therefore   useful   to   this   study   is   the   non-­representational   concept-­
metaphors  that  this  vocabulary  entails  and  the  ‘languaging’  (Maturana  1988)  
that   these   concept-­metaphors   can   offer.   In   a   similar   way   to   the  
poststructuralists  position  of  ‘[t]here  is  nothing  outside  of  the  text  [there  is  no  
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outside-­text;;   il   n'y  a  pas  de  hors-­texte]   (Derrida  1997),  enactivist  Maturana  
suggests  that  we  ‘happen  in  language’  (Maturana  1988,  p.43)  and  that  ‘[w]e  
have   no   way   of   referring   to   ourselves   or   to   anything   else   outside   of  
language’  (ibid.).  He  situates  language  as  a  biological  phenomenon,  and  as  
interrelational:  
[L]anguage   is   a   manner   of   living   together   in   a   flow   of  
coordinations   of   coordinations   of   consensual   behaviors   [sic]   or  
doings  that  arises  in  a  history  of  living  in  the  collaboration  of  doing  
things  together  (Maturana  2002,  p.27).    
  
In   Work   Space   I,   I   observed   that   the   connectionist   (representational)  
language  model,  when   languaged  (en-­spaced,  and  enacted),  generated  an  
enactive,  autopoietic  scenographic  system.    
Understanding  therefore  language  as  a  manner,  or  a  doing,  as  ‘languaging’  
(Maturana   1988)   can   be   useful   to   scenography   for   harnessing   the  
sensorimotor   and   felt   understanding   of   metaphors   for   the   creation   of  
dynamic,  self-­organisational  scenographies   (or   ‘scenograpy   in   the   flesh’  as  
outlined   on   p.   57).   Such   scenographies   allow   the   participants   to   develop  
common   doings,   reflect,   get   stuck   and   rely   on   their   ‘histories’   in   order   to  
bring  forth  their  own  worlds  to  complement  these  common  doings.  
Applications  of  Enactive  Perspectives  of  Affordances  in  
Work  Space  I    
3.2  Expanded  Perspectives  of  Audiences’  Engagement  with  
Materials:  Landscape  and  Field  of  Affordances,  Optimal  Grip  
An   ‘affordance’   is   a   neologism,   coined   by   ecological   psychologist   James  
Gibson  (1986)  from  the  verb  ‘to  afford’  as  a  way  of  attempting  to  explain  the  
potential  that  an  object  carries  or  entails  and  at  the  same  time  the  potential  
or   function   that   another   organism   finds   in   that   object.   The   concept   of  
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affordance,   although   it   draws   from   the   gestalt   psychology   concepts   of  
‘valence,   invitation   and   demand’   (Gibson   1986,   p.138)   that   a   phenomenal  
object   has   in   relation   to  a  physical   object,   is   different   in   the   sense   that   an  
affordance  is  a  quality  of  an  object  that  is  there  to  be  perceived  regardless  of  
the   phenomenal   object’s   need.   The   observer  may   locate   an   affordance   in  
the  object  or  the  environment  and  use  it  but  she/he  does  not  determine  it.  As  
Gibson  himself  puts  it:  ‘The  object  offers  what  it  does  because  it  is  what  it  is’  
(ibid.  p.138–9).  Gibson  therefore  suggests  an  ecological  approach  to  (visual)  
perception   where   ‘perceiving   is   an   achievement   of   the   individual,   not   an  
appearance  in  the  theatre  of  consciousness’  (ibid.  p.239).  Perception  is  not  
based   on   stored   information;;   the   information   is   always   available   to   the  
animal  in  the  world.  
According   to   theatre   and   performance   scholars   Bleeker   and   Germano  
‘enactive   approaches   are   useful   in   understanding   how   theatre   works   by  
starting  from  the  interaction  between  the  affordances  of  the  medium  and  the  
perceptual  possibilities  of  spectators’  (2014,  p.383).  This  is  a  pertinent  quote  
to   this  project   that   I  will  be   following  up;;  however,   I  need   to  point  out  here  
that   the  enactivists  Varela,  Thompson,  and  Rosch   take  a   critical   stance   to  
the  Gibsonians’  ‘attempt  to  build  up  the  theory  of  perception  almost  entirely  
from   the   environment’   (Varela   et   al.   1991,   p.204).   They   write:   ‘Whereas  
Gibson   claims   that   perception   is   direct   detection,   we   claim   that   it   is  
sensorimotor   enactment’   (ibid.)   and   focus   on   the   structural   coupling   of   the  
animal.  I  agree  with  the  enactivists,  who  on  one  hand  reject  dualism  but  on  
the  other  hand  do  not  go   the  completely  opposite  direction  of  suggesting  a  
monism  like  Gibson,  but  find  a  middle  way  between  these  two  (Varela  et  al.  
1991,  p.202).  
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Therefore   what   I   will   be   using   are   recent   radical   embodied   and   enactive  
views  that  consider  affordances  both  relational  and  a  resource  (Rietvelt  and  
Kiverstein   2014,   p.327)   to   reflect   on   the   rich,   reciprocal   scenographic  
exchange  between  the  participants,  co-­participants  and  materials  in  WS  I.  
The   materials   used   in  WS   I   were   simple   and   common   (e.g.   wool,   paint,  
carbon,   pastels,   paper,   thread,   and   food   (cheese)).   With   time,   new  
affordances   of   the   materials   were   discovered   and   perceived   by   the  
participants   who   started   unfolding,   unrolling,   cutting,   filling,   covering,  
grasping,  sticking,  tasting,  and/or  throwing  them.  A  ball  of  wool  was  unrolled  
and  was  used   in  more  unusual   and   ‘inventive’  ways  as   time  went   by.  The  
participants   used   the   wool   to   create   new   spaces,   to   stick   on   paper   as  
decoration,   or,   later,   as   one   of   the   participants   did,   to   cover   their   heads,  
transforming  it  into  a  wig,  a  veil,  a  moustache,  and  so  on.    Furthermore,  new  
objects  were   created  as   the  participants   combined  different  materials   (e.g.  
clay  with  string),  and  new  affordances  emerged  in  these  new  combinations.    
WS   I   was   a   ‘scenographic   landscape’,   as   defined   by   scenographer   David  
Shearing:  ‘a  manifold  experience  of  cognitive,  corporeal,  material  and  spatial  
agents   that   manifests   itself   through   an   active   doing   of   the   scenographic  
world’   (2014,   p.50).   The   participants   engaged   in   an   active   doing   and  
experienced   the   work   as   active   agents   in   a   dynamic   interplay   with   the  
constantly   changing   scenographic   landscape:   the  materials,   the   voice,   the  
light,  the  environment,  their  co-­participants,  and  so  on.  In  terms  of  untangling  
the   elements   of   the   ‘scenographic   landscape’   of  WS   I,   I   am   referring   to  
Bruineberg   and   Rietveld’s   ‘terminology   of   skilled   intentionality’,   where   a  
‘landscape   of   affordances’   is   defined   as   ‘the   affordances   available   to   the  
whole   spectrum   of   abilities   available   in   our   socio-­cultural   practices’   and   a  
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‘field   of   affordances’   as   the   ‘affordances   that   stand   out   as   relevant   for   a  
particular   individual   in  a  particular  situation’  (Bruineberg  and  Rietveld  2014,  
p.2).    
The  term  ‘field  of  affordance’  could  prove  useful  here  as  it  focuses  more  on  
the   dynamic   and   self-­organisational   nature   of   an   audience–participant’s  
experience   relating   to   the   affordances   that   stand   out   as   relevant   for   the  
audience  at  a  given  moment  within  the  ‘scenographic   landscape’  (Shearing  
2014,  p.50).  Participant  A1  shared  their  experience  by  writing,  ‘I  used,  clay,  
string,  fabric.  I  made  a  washing  machine  with  a  line  of  clothes  coming  out  of  
it.  It  was  whimsical.’  They  then  explained  that  they  made  a  washing  machine  
because   the   story   (what   the   central   ‘actor’s’   voice   was   talking   about)  
included  washing.  In  the  case  of  participant  A1  the  affordances  that  stood  up  
as   relevant,   the   ‘field   of   affordances’   along  with   the   stimulus  of   the   ‘story’,  
guided   them  to  select   the  materials   that  appeared  relevant  at   that  stage   to  
respond   to   the  specific   task:   the  making/manufacturing  of  an  object.  There  
was  a  certain  amount  of  distilling  of  information  on  the  part  of  participant  A1  
in  order  to  maintain  their  self-­organisation.  This  distilling  was  not  happening  
inside  their  head  but  occurred  as  an  action-­oriented  haptic  dialogue  between  
the   participant   and   the   surrounding   affordances.   Participant   A1   created   a  
‘washing   machine’   but   the   shape,   size,   and   design   of   the   specific   object  
were  determined  by  the  sensorimotor  ‘conversation’  between  the  participant,  
the   experience   (listening   to   a   specific   ‘story’),   and   the  materials   available.  
There  was  a  tendency  towards  an  ‘optimal  grip’,  defined  by  Bruineberg  and  
Rietvelt  as   ‘the   tendency  of  a  skilled   individual   to  be  moved   to   improve   its  
grip   on   the   situation   by   responding   to   solicitations’   (2014,   p.2),   in   order   to  
maintain  their  self-­organisation  within  the  interrelated  network  of  affordances  
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(‘landscape   of   affordances’)   and   continue   to   experience   the   ‘scenographic  
landscape’.   The   participant   responded   to   what   they   heard   of   a   washing  
machine  with   a   line   of   clothes   coming  out   of   it;;   out   of   all   the  materials   on  
their   desk,   they   chose   to   use   clay,   string   and   fabric   to   give   life   to   that  
interpretation   of   the   ‘story’,   and   the   image   of   that   story   was   co-­created  
alongside  their  interaction  with  the  materials.  
The  active  doing  of  audience–participant  A1   in   the  specific  example  during  
WS   I   is   haptic   and   is   largely   impacted   by   the   fact   that   it   is   placed   in   a  
dynamic  interplay  with  the  landscape  of  affordances:  what  the  central  voice  
said  (a  story  related  to  washing),  the  materials  and  objects  in  the  room  (clay,  
string,   fabric,   microphone,   lights,   etc.),   their   mood/state   (described   by   the  
participant   as   ‘whimsical’),   and   the   co-­participants   (how   they   occupied   the  
space,  what  they  said  and  other  aspects  of  their  presence  in  the  space  that  
are  difficult  to  pinpoint  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  system).    
Rietveld  and  Kiverstein  (2014)  assume  a  new  perspective  of  understanding  
affordances,  which   is  situated   in   the  observation   that  until  now  the  concept  
of   affordance   has   been   applied   without   taking   into   account   the   specific  
context  in  which  the  affordances  are  exercised  by  each  animal.  Therefore,  in  
the   case   of   humans,   they   suggest   an   understanding   of   the   affordances’  
‘embedding  in  sociocultural  practices’  (Rietveld  and  Kiverstein  2014,  p.326).  
Their  view  comes  from  Gibson’s  reference  to  an  ecological  niche  that  each  
animal   forms   and   tailors   according   to   its   needs;;   in   the   case   of   humans,  
Rietvelt   and   Kiverstein   argue   that   the   niche   in   which   affordances   are  
understood  and  used  is  particularly  defined  by  sociocultural  practices.  In  the  
occasion  of   theatre  and  performance,   this  can  be  applied   to   the   relation  of  
the  audience  within  the  performance,  and  an  example  is  given  below.      
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In  WS   I   during  Cycle  1   (Immersing)   the  group  worked  on  an  exercise   in  a  
circle  using  a  ball  of  wool:   the   instruction  of   the  exercise  was   to   throw   the  
ball  of  wool  to  each  other  while  at  the  same  time  to  not  let  go  of  the  unfolding  
thread,  thus  creating  visible  ‘links/lines  of  wool’  from  one  person  to  the  other  
in  a  circle  (Figs.  24,  25,  and  26).  When  the  exercise  commenced  it  was  clear  
that  the  members  of  the  group  found  themselves  in  bewilderment  of  how  to  
throw  the  ball  of  wool  and  at  the  same  time  keep  hold  of  the  other  end  of  the  
thread;;   the  material  wanted   to  naturally   follow   the  direction  of   the   throwing  
action.   In   fewer   than   five   tries   this   puzzle   was   solved   by   the   group,   who  
collectively  came  to  the  decision,  after  trial  and  error,  that  the  best  way  to  do  
this   would   be   to   make   a   loop   with   the   wool   around   one’s   wrist   before  
throwing.  The  group  therefore  found  a  way  to  embed  the  affordances  of  the  
wool  in  their  circle  of  interaction,  using  their  own  body  (wrists,  posture,  etc.),  
language   (explaining   the  problem  and  potential   solutions   to   the   rest   of   the  
group),  and  prior  knowledge  so  as  to  reach  their  collective  goal  and  continue  
their  original  task  (the  game).    
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Figures 24, 25 and 26, 
Immersing. (photograph taken 
from above the grid). The 
participants took the collective 
decision to make a loop around 
their wrist before throwing the 
wool to the next person in the 
circle. This allowed the group 
to carry on with their task of 
making visible thread 
connections between one 
another. 
  
The   group’s   main   task   was   to   get   on   with   their   activity   and   so   they  
economised   time  by  collectively  concentrating  on   ‘ad-­hoc’  problem  solving,  
finding   the  most  effective  way  of  using   the  affordances  of   the  medium  (the  
wool)   in   order   to   continue   within   their   sociocultural   practice   (the   game).    
Once   they   figured   out   the   best   way   to   overcome   this   challenge   they  
continued   the   game   until   the   thread   of   wool   was  mostly   unfolded   and   the  
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game   ended.   The   case   above,   I   argue,   illustrates   how   cognition   can   be  
extended  from  the  group  of  participants  to  the  ball  of  wool  and  how  the  mind  
is  socially  distributed  between  the  members  of  the  group  in  order  for  them  to  
communicate  with  each  other  and  think  through  doing,  within  a  sociocultural  
context   (in   this   specific   occasion,   the   game   between   the  WS   I   group)   in  
order  to  get  an  ‘optimum  grip’.  Trimingham  observes  a  similar  outcome  when  
working   with   autistic   children   in   much   the   same   performance   conditions,  
describing  the  embeddedness  of  the  objects  on  a  social  and  cultural  level  as  
so  strong  so  that  ‘individual  consciousness  and  the  extended  mind  become  
impossible   to   distinguish’   (Trimingham   2013,   p.240).   The   reason   this  
happened  though   in   the  specific  example  was  because  of   the   focus  on  the  
simple  game  of  throwing.  
Participant  A2  commented  after   the  workshop   that   they  were  not   skilled   in  
drawing   and   painting   and   having   to   paint   during   the   workshop   was  
frustrating,   especially   when   they   compared   their   drawings   to   those   of   the  
people   next   to   them,   who   they   described   as   more   skilled.   Later   they  
explained   how   they   persisted   with   the   materials   (paper,   watercolours,  
crayons,  etc.)  and  ‘focused’  their  mind  on  what  they  were  doing,  not  listening  
to   the  surrounding  voices,  and  eventually  saw  something  emerge   that   they  
were  happy  with.    
The  idea  of  the  novice  is  explored  by  Rietveld  and  Kieverstein,  in  relation  to  
Gibson’s   reference   to   an   ‘education   of   attention’,   which   crucially   involves  
other  practitioners  who  ‘selectively  introduce  the  novice  to  the  right  aspects  
of   the   environment   and   their   affordances’   (Rietveld   and   Kiverstein   2014,  
p.331).   In   the   case   of   participant   A2   from   the   example   above,   we   see   a  
reciprocal   exchange,   a   sensorimotor   coupling   not   only   between   them   and  
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the  materials   (persistence   to  get   the  anticipated   result  versus   resistance  of  
the   material)   but   also   between   them   and   the   creations   and   materials   of  
fellow   participants   within   the   sociocultural   practice   of  WS   I   (in   this   case,  
comparing   results;;   in  other   cases   liking  or  not   liking   the   ideas  of  others  or  
appropriating   the  drawings  of  others).  Participant  A2  was   introduced   to   the  
activity  and  was  initially  put  off  by  their  lack  of  skill;;  therefore,  they  were  not  
able   to  get  an   ‘optimal  grip’  of   the  situation.  They  were   later  guided  by   the  
skills   of   their   co-­participants   and   engaged   and   persisted   with   the   task   of  
drawing,  wanting  to  overcome  failure.    
A2’s   intention   was   to   subdue   the   difficulties   of   the   novice   by   creating   for  
themselves   a   manageable   field   of   affordances   from   the   materials   (paper,  
watercolours,   and   crayons)   in   order   to   create   an   image   they   were   happy  
with,  so  as  to  overcome  their  frustration  and  feel  part  of  the  group.  What  they  
did  was   to   attune   themselves  with   the   group,   establish   a   common   ground  
with   their   fellow   participants   by   fast-­tracking   their   drawing   skills.   Because  
drawing  was   the  medium   of   establishing   a   connection  with   the   group   and  
participant  A2  was  not  willing   to  accept   failure  nor   leave,   they   ‘focused’  as  
they  said  and  progressed  their  skills  in  order  to  get  a  grip  and  overcome  their  
tension.  
Another   way   of   getting   an   ‘optimal   grip’   in  WS   I   was   the   appropriation   of  
designs,  motifs,   and/or   images   of   others   and   so   some   shapes   reoccurred  
during  the  workshop  as  seen  on  figures  27  and  28.    
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This  kind  of  contagion  of  certain  aspects  of  the  participants’  creations  and  of  
the  contagious  ways  the  affordances  of  the  mediums  that  were  used  in  WS  I  
Figures 27 and 28. Contagious scenography.  The image of an eye was a reoccurring one during WS I. 
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leads   to   the   observation   that   in   the   specific   workshop   a   ‘contagious  
scenography’  occurred  in  which  certain  responses  to  the  affordances  (ways  
of  unfolding  the  thread,  tying  knots,  cutting  pieces  of  paper)  and  motifs  (e.g.  
the  image  of  an  eye)  gained  popularity  and  were  repeated  (Fig.  27,  28).  This  
‘contagious   scenography’   generated   by   the   groundless   co-­relation   of   the  
participants   to   the   affordances   can   be   considered   not   only   an   ecological  
activity   but   also   one   that   is   socially   distributed   and   embedded   in   the  
sociocultural  practices  of  the  group,  and  one  that  drove  the  system  of  WS  I.  
In   his  work  Theatrical   Improvisation,  Consciousness,   and  Cognition   (2013)  
Clayton   Drinko   argues   (based   on   experiences   of   improvisers   and   recent  
experiments   and   findings   of   cognitive   neuroscience,   psychology,   and  
philosophy)   that   improvisation   ‘is   not   just   something   that   happens   in   the  
brain’   (2013,   p.108)   but   a   co-­originating   activity   between   participants   and  
their   cultural   expectations   (such   as   the   rules   of   the   game).   ‘Successful  
improvisation   can   be   contagious,   and   it   is   generally   contingent   on   giving  
oneself  over  to  the  group,  the  group  mind’  (ibid.).  He  then  goes  on  to  explain  
about   how   a   structure   is   essential   for   a   successful   improvisation   and   that  
‘embodying   these   improve   guidelines   can   also   lead   to   self-­consciousness  
and  deeper  connections  between  people  in  other  contexts’  (ibid.).    
This   idea  of   ‘embodying  guidelines’   is  similar  to  what  I  explored  in  terms  of  
how  and   if   the  embodiment  of   these   ‘guidelines’  was  achieved   in  WS   I   by  
fleshing  out  GWT.  Assuming  an  ‘ignorant  scenographer’s’  role  I  provided,  as  
the   facilitator   the   design,   some   tools   (such   as   materials,   and   cards   with  
‘rules’);;  however,  I  did  not  ask  the  participants  to  join  my  story  but  to  make  a  
story,  and  here  the   idea  of  making   is  also  taken   literally  as  the  participants  
were   actively   engaged   with   the   production   of   a   tangible   artefact.   What   I  
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provided  (wool,  clay,  tables,  chairs,  etc.)  was  familiar  to  the  participants  but  
did   not   impose   a   certain   use;;   however,   once   the   system   scenography  
started   to   unfold,   the   system   scenography   itself   began   making   some  
suggestions   of   how   to   use   the   materials   through   the   co-­participants’  
contagious  actions  and  presence  within  WS  I.  
What  was   tested   in  WS   I  was  how   the   individuals  established  connections  
through  the  materials  and  by  engaging  with  their  co-­participants.  My  aim  was  
to  create  a  context-­sensitive  system  that  was  not  designed  to  function  like  a  
factory,   for  example,  where   the   final  product   is  of  no  or   little   interest   to   the  
person  who  places   the  bolt,   but   designed   in   such  a  way   that   each  person  
who   contributed   to   the   ‘central   spotlight’   was   aware   and   interested   of   the  
impact  their  contribution  could  have  to  the  overall  result.      
Looking   at   the   data,   one   of   the   participants   described   the   system   as   ‘a  
machine  or  a  factory,  but  a  very  inefficient  one’,  while  some  others  referred  
to   it   as   ‘a  playground’,   a   ‘classroom’,   ‘an  outdoor   space’,   and   ‘an  arts  and  
crafts  community  centre’.  These  characteristics  belong  to  the  ‘scenographic  
contraption’  of  WS  I,  and  point   to   the   fact   that   the  participants   found  some  
sort   of   structure   in   the   activity,   but   mostly   a   structure   like   an   educational  
setup,   for   example,   that   provided   them  with   permission   or   freedom   to   fail.  
The   important   thing  was   to  make   something   but   it   didn’t  matter  what   they  
made.  Making  became  an  extension  of  their  communication  with  each  other  
(Fig.29)   and   what   they   made   became   the   material   of   observation   in   the  
workshop.    
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3.3  Interim  Conclusions  
The   translation   of   GWT   into   a   workshop   brought   forth,   therefore,   ‘a  
contraption  scenography’:  a  closed,  dynamic,  scenographic  architecture  that  
continuously  transforms  through  the  participation  of   the  people  triggered  by  
the  affordances  within  the  architecture,  and  gives  rise  to  itself,  until  the  show  
is  put  to  an  end  by  the  workshop  leader,  or  if  all  participants  decide  to  leave  
(which  was  not   the  case   in   this  specific  experiment).  The  participants  were  
the  dynamic  elements  of  the  composition  as  long  as  they  were  in  the  space,  
whether   they  were  engaged  with   the  making  or   not.  When   they  exited   the  
door   they   stopped   being   a   dynamic   element   of   this   composition.   This   is  
useful   as  an  observation  as  one  may  say   that   the   idea  of  a   ‘scenographic  
contraption’   can   be   applied   to   proscenium   arch   spectating   as   well.   What  
happens   to   the   system   occurs   as   a   structural   dynamic,   depending   on   the  
Figure 29. A scenographic artefact generated by a contagious scenography. 
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dynamic  structure  of   its   individual  parts,   including   the  participants,  and   it   is  
not  dependent  on  an  outside  intervention.    
What  was  explored  with  WS  I  was  the  contextualisation  of  consciousness  as  
a   multimodal,   non-­linear,   rhizomatic,   non-­hierarchical   model   of   collective  
creation   and   the   dynamic   interactions   between   the   participants,   the  
environment,   and  materials.   In   this   study   I   engaged   in   a   creative   dialogue  
with   scenography   and   Baars’   GWT   of   consciousness   to   develop   a  
scenographic  workshop.  Using  this  cognitive  architecture  as  a  springboard  I  
generated   for   my   research   a   ‘rich   landscape   of   affordances’,   which   I  
analysed  using  enactive  and  embodied  views  and  approaches  of  Gibson’s  
notion  of  affordances  (Rietveld  and  Kiverstein  2014).  Drawing  on  examples  
from  WS  I  and  the  analysis  of   these  examples  with  the  help  of   frameworks  
such   as   the   ‘field   and   landscape   of   affordances’   (Bruineberg   and  Rietveld  
2014),  by  referring  to  three  examples  I  have  managed  to  ‘untangle’  as  much  
as   possible   the   ‘scenographic   landscape’   (Shearing   2014)   of   WS   I   and  
provide   some   insights   on   the   material   and   experiential   nature   of  
scenography  with  a  specific  audience.  The  materialisation  of   this  workshop  
brought  forward  the  insight  of  a  contagious  scenography,  which  is  distributed  
between   the   workshop   environment,   the   participants,   and   their   co-­
participants,  and  generated  a  reflection  on  the  idea  of  emancipation  through  
trial   and   error   for   the   acquisition   of   skills   in   relation   to   the   ‘ignorant  
scenographer’.  
The  ‘intelligence’  that  comprised  the  system  of  WS  I  was  generated  by  a  set  
of   simple   rules   of   a   game   open   to   interpretation   and   appropriation   by   the  
collective   of   the   participants.   And   so   in  WS   I,   I   assumed   the   role   of   the  
(willingly)   ignorant   artist–researcher   who   presents   to   the   unknown  
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participants   materials   that   are   not   already   processed   into   some   form   of  
artwork.   This   makes   for   a   contraption-­environment   for   the   participants   to  
unite   or   even   conspire   with   their   fellow   audience   members,   working   with  
materials  and  with  their  bodies  (movement,  speech)  in  order  to  make  sense,  
based  on  the  experience  that  they  bring  into  the  work.  As  a  creator,  on  the  
other  hand,   I   rely  on   them  and  depend  on   the  unknown  elements   they  will  
bring  into  the  piece  as  a  result  of  their  agency.  
The  scenographer  cannot  enter  the  autonomous  system  that  is  an  audience  
member,   because   a   person   is   an   operationally   closed   system,   with   self-­
organising  processes;;  however,  they  can  intervene  in  the  environment  of  the  
audience,   and   by   re-­arranging   the   environment   create   a   conversation  with  
the  audience  about  themselves,  bringing  them  into  a  dialogue  with  ‘speaking  
of  today’s  man’,  as  Eco  suggests,  by  using  themselves  as  material.  In  doing  
so,   another   element   that   needs   to   be   taken   into   account   is   distributed  
cognition   between   the   audience;;   again,   this   is   not   something   that  may   be  
controlled,   but   it   can   be   addressed.   The   above   observation   generated   a  
number   of   new   questions   in   relation   to   my   research   questions,   including:  
How   do   I   contextualise   this   distribution?   How   might   metaphors   of  
consciousness  help  me   further  design   this  distribution  of   the  experience  of  
the   audience?  How   do   I   frame   the   experience   of   distributed   design?  How  
might   radical   embodied   cognitive   neuroscience   and   the   more   generally  
applied   notions   of   encultured   cognition   contribute   further   to   understanding  
the  workings  of   dynamic  distributed  scenographic   systems?     WS   II   follows  
up  on  these  questions.    
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Chapter  4:  Work  Space  II–Attempts  on  Margarita  (Multiple  
Drafts)    
4.1  Scenographic  Contraptions    (part  2):  Tackling  
Groundlessness  
Using   the   ‘scenographic   contraption’   as   a   methodological   tool   I   have  
engineered   a   practical   approach   as   a   means   of   developing   new   ways   of  
making   and   navigating   a   ‘groundless   scenography’   in   a   space   that  
‘performs-­rehearses’.   For   this   I   am   fleshing   out   metaphorical   notions   of  
consciousness  and  perception,  in  order  to  generate  participation.  I  have  also  
conceptualised   scenography   ‘as   contraption’,   to   point   out   the   compressed  
meaning   of   scenography   that   the   audience   need   to   untangle   each   in   their  
own   autonomous   way,   and   have   explored   briefly   how   theorising  
scenographic   ‘participation   as   contraption’   may   facilitate   a   sense   of  
understanding   participation   as   communion   between   the   participants   in   a  
space   that   simultaneously   performs-­rehearses.   This   communion   entails  
intimacy,  an  exchange  and  sharing  of   feelings,   thoughts  and  actions,  on  a  
reflective,   spiritual   or   action-­oriented   manner,   and   it   does   not   exclude  
tensions,  or  messiness  for  example.    
In   this   section   I   will   continue   unpacking   the   methodological   tool   of  
‘scenographic  contraption’  and  its  underlying  logic  and  aesthetics  borrowing  
from  the  enactive  cognition  principle  of   ‘structural  coupling’,  and   the   insight  
of   pursuing   groundlessness,   of   going   further   into   groundlessness   with  
‘disciplined   and   genuine   means’   (Varela   at   al.   1991,   p.253).   I   will   explain  
why   this   is  useful   for  scenography  and  my  scenographic   interpretation  and  
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application  of  the  enactivists’  ‘disciplined  and  genuine  means’.  I  am  drawing  
in  this  part  from  general  insights  generated  through  all  the  Work  Spaces.  
As   already   outlined,   enactivists   refer   to   structural   coupling   and   the   co-­
determination  between  animal  and  environment  and  claim  that  an  enactment  
of  world  and  mind  is  based  on  what  the  being  can  do  or  is  able  to  perceive  
they  can  do  based  on  its  history  (ibid.  1991,  p.9),  e.g.  bees  gather  food  from  
flowers  and  so  need  to  recognise  them  from  a  distance.  But  if,  for  example,  
the  bees   recognised   the   flowers   from  a  distance  but  when   they  got   closer  
found   that   these   flowers   are   plastic   then   they  would   have   to   adjust   in   this  
new  world.    
One's   behavior   changes   as   one   learns   to   cope   with   new  
conditions   and   situations.   And,   as   one's   actions   change,   so   too  
does  one's  sense  of  the  world  (Varela  et  al.  1991,  p.164).  
  
Similarly  the  invisible  ‘instructions’  as  provided  by  the  contraptions  and  used  
in   the  Work  Spaces   constitute  what   I  will   call   from  now  on   the   ‘disciplined  
means’  of  ‘contraption’,  which  at  an  initial  stage  provide  temptations  and  call  
for   a   certain   level   of   skill   or   willing   engagement   from   the   part   of   the  
audience–participant.   These   are   governed   in   a   large   part   by   affordances,  
prediction,  and  prediction  error.  For  example,  a  pen  and  paper  are  provided,  
because   the   designer   ‘predicts’   that   an   audience–participant   will   draw   or  
write;;  the  audience–participant  accepts  the  invitation  of  the  affordance  of  the  
pen   and   paper   and   draws.   After   recognising   that   the   above   invitation   is  
working   the   designer   goes   on   to   evolve   the   affordances   and   creates   a  
system  where,  for  example,  what  is  drawn  by  the  audience  is  projected  on  a  
screen.  The  invisible  ‘instruction’  provided  by  the  initial  affordance  is  present,  
yet  another   layer  of  affordance,   that  of   the  projection,   is  established   in   the  
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negotiating   language   between   the   audience–participant   and   the   designer,  
when  the  former  encounters  the  contraption-­prop.    
The   above   example   demonstrates   the   constant   negotiations   between   the  
agent   and   the   designed   environment,   and   the   orchestration   of   this  
negotiation   by   the   scenographer.   I   will   refer   to   the   artist–scenographer,   in  
the   case   of   designing   groundless   contraption-­environments,   as   the  
‘processual   designer’,   appropriating   a   term   from   White   (2013)   following  
Murray  (1999),  who  refer  to  the  creator  in  interactive  gaming  (Murray)  and  in  
interactive   performance   (White)   as   a   ‘procedural   author’.   I   will   add   that   a  
‘processual   designer’   is   also   ‘Janus-­faced’,   thinking   about   the   space   as  
performing-­rehearsing,  and  thinking  between  material  and  immaterial.  In  the  
case   of   the   Work   Spaces   the   ‘processual   designer’   (me)   designs   a  
‘disciplined’   process,   using   the   method   of   the   scenographic   contraption,  
which   is   itself   an   undisciplined   notion,  meaning   that   it   does   not   follow   the  
cookie-­cutter  idea  of  imposing  a  shape  or  having  only  one  shape,  but  allows  
for   more   flexibility   in   creating   top-­down,   bottom-­up,   and   distributed  
interactions  and  interpretations  from  the  part  of  the  audience.    
Gradually   in   this   initially   structurally   determined,   context-­sensitive  
environment  associations  begin  to  take  place  and  shape  the  development  of  
the   ‘genuine  means’:   the  experience  of   the  audiences’   ‘structural   coupling’  
with   the   design.   This   happens   through   unwritten,   invisible   instructions   that  
are   afforded   by   the   design.   The   language,   which   will   successfully   and  
constructively   communicate  between   the   two   (artist–scenographer  plus   the  
artistic   team,   and   the   audience–participants),   unfolds   in   layers,   some   of  
which   are   nuanced   and   invisible,   so   that   the   experience   is   not   solely  
structural,   but   also   bodily,   emotive,   and  engaging   the   senses.   This  means  
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that   the  audience  overall  should  not   feel   forced  or  over-­stimulated,  and  not  
completely  lost  throughout  the  duration,  as  they  may  lose  complete  interest.    
In  terms  of  scenography  this   is  close  to  what  Lotker  and  Gough  refer  to  as  
‘invisible   scenography’   (2013,   p.5),   a   scenography   designed   in   the  
scenographer’s  mind  and  seen  (experienced/felt)  by  the  individual  audience  
member’s   whole   body   (ibid.).   Ideally,   the   audience   believe   that   they   have  
invented  their  own  scenographic  language  when  this  happens,  although  this  
language  has  been  suggested  by  their  interaction  with  the  design.  Therefore,  
the   invisible   and   subtle   co-­originating   scenography   makes   them   face  
themselves   and   their   state   in   that   moment   and   in   relation   to   their   co-­
audiences–participants   and   find   the   immaterial   material   in   this   condition  
(feelings,   imagination,   actions,   senses,   etc.)   to   generate   the   scenographic  
languaging,   a   language   as   a   doing:   the   feelings,   thoughts,   and   doings   as  
they  happen  and  not  a  representation  of  what  we  do  or  feel  (Maturana  2011,  
p.149).    
Such  insights  of  a  nuanced  language  appear  gradually,  and  this  was  mostly  
the   case   during   each   Work   Space.   From   the   part   of   the   artist–
scenographer–researcher,   these   insights  were   captured   and   developed   as  
an   ongoing   way   of   working   with   the   contraptions   and   by   observing   their  
interaction   with   the   audience–participants.   After   each   presentation   of   the  
work,  some  parts  of  the  scenographic  contraption  were  simplified,  producing  
nuanced,  and  subtle  aesthetics,  while  new  contraptions   took   form   in  a   less  
subtle,   and   in   some   cases,   primitive   stage.   These   were   then   developed,  
after  I  had  received  the  ‘embodied  feedback’  from  the  audience–participants’  
interaction   (through   observation   and   footage)   creating   gradually   more  
connections   or   different   approaches   between   the   layered   subtle   and  
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primitive   nuances   in   the   following   WorkSpace.      The   artist–scenographer  
therefore   never   stops   working   within   the   world,   while   the   artist–
scenographer–researcher   also   takes   a   critical   step   on   the   process   and   is  
writing  what  they  have  found  out  here  in  this  thesis.    
Following  Harpin  and  Nicholson  (2017),  I  argue  that  navigating  the  space  in  
an  inventive  though  inefficient  way  turns  participation  less  into  an  action  and  
more   into   an   encounter   and   a   perception.   This   encounter   entails   the   co-­
audiences,   and   also   the   audience–participants   reflecting   on   themselves,  
while   the   idea  of  participation  as  perception   is  very  useful   in   this  occasion,  
because   perception   and   consciousness   are   understood   as   contraptions   in  
contemporary   cognitive   science:   an   event-­invention,   a   performance-­
rehearsal,  a  brainweb,  an  ambiguous  event.  
Therefore  I  suggest  that  our  understanding  of  the  ‘disciplined  means’  of  the  
contraption   in   such   a   design   approach   may   be   reached   by   the   artist–
scenographer–researcher   (me,   in   the   case   of   the   WorkSpaces)   through  
identifying   and   reflecting   spatially   on   the   inner   logic   of   contemporary  
structural-­conceptual  metaphors  of   shifting  architectures   in  current  abstract  
structural   thinking   related   to   inventive  processes,  ambiguity,   etc.   (i.e.   as   in  
the   case   of   this   study   metaphors   of   consciousness,   perception,   or   living  
systems).      Other   examples   of   abstract   notions   would   be   the   rhizome,   the  
internet,   democracy,   the   experience   of   an   abstract   work   of   art   such   as   a  
painting,   a   song,   a   philosophical   idea,   a   notion,   a   person,   and   information  
systems,  etc.    
In  his  critique  The  Nightmare  of  Participation,  architect,  curator,  and  thinker  
Markus  Miessen  states   that   it   is   necessary   to   separate  oneself   from  using  
magic   buzz-­words   such   as   ‘sustainability,   participation,   democracy’   as  
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billpostings   and   that   ‘one   must   tackle   their   underlying   motives   through  
contextualized   practice’   (2010,   p.242).   This   is  what   I   am   attempting   in  my  
Work   Spaces   with   the   ‘contraption’   to   contextualise   in   an   embodied   and  
ecological   scenographic   manner   the   process,   ambiguity,   and   dynamics   of  
the  stories  of  consciousness  and  perception  as  a  response  to  what  I  argue  is  
the   current   contraption   climate.   The   insights   stemming   from   this  
understanding  can  help  incorporate  process  aesthetics  within  a  performance  
and   help   us   understand   better   the   dynamics   of   the   ‘invisible   but   decisive’  
nature   (Lotker   2015,   p.13)   of   scenography   and   aim   to   contribute   to   the  
overlapping  ‘nuanced  language’  (Bishop  2012)  of  contemporary  participatory  
art.  I  argue  that  4E  cognitive  science,  and  the  embodied  materiality  entailed  
in  metaphors  used  for  consciousness,  can  help  to  contextualise  this  invisible  
but  decisive  nature  of  scenography,  and  in  this  chapter  I  am  showing  how.  I  
will   also   address   the   questions   that   occurred   from   WS   I   regarding   the  
specific  aspect  of  distribution.  
Maturana   uses   the   analogy   of   living   beings   as   happenings   (2011,   p.146).  
This  is  a  very  apt  term  to  use  for  the  audience–participants  who  navigate  a  
space   which   performs-­rehearses,   and   who   are   themselves   performing-­
rehearsing.  If  living  beings  are  happenings  and,  if  we  follow  this  up,  then  the  
combinations  between  networks  of  happenings  may  not   lead   to  an   idea  of  
montage   as   fragmentation,   or   piecing   things   together,   but   a   network-­in-­
action.   And   because   these   ways   are   not   tried   enough,   the   results   are   an  
ongoing  mediation   of   reality   and   of   the   self,   and   can   lead   to   some   sort   of  
rhythm,   a   rhythm   of   groundlessness   maybe,   which   at   times   has   its  
cacophonies.      What   this   is   was   explored   in   WS   II,   which   attempted   to  
contextualise   this   rhythm   of   self   as   a   scenographic   network-­in-­action  
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borrowing   from   participants’   stories,   and   voices   and   cognitive   theories   of  
consciousness   as   a   process,   ‘patterns   of   practice’   (Roepstorff   et   al.   2010,  
following  Bourdieu  1990)  and  ‘cultural  affordances’  (Ramstead  et  al.).    
4.2    WS  II  :  An  Outline    
I  will  go  on  to  outline  the  ‘what’  and  ‘how’  of  WS  II  and  will  later  return  to  the  
‘why’.  WS   II   –   Attempts   on   Margarita   (multiple   drafts)   was   a   three-­hour  
durational   performance   installation.   With   this   piece   of   practice   I   explored  
how   the   empirical   hypothesis   of   consciousness,   like   the   ones   of   Dennett  
(1991),  Edelman  and  Tononi  (2000),  and  Tononi  (2004),  might  be  employed  
and  applied  imaginatively  as  a  method  for  creating  dynamic  and  distributed  
scenographic  systems.  As  already  stated,  I  am  not  making  empirical  claims  
on   how   consciousness   works   but   I   am   tackling   groundlessness   by  
contextualising   through   practice   consciousness,   as   suggested   by   these  
connectionist  metaphors.    
    (Please  watch  now  the  video  WS  II.mov/avi.,  7min,  in  the  folder  WS  II).  
The  installation  took  place  at  Stage  One  (stage@leeds),  University  of  Leeds,  
on  26  February  2015  as  part  of  the  Little  Leeds  Fringe  Festival  2015.  Stage  
One  is  a  studio    theatre  (black  box)  with  theatre  lighting  and  sound  facilities.  
For   the   purpose   of   documentation   the   central   part   of   the   installation   (the  
tubes,  Fig.   32)  was   recorded   from  above   the  grid   using  a   video   camera.   I  
used  a  still  camera  from  the  balcony  to  document  the  installation,  and  I  also  
took  some  photographs  from  the  ground  level.  Participanting  artists  also  took  
stills  which   they   later  shared  with  me;;   the  overall  sound  was   recorded  and  
sound  recordings  from  the  individual  parts  of  the  installation  are  also  kept  in  
the  project’s  archive  (these  can  be  accessed  on  request).  There  was  a  post-­
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show   discussion   between   me   and   the   participanting   artists   which   was  
recorded  (USB,  WS  II,  Folder  2).  
The   key   players   were  me   (the   principal   investigator),   artists–collaborators,  
the  audience–participants  (mostly  students  attending  the  Little  Leeds  Fringe  
Festival  2015  and  members  of  staff  at  University  of  Leeds).  I  took  up  the  role  
of  ‘dialogic  facilitator’  (Blaikie  2000,  p.52)  so  during  the  event  I  was  situated  
mostly   on   the   balcony   of   the   black-­box   theatre   in   order   to   observe   and   to  
coordinate  the  show,  making  sure  the  participating  artists  were  on  track  with  
their   cues  and  were  made  aware  of  any  changes.  The  methods   I  used   for  
collecting  data  were  photography,  voice  recording,  some  video  and  feedback  
questionnaires  (for  access   to   the  above  material  you  may  refer   to   the  USB  
WS  II,  Folder  3).  My  analysis   is  based  on   the  use  of   the  above  qualitative  
data   collected   during   the   performance   and   on   the   post-­show   interview  
discussion.  
The   piece   draws   its   structure   and  makes   a   reference   in   the   title   to  Martin  
Crimp’s  post-­dramatic  work  Attempts  on  her  Life   (1997)  and   from  cognitive  
theories  of  consciousness  and  perception  (as  mentioned  earlier)   in  order  to  
create   a   multi-­layered   dramaturgy   called   ‘Margarita’   in   the   form   of   an  
installation.   The   name   ‘Margarita’   entered   this   project   from   previous   work  
from   the   aswespeakproject,   where   it   was   chosen   for   its   multiplicity   (as   it  
could  be  a  person’s  name,  a  drink,   a  pizza,   an   island,  a   flower,   etc.).  The  
piece  was  durational   based  on   recordings,   live  performance  and   individual  
scenographic  contraptions,  and  it  was  generated  by  the  contributing  artists,  
the   audience–participants  who  were   free   to   enter   and   exit   as   they  wished  
(Participants  B),  and  other  participants  who  recorded  their  voice  in  advance  
(Participants  A).  The  sound  of  the  installation  consisted  of  eleven  chapters,  
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The   score   I   devised   above   outlines   the   overall   sound-­chapters   of   the  
installation,   heard   inside   the   theatre   at   stage@leeds.   There   were   no  
instructions   or   guidance   but   a   range   of   sonic,   visual,   kinetic,   and   haptic  
affordances,   which   will   be   analysed   further   below,   and   possibilities   of  
experience.  
Participants  A  contributed  with  their  voices  to  the  overall  sound  score  of  the  
installation;;   they  were  sent  a  questionnaire  and  were  asked   to   record   their  
answers   to   questions   as   can   be   seen   on   Appendix   B1.      These   were   my  
friends/   colleagues/acquaintances   and   were   asked   to   respond   to   the  
questions   in   relation   to   themselves  but  using   the   third  person.  Male  voices  
were   asked   to   talk   about   a   female   person   they   know  well.   In   the   case   of  
Participants  A,  the  recordings  took  place  in  private  and  then  the  sound  files  
were  sent  to  the  sound  designer  and  me.  
Figure 31. The score for WS II 
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This   strategy   created   an   emotionally   rich   landscape   of   sonic   affordances,  
which   was   at   times   uncomfortable   to   listen   to,   due   to   the   intimate  
confessions   from   some   of   the   participants.  One   of   the   project’s   objectives  
was   to   create   a   tension   between   the   audience   and   the   scenographic  
environment,  but  the  intention  on  this  occasion  was  for  this  to  be  achieved  in  
a  subtle  way,  not  to  shock  or  monopolise  the  audience–participants’  interest.  
Therefore,   the   more   intimate   recordings   were   kept   inside   the   container-­
contraptions  (like  in  Fig.  32  below),  rather  than  being  broadcast  to  the  whole  
space,  and  the  audience–participants  were  free  to  use  headphones  found  at  
designated  areas  in  the  space,  inside  some  of  the  contraptions,  and  to  listen  




During   the   installation   there   were   also   live-­stream   voices   broadcasted   of  
random  passers-­by  in  the  café  of  Leeds  University  campus  (Participants  C)  
Figure 32. Hidden speakers, and headphones inside the individual contraptions, allowed for the 
audience–participants to listen to more intimate recordings. 
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answering   to   questions   in   response   to   the   script   and   asked   by   two  
participant-­artists   of   the   project,   Alaena   Turner   and   Esther   Collins.  
Participants  C  were  also  asked  to  take  a  photograph  using  the  production’s  
mobile  phone,  and  these  images  were  projected  into  the  main  performance  
space.  Both  the  overall  sound  and  the   incoming  recordings  were  controlled  
live  by  sound  designer  Ben  Eyes  following  the  time-­score  (Fig.  31).  Lighting  
designer   Katherine   Graham   controlled   the   lights   ad   hoc,   creating  
‘scenographic   light’  (Graham  2016,  p.74).   Indeed  the  understanding  of   light  
in  WS  II  was  perceived  as  ‘an  active  contributor  to  the  complex  processes  of  
meaning-­making’   (ibid.)   acknowledging   its   ability   to   ‘shift   between   moods’  
(ibid.  p.77).  Every  fifteen  minutes  or  so,  performer  Olivia  Bradbury  was  given  




Figure 33. WS II – Attempts on Margarita (Multiple Drafts). Olivia Bradbury performing her song. 
Photograph by Lucy Steggals. 
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Artist   Lucy   Steggals  made   an   intervention   using   a   set   of   personal   objects  
(Fig.  34).  Jennifer  Carlberg,  an  associate  of   the  project   from   the  School  of  
Media   and   Communication   (University   of   Leeds),   typed   different   drafts   of  
Margarita   chapters   by  mixing   pre-­written   transcripts   of   the   recordings  with  
what  was  being  broadcasted  during  the  show  (Fig.  35).      
Figure 34.  Lucy Steggals made an intervention bringing her own personal objects, her grandmother’s box of 
buttons. This was an uncanny coincidence with Christopher Baugh’s arrangement of his mother’s buttons to 
communicate the uniqueness of each scenography: ‘the pile of buttons gave me hours of pleasure’ (p.xiv), 
‘there will be no final archive, no final arrangement of buttons’ (p.xv).  
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In   the   second   part   of   Cycle   Two,   a   group   of   first-­year   undergraduate  
performance  students  (under  the  co-­ordination  of  Dr  Maria  Kapsali)  entered  
the   space   and   improvised   a   set   of   actions   while   inviting   the   audience–
participants  in  one-­to-­one  discussions  about  experiences  of  unpleasant  jobs.  
  
  
Figure 35. Jennifer Carlberg typing the 
multiple drafts. 
Figure 36. First-year performance students improvising a live score during WS II 
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   In  answering  my  second  research  sub-­question,  related  to  how  might  
we   use   empirical   metaphorical   models   of   consciousness   as   creative  
methods,   I   will   outline   below   how   the   suggested   architectures   and  
hypothesis  of  consciousness  that  I  used  for  scaffolding  participation  in  WS  II  
proved   a   useful   device   for   generating   dynamic   and   reflective   exchange  
between   the   audience–participants,   the   artists–collaborators,   the  
environment  and  the  practitioner–researcher  (me)  in  a  distributed  manner.    
Figure 37. WS II–Attempts on Margarita (Multiple Drafts). Flyer. Back side.
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My  role  was  to  orchestrate  the  dynamics  of  a  groundless  scenography  with  
as  little  intervention  on  my  part  as  possible  during  the  show,  so  as  to  test  the  
‘invisible   scenography’   and   the   distributed   experience   of   the   audience–
participants   as   mentioned   earlier.   During   the   post-­show   discussion   I  
expressed  my   intention  by  describing   it   as   the   ‘how-­do-­you-­accommodate-­
this   kind  of   energy’.  B5   (participant)   in   response   to  my   remark   referring   to  
the   space   said   that   ‘it   was   accommodating   but   in   a   very   smooth   way  
established  a  kind  of,  I  would  almost  dare  to  say,  ethics  […]  that  this  is  the  
type  of   behaviour,   this   is   the   type  of   being   you   can  practice   in   here.’   This  
notion  of  spatial  ethics  in  informing  the  contraption  idea  is  a  pertinent  one  as  
the   aim   of   WS   II   was   to   produce   critical   embodiment   and   ecological  
intelligence   without   the   necessity   of   explaining   or   explicitly   guiding   the  
process   both   with   the   artist-­participants   and   the   audience–participants.   At  
the  same  time  the  scenography  needed  to  maintain  a  top-­down  ‘discipline’  or  
‘ethics’   as   mentioned   so   that   the   audience–participants   would   not   fail   to  
register  the  scenography  all  together.    
Dennett’s  theory,  together  with  the  structure  of  Crimp’s  Attempts  on  Her  Life  
(1997),  triggered  the  idea  of  the  Margarita  experience  and  the  sonic  collage  
of   the   different   voices   and   chapters.   Initial   imaginative   points   of   reference  
were   found   between   Dennett’s   hypothesis   of   consciousness   and   Crimp’s  
‘she’  as  multiple  drafts.  As  outlined  earlier,  Dennett’s  ‘multiple  drafts’  model  
understands   consciousness   as   ‘narrative   fragments’   at   various   stages   of  
editing  in  various  places  in  the  brain  (Dennett  1991,  p.113).    
Dennett   later   uses   the   example   of   the   ‘fame   in   the   brain’   or   ‘cerebral  
celebrity’   (1996)   and   also   describes   consciousness   more   like   political  
influence  or  clout  (Dennett  2001).    He  wants  to  show  that  in  consciousness  
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there  isn’t  ‘a  clear  threshold  of  entry  and  sequence  of  events’,  but  like  fame  it  
is  a  complex  and  competitive  phenomenon  (Dennett  1991,  p.28).  One  might  
be  famous  one  moment  and  then  something  more  important  occurs  and  they  
lose   their   fame.   In   terms  of   the  clout  example,  processes  compete  and  the  
one  with  the  greatest  clout  will  dominate  the  scene  until  a  stronger  process  
dominates   the  scene  and  so  on.  Dennett  argues   that  our  brains  are   ‘more  
democratic,   indeed   somehow   anarchic’   (Dennett   2001,   p.225).   An   explicit  
clout  example  during  WS  II  was  that  of  the  song:  each  time  Olivia  performed  
her   song,   as  B2   observed   during   the   post-­show   talk,   ‘everyone’s   attention  
then  went  that  way’,  stating  how  a  bidirectional  relationship  was  established  




The   idea   of   ‘clout’   is   also   expressed   in   the   ‘dynamic   core   hypothesis’   by  
Edelman  and  Tononi  (2000),  who  suggest  that  the  metaphor  to  use  would  be  
closer   to  a   riotous  parliament   trying   to  make  a  decision  not  by   ‘persuasive  
Figure 38. Olivia Bradbury performs her song. An audience–participant is in at the same space as Olivia, 
behind the scrim, playing with the buttons. The button action is projected live on the screen. An 
audience–participant watches the scenography generated.  
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rhetoric   but   by   simply   pushing   and   pulling’   (Edelman   and   Tononi   2000,  
p.245).   They   assert   through   empirical   studies   that   consciousness   is   a  
process,   not   a   thing   or   a   place,   and   that   it   ‘is   defined   in   terms   of   neural  
interactions,  rather  than  in  terms  of  specific  neural   location,  connectivity,  or  
activity’  (Edelman  and  Tononi  2000,  p.144).  Edelman  and  Tononi  argue  that,  
although   they   agree   with   Baars   (see   WS   I)   on   the   global   aspect   of  
consciousness,   they   disagree   on   the   actor   hypothesis   (the   spotlight   of  
attention).  For  them  the  information  is  not  in  the  message,  but  in  the  number  
of  system  states  that  can  be  brought  about  by  global  interactions  within  the  
system  itself  (ibid.  p.245).    
The  element  I  am  drawing  upon  conceptually  is  the  idea  that  the  ‘information  
is   not   in   the   message,   but   in   the   number   of   system   states’   and   the  
interactions  within  the  whole  system.  This  was  reflected  in  the  design  of  WS  
II  in  which,  unlike  WS  I,  there  was  not  a  spotlight  of  attention,  and  more  than  
one  projection.  What   the   system  aimed   to   communicate  was  more  or   less  
similar  to  the  thought:  I  don’t  have  a  specific  story  to  offer  to  the  audience–
participants   (a   pronouncement)   but   instead   a   critical   ecology   of   different  
stations   in   the   installation,   suggestions   for   interaction,   reflection,   and   the  
creation   of   various   emotions,   feelings   that   the   voices   generate   for   the  
audience’s  experience.  In  short,  it  is  more  like  I  was  saying  to  the  audience:  
Here  are  some  attempts  my  invited  artists  and  I  made  to  capture  ‘Margarita’.  
Who  or  what  is  Margarita  for  you?  Could  you  attempt  to  capture  Margarita?  
The  voice  recordings  that  took  place  in  advance  (Participants  A)  were  based  
on  simple  questions,  and  this  simplicity  of  having  to  elaborate  on  one’s  own,  
on   a   question   in   front   of   a   recorder   invited   the   speaker   to   expand   to  
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describing  other   states  about   themselves5.  For  example,  on  answering   the  
question  ‘What  does  she  look  like?’,  one  of  the  participants  answered,  ‘She  
has   green   eyes   and   they   become   grey   when   she   cries’,   revealing  
information  that  wasn’t  asked,  but  provided  me,  the  sound  designer,  and  the  
audience–participants  in  the  installation  with  rich  emotional  material  to  work  
with  and  respond  to.    As  one  of  the  participants  (B3)  put  it:  ‘The  tone  of  their  
voices   was   intimate   and   open   and   that   gave   huge   quality   to   the   space.’  
Another   system   state   of   multiple   interpretations   was   the   number   of  
transcripts  that  were  printed  throughout  the  three-­hour  show  and  placed  on  








                                                
5  There  was  an  experiment  in  AI  called  Eliza,  led  by  Joseph  Weizenbaum  at  MIT  in  the  1960s.  Eliza  
simulates  a  Rogerian  psychotherapist,  and  you  can  ask  her  questions  about  your  problems,  anxieties  
etc.  The  insight  that  this  program  brought  forward  is  that  despite  people  knowing  that  this  is  an  AI  
system,  and  not  really  giving  any  answers,  it  was  very  successful  in  having  users  talk  about  
themselves.  You  can  try  it  here:  http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych101/Eliza.htm.    
Figure 39 (above). WS II - Attempts on 
Margarita (multiple drafts), 26 February 
2015, stage@Leeds. Audience-–articipant 
reading the various multiple drafts of 
Margarita produced during the performance. 
Photograph by Lucy Steggals. 
Figure 40 (below). A still image from 
Synecdoche, New York (2008) a 
postmodern film based on the blurring 
between reality and theatre. This image 
was used to communicate the idea of the 




"This  image  has  been  removed  by  the  author  of  this  thesis  
for  copyright  reasons”    
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Tononi  explains   that   ‘the   integration  of   information   in  conscious  experience  
is  evident  phenomenologically’  (2004),  arguing  that  when  someone  sees  an  
image   they  experience   it   as  an   integrated  whole  of  which   the   components  
cannot  be  experienced  separately.  For  example,  when  someone  sees  a  red  
ball   they   don’t   experience   the   colour   and   the   shape   independently.   This  
phenomenological  understanding  is  what  Lucy  Steggals  tried  to  verbalise  at  
the  post-­show  discussion  regarding  her  experience  of  seeing  the  projection  
of  the  buttons  on  the  screen  and  thinking  of  how  she  could  make  this  into  a  
film.  In  the   image  below,  this  experience  has  been  captured  in  the  speech-­
bubble.  It   is  an  example  of  a  montage-­contraption  moment  (Fig.  41  below),  
when   one   sees   something   complex   and   tries   to   unravel   its   complexity,  
thereby  entering  into  a  conversation  with  the  work:  
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Figure 41. WS II–Attempts on Margarita (multiple drafts), 26 February 2015, stage@leeds. Speech bubble 
added using material from the post-show discussion transcript. According to the ‘multiple drafts’ model, ‘all 
varieties of perception –indeed, all varieties of thought or mental activity– are accomplished in the brain by 
parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the 
nervous system is under continuous “editorial revision”’ (Dennett 1991, p.111). 
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However,   the  speech  bubble  as  shown  on  Fig.  41   is  Cartesian6  because   it  
contains   only   one   thought,   unlike  The   New   Yorker   example   (Fig.   42)   that  
Dennett  uses  (see  caption  Fig.  42),  and  this   indicated  to  me  how  ingrained  













Dennett   provides   an   analogy   to   explain   how   consciousness   is   constructed  
as    ‘an  artefact  of  our  immersion  in  human  culture’  (1998,  p.346).  Margarita  
was   an   artefact   of   immersion,   an   en-­spaced   consciousness,   that   was  
triggered   by   materials,   objects,   bodies,   and   the   shifting,   sharing,  
contradicting   cultural   traits   of   participant   groups   A,   B,   and   C,   the   artists–
participants,  and  me.  This   is   indeed  something   that   can  also  be  argued  of  
Dennett’s   own   conscious   attempt   to   explain   consciousness:   as   a   draft,   as  
fame,  as  clout,  or  by  referring  to  the  above  illustration;;   it   is  evident  that  the  
                                                
6  Special  mention  here  to  Chris  Fite-­Wassilak  for  pointing  this  out  in  his  book  Ha-­Ha  Crystal  (2016).  
Figure 42. Saul Steinberg's New Yorker cover 
from 8 October 1969 is used by Dennett in 
his lectures as a ‘successful image of human 
consciousness’ (1996) because, according to 
Dennett it contains words, shapes, colours 
and communicates an experience where there 
is not an area where it all comes together.  
  
"This  image  has  been  removed  by  the  author  of  
this  thesis  for  copyright  reasons”    
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stories   hidden   behind   the  metaphors   that   Dennett   is   using   are   due   to   his  
personal   immersion   in   his   contemporary   culture,   i.e.   the   multiple   drafts  
metaphor  relates  to  a  postmodern  view.  Furthermore,  my  cultural  references  
led  me   to   the  connection  between   the  multiple  drafts  metaphor  and  Martin  
Crimp’s   Attempts   on   Her   Life,   establishing   a   dialogue   with   Dennett’s  
understandings,   and   sharing   this   with   the   audience–participants.   Di  
Benedetto  observes  that  ‘artists  direct  our  attention  so  that  they  may  achieve  
a  result.  How  we  interpret  that  result  is  dependent  upon  our  own  willingness  
to  participate   in  the  experience’  (2010,  p.196)  and  our  willingness  in  turn   is  
fuelled  by  other  factors,  such  as  cultural  ones.    
4.4  Applications  of  Cultural  Affordances  in  WS  II  
The  distributed  scenographic  system  network  I   imaginatively  devised,  when  
shared  with  the  artists–participants  and  with  participant  groups  A,  B,  and  C  
became  a  scenographic  system  network-­in-­action,  what  Roepstorff  et  al.  call  
‘networks   that  extend   in   relevant  ways   in  social   interaction’   (2010,  p.1056).  
In   this   section   I   am   applying   integrative   cognitive   frameworks   of   cultural  
affordances  and  patterned  practices  for  the  analysis  of  the  network-­in-­action  
that  was  the  scenography  of  Margarita.  The  main  advantage  of  both  of   the  
frameworks   that   will   be   used   here   is   that   they   approach   culture   as   a  
dynamic,   contemporary,   interacting   system   of   individuals,   rather   than   an  
independent   element   related   only   to   factors   such   as   nationality   or   native  
language,   and   therefore   make   for   frameworks   useful   for   the   analysis   of  
contemporary   systems   networks-­in-­action   including   humanly   constructed  
and  designed  ‘rich  landscapes  of  affordances’  (Ritveld  and  Kiverstein  2014).  
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anthropology  sees  cognition  as  distributed;;  it  is  used  in  neuroscience  for  the  
study   of   human   behaviour,   and   it   is   related   to   attentional   practices.   The  
framework   deals   with   the   particular   patterns   that   characterise   human  
practices;;  studies  show  that  these  practices  resonate  in  the  brain  i.e.  regular,  
patterned   activities   (such   as   speaking)   ‘shape   the   human   mind   and   body  
through   embodiment,   and   internalization’   (Roepstorff   et   al.   2010,   p.1052).  
There   is   therefore   a   bidirectional   understanding   between   brain   and   world,  
where  the  world  we  shape  shapes  us  in  return.  This  is  particularly  useful  for  
this  research  when  looking  at  the  questions  of  how  can  scenography  make  
us  or  shape  us.  
‘We   live   in  a   landscape  of   cultural  affordances’  write  Ramstead,  Veissière,  
and  Kirmayer  (2016,  p.  13).    Cultural  affordances  (Ramstead  et  al.  2016)  are  
the   affordances   found   in   the   niches   (the   landscapes   of   affordances)   that  
people  are  part  of,  and  are  justified  with  the  use  of  patterned  practices  (see  
above)  and  predictive  processing  (Clark  2013b).  This  understanding  creates  
a   continuum   with   the   expanded   notion   of   affordances   following   enactivist,  
radical   embodied,   and   ecological   understanding   (i.e.   skilled   intentionality,  
landscape,   and   field   of   affordances)   as   referred   to   in  WS   I   (Rietveld   and  
Kiverstein  2014;;  Bruineberg  and  Rietveld  2014),  but  accepts  a  mild  neural-­
computational   approach   of   the   human   system   in   order   to   explain   the  
coupling  with  shared  social  representations.    
Ramstead   et   al.   distinguish   between   two   groups   of   cultural   affordances:  
‘natural’   and   ‘conventional’;;   the   first   group   refers   to   the   detection   and  
engagement   of   the   individual   with   the   possibilities   of   action   that   their  
environment  affords,  in  relation  to  their  set  of  natural  abilities,  i.e.  given  that  
a  person  has  two  feet  and  can  walk   ‘an  unpaved  road  affords  a  trek’  (ibid.,  
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p.3),   and   ‘conventional’   –   the   detection   of   the   possibilities   of   action   of   the  
individual   that  are  related  to   ‘culturally  specific  set  of  expectations  of  which  
they  are  immersed’  and  are  related  to  how  the  individuals  interpret  these  in  
relation   to   ‘other   agents   and   the   symbolically   and   linguistically   mediated  
social   world’,   e.g.   ‘a   red   light   affords   stopping’   (ibid.).   Both   of   these   types  
‘are   related   to   understanding   human   social   niches’   (ibid.)   such   as   the  
designer   niches   (contraptions)   found   in   the   Margarita   ecosystem,   and  
Margarita  as  a  contraption  environment  itself.    
Based  on  the  post-­show  interview  and  my  observations  from  the  data  of  WS  
II   in   this   part   of   the   thesis   I   am   tackling   the   questions:   What   are   the  
implications  of  cultural  affordances  and  patterns  of  practice  in  scenographic  
reception  and  making  processes?  And  in  what  ways  might  we  use  these  to  
investigate  the  audience’s  experience  of  dynamic  scenographic  systems-­in-­
action?  I  am  continuing  to  contribute  to  the  questions  that  occurred  after  WS  
I   on   finding  out   how  might   I   frame   the  experience  of   distributed  design,   in  
pursuing   further   the   disciplined   and   genuine   means   of   the   scenographic  
contraption.  
4.4.1  Disciplined  means  of  the  scenographic  contraption:  
preparing  the  scenographic  system  network  for  action  
Unlike  WS  I   the  audience–participants  during  WS  II  were  not   invited   into  a  
hands-­on   making   game;;   instead   they   were   invited   into   a   ‘designer  
environment’   (Clark   2015a)   to   re-­arrange   or   to   co-­construct   their   fields   of  
affordances,   using   ‘immaterial’.   Specifically   they   were   invited   to   perform-­
rehearse  how  their  bodies  behaved   in  relation  to   the  space,   the  sound,   the  
props,  and  the  bodies  of  other  participants,  and  how  the  awareness  of  their  
own   image   was   craftily   manipulated   by   them   in   order   to   contribute   to   the  
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tapestry  of   the  piece.  As  audience–participant  B3  said:   ‘It  got   richer.   It  was  
like  a  tapestry  that  created  the  group.’  
  
These   rich   landscapes   of   affordances   for   the   audience–participants   were  
elaborately  scaffolded  by  the  processual  designer  (me)  plus  the  artistic  team  
using   a   non-­binary   ‘Janus-­faced’   understanding   of   the   relation   between  
material  and  immaterial,  and  the  space  performing-­rehearsing.  For  example,  
immaterial   affordances   of   the  multi-­layered   surround   sound   were   used   for  
designing  the  ‘disciplined  means’  and  a  number  of  contraption-­props,  made  
from   found   or   bought   objects,   for   the   material   affordances.   Light   was   a  
powerful   element,   with   the   lighting   designer   orchestrating   atmospheres   ad  
hoc   (but   there   is  not  enough  space   to   reflect   further  on   the  contribution  of  
light   this   time)   .   By   providing   these   ‘disciplined   means’   we   designed   an  
enfold-­unfold-­ready   ‘contraption   environment’   waiting   to   be   structurally  
coupled   with   the   ‘genuine   means’   that   the   audience–participants   would  
bring.  
In  terms  of  the  ‘contraption-­props’,  I  made  or  sourced  very  simple  ones,  such  
as  the  tepee,  for  example,  using  basic  materials  (wool,  fabric,  thin  plywood),  
and  basic  building  skills   (sticking,  stapling,  sewing,  cable-­tying)   rather   than  
Figure 43. Inside the 
tunnel. Listening to the 
travels of Margarita and 
watching an audience-–
participant play with the 
buttons, while their action 
is projected on the scrim. 
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creating   heavy   sets.   This   was   done   in   order   to   create   a   further   layer   of  
‘conventional  affordances’  of  familiarity  and  ephemerality.  I  hand  crafted  for  
the  audience–participants  what  I  call  ‘handmade  landscapes  of  affordances’  
within  the  Margarita  ecosystem  (the  tunnels,  the  uncanny  hat  –  see  Figs.  43  
and  47).    
For   this   reason   the   construction   of   the   contraption-­props   was   developed  
gradually  through  reflecting  and  trying  out  the  possibilities  of  the  affordances  
of   the  props   in   the  studio   (Figs.  44  and  45),   rather   than  designing   them   in  
advance  and  handing   the  designs   to  a  builder.  Trying   in   this  way   to  afford  
familiarity  and  ephemerality  with  the  work  was  related  to  the  contraption  idea  
as   something   that   does   not   hide   the   process   and   therefore   exposes   the  
maker  –  more  like  a  mock-­up  rather  than  a  final  slick  product,  engaged  in  a  
dialectical   relation   between   the   contraption-­prop,   its   maker,   and   the  
audience–participants   when   they   encountered   it   and   tried   to   unravel   its  
meaning   and   use.   As   one   of   the   audience–participants   told   me   after   the  
show,  it  was  liberating  that  the  props  had  this  flimsy,  handmade  element  to  
them,   as   it   eliminated   the   barrier   of   formality   and   made   for   being   playful  
in/with   them.   They   became   more   accessible   for   the   specific   person   (B4),  
because   of   this   handmade,   ephemeral   feel,   and  more   inviting   as   a   result,  
like   saying:   ‘Touch   me’   instead   of   ‘Don’t   touch’.   Furthermore   this   type   of  
handmade   construction   would   not   have   been   seen   as   rough   if   lit   on   a  
proscenium   stage,   for   example,   and   experienced   from   a   far   away,   but   it  
became   exposed   by   being   experienced   from   a   close   distance.   This  
corroborates  the  understanding  of  a  process  aesthetics  of  the  scenographic  
contraption   idea   as   being   experienced   raw   rather   than   looked   at   as   an  
illusion.  
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The   affordances   I   wanted   to   develop  were   very   simple   and   related   to   the  
structural   notion   of   the   container   inviting   thus   the   participants   to   cover  
themselves   (blankets),  enter   into   (tunnels,   behind   scrim,   tepee)  or   to   hide  
their  heads  (uncanny  hat),  or  the  top  part  of  their  bodies  (tunnels)  (Figs.  41,  
46,  45  and  47).  What  was   taken   into  account   in   the  designing-­making  was  
also   the   image  of   the   part   of   the   audience’s   bodies   that  were   exposed  as  
part  of  the  prop,  creating  a  live-­sculpture  contraption,  half  prop,  half  human  
(Figs.  46,  and  47)   for  others   to  watch.  This  elevated   the  dialectical   relation  
between  prop,  artist–scenographer,  and  audience–participant   to  be  also  an  
agentive  and  co-­authored  one,  because  apart  from  unravelling  the  perceived  
meaning   by   looking   at   the   landscape   of   affordances   and   pointing   out   the  
Figure 44 (left) The processual designer imagining-predicting, improvising, and constructing the props in the 
studio. 
Figure 45 (right) Ben Eyes (sound designer) trying the affordances of the tubes. The contraption-props  in WS II 
were built organically through doing-thinking, rather than drafted on paper and constructed by a builder.  
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salient   field   of   affordances   offered   by   the   contraptions,   sound   etc.   the  
audience–participants   also   made   meaning   using   their   own   agency   to  
immerse   in   this   field.  They   then  created   further  meaning   for   the  audience–
participants   who   were   watching   (what   I   earlier   described   as   performing-­
rehearsing)  by  becoming  part  of  a   live-­sculpture  contraption,  changing  thus  
the   field   of   affordances   both   for   themselves   and   for   their   co-­audience–
participants   (see  Fig.   46   and   caption).   B5   observed   that   it  made   her   think  
about   the   ‘theatre   being   historically   the   place   to   see   and   to   be   seen’   and  
continuing  their  line  of  thought  regarding  the  ethics  established  by  the  design  
they  said,  ‘This  was  what  was  very  interesting  that  we  started  to  look  at  each  
other.’  
Ramstead  et  al.  claim  that:    
The   sets   of   expectations   embodied   and   enacted   by   organisms  
change   the   field   of   affordances.   This  mechanism,  we   submit,   is  
exploited   by   culture   in   the   acquisition   of   cultural   affordances  
(2016,  p.15).    
  
The  set  of  expectations  on  entering  the  tepee  was  embodied  and  enacted  by  
the  audience–participant  below  (Fig.  46),  while  another  audience–participant  
that  may  have  been   looking  had  their   field  of  affordances  also  altered  (e.g.  
triggering   them   to   go   ahead   and   try   out   entering   the   tepee   as   well).   The  
artist–scenographer   intuitively   knows   how   to   exploit   this   shift   of   attention,  
and   with   this   analysis   I   aim   to   shed   some   light   on   how   this   is   done,   and  
move  from  intuition  to  knowledge.    




Affordances  have   the   capacity   of   being   ‘descriptive’   on  one  hand  because  
they  constitute  that  which  is  perceived,  as  outlined  with  the  examples  above,  
Figure 46 (above):  The tepee 
contraption with multiple drafts 
on the floor.  
Figure 47 (below): The ‘uncanny 
hat’.  
Live sculptures, assemblages of 
bodies and props were created in 
the space. These ‘live sculptures’ 
were co-authored by the 
scenographer who provided the 
prop and the audience–
participant who accepted the 
invitation. The audience–
participants detected the field of 
affordances and situated 
themselves according to their 
skilled intentionality.  
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and   ‘prescriptive’   on   the   other   hand   (Ramstead   et   al.   2016,   p.5)   ‘because  
they   specify   the   kinds   of   action   and   perception   that   are   available,  
situationally   appropriate   and,   in   the   case   of   social   niches,   expected   by  
others’  (ibid.,  p.5).  In  terms  of  their  prescriptive  role  this  is  very  much  in  line  
with   what   the   theory   of   scenographic   contraption   aims   to   achieve   through  
the   ‘disciplined   and   genuine’   means   of   designing   groundlessness   in  
performance:   to  specify   to   the  audience–participant   the  types  of  action  and  
perception   that  are  available  but  without  making  pronouncements,  so  as   to  
generate  a  multiple  unfolding  and  enfolding  situation.  Without  using  rules  the  
‘natural’   cultural   affordances   of   the   Margarita   niche   (landscape   of  
affordances)  offered  to  the  audience–participants  the  possibilities  to  exist  in  
the  space   in   three   levels  –   lie,  sit,  stand  –  and  further   ‘natural’  affordances  
were  detected:  hide  your  head,  read,  pick  up,  touch,  listen,  watch,  etc.    
In  turn  this  scenography  can  be  navigated  in  a  disciplined  and  genuine  way  
from   the   part   of   the   audience–participants.   For   example,   B5   argued  
(continuing  from  a  quote  earlier  related  to  the  ethics  of  the  space)  that:  
We   looked   at   what   other   people   were   doing   but   we   were  
contained  within  what   the  space  and   the  various  materials…so   I  
think  we  were  guided  up   to  an  extend   that  perhaps  because   the  
guiding  was  quite  smooth  and  subtle  maybe  we   feel  oh!  We  are  
actually  you  know  anyone  could  do  anything  but  no  I  think  actually  
the   installation   kind   of   you   know   gently   but   very   assertively  
implied  a  sense  of  being  in  it.  
  
The  above  audience–participant’s  observation  was  similar  to  my  observation  
during   the   installation  of   the  prescriptive  character   (the  disciplined  means   I  
am  aiming  for)  of  the  social  niches  that  were  developed  for  Margarita.  I  first  
noted  the  impact  that  this  setup  brought  forward  in  comparison  to  WS  I:  the  
audience–participants  were  not  talking  with  each  other  in  the  same  way  as  in  
WS   I;;   they   were   now   moving   around   the   space   and   engaging   with   the  
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dynamics  of  the  installation  in  a  playful  but  at  the  same  time  solemn  manner  
by   attuning   their   awareness   to   listen   to   the   surrounding   voice-­collage   of  
Margarita   and   to   the   actions   of   their   fellow   audience.   This   was   enhanced  
spatially   by   the   black-­box   architecture   of   a   theatre   space   (another  
prescriptive  affordance),  which  specified  a  certain  way  of  behaving.    
The   result   of   the   prescriptions   of   the   affordances   during   the   particular  
installation  was  playful;;  however,  the  audience’s  way  of  navigating  the  space  
could   be   compared   with   that   of   a   person   entering   a   space   of   ritual:   the  
audience–participants   entered   the   space   engaging   with   the   prescriptive  
affordances   required  by   the  sociocultural  situation.  Knowing   that   they  were  
allowed   to   talk  but  not   loudly,   they  explored   their   surroundings  and   looked  
out  for  initiated  members,  the  audience–participants  who  were  already  there,  
so   as   to   find   out   what   they   were   supposed   to   do   and   how   they   were  
supposed  to  behave.  
Several  participants  referred  to  the  groundless  language  and  languaging  that  
happened   in   the   space   as   meditative,   transcendental,   and   relaxed,   a  
reflective  space  –  while   for  another   ‘it  was  a  very   indulgent   thing,   I  am  not  
sure  that  I  find  it  meditative  I   just  find  it  […]  a  space  I  can  call  my  own  and  
take   up   invitation   from…’   (B4).   In   terms   of   designing   the   scenography  
system   network-­in-­action   with   the   art   team   my   intention   as   a   processual  
designer  was  to  achieve  a  subtle  playground  for  adults,  a  free  space  where  
one  would   feel   comfortable   to  move,   be   seen,   retreat   or   hide   at   their   own  
pace  if  they  wished,  while  listening  to  the  soundscape  of  the  different  voices  
of  Margarita.  Taking  into  account  that  not  every  audience  member  navigates  
their  environment  in  the  same  way,  the  idea  behind  the  use  of  contraptions  
in  Work  Space  II  was  to  offer  a  number  of  stimuli,  in  some  cases  unusual  or  
-­  148  -­  
strange,  so   that   the  audience–participants  were   invited   to  use   their  agency  
and   bring   into   the   space   their   own   discursive   way   of   engaging   between  
material-­immaterial.    
4.4.2  ‘Genuine  means’  of  the  ‘scenographic  contraption’:  how  
much  can  I  improvise  here  (given  what  the  local  cues  tell  me  
about  what  others  expect)?  
In  order  to  generate  the  ‘genuine  means’  from  the  audience–participants  the  
installation  exploited  the  idea  of  a  social  niche  and  provided  a  set  of  cultural  
affordances  on  the  interplay  between  feeling  comfortable  and  uncomfortable:  
some   of   these   unusual   (or   unusually   situated   in   the   space)   constructions  
were   designed   in   a  way   so   as   to  make   the   user   feel   comfortable,   like   the  
cushions  and  blankets  and   the   tepee   for  example,  while  others   triggered  a  
sense   of   tension   by   seeming   unfamiliar   like   the   elevated   ‘clown   hat’,   for  
example  (Fig.  47),  aiming  to  create  tensions  between  the  structural  coupling  
of   the   audience,   the   semi-­familiar   environment,   the   audience’s   Know-­How  
(common   sense)   and   embodied   expectation,   and   the   tension   that   an  
unexpected   or   unknown   affordance   might   bring.   As   B10   said   in   a   written  
communication   after   the   show   in   relation   to   the   ‘clown   shoes’:   ‘They   are  
such   strong   signifiers   of   strangeness   and   fear,   punishment,   ridicule.  
Although  I  wanted  to  hear  the  funny  stories  I  didn't  put  the  shoes  on.’    
Another  audience–participant  went  one  step   further   in  putting  on   the  clown  
shoes:    
B6:  […]  and  then  I  decided  to  try  them  on  I  wanted  to  walk  around  
in   them   as  well   but   I   thought   I   shouldn’t   because   I   thought   this  
would   be   too   attention   seeking…   (laughter)   you   know,   well   I  
though   they   will   make   a   noise   and   I   thought   that   might   be  
intrusive  for  other  people.  
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What   B10   and   B6   say   above   situates   the   ‘prescription’   offered   by   the  
affordance  within  a  social  niche  (the  expectations  of  others  within  the  niche).  
Ramstead  et  al  argue  aptly  that  ‘humans  behave  according  to  the  way  they  
expect  others  to  expect  them  to  behave  in  a  given  situation’  (Ramstead  et  al,  
2016  p.5,  italics  in  original).  Therefore,  the  conventional  affordances  such  as  
the  one  communicated  by  B6   (walking   in   the  clown  shoes)  were  bound  by  
explicit  and  implicit  social  conventions  (ibid.,  p.6),  and  B6  further  inferred  the  
intentional  states  of  other  individuals  in  the  niche.    
What   B6   described   that   they   experienced   points   us   to   another   element   of  
sociocultural   experience   and   cultural   affordances   related   to   the      ‘notion   of  
variation  and  improvisation  in  action’  (Ramstead  et  al.  2016,  p.6).  This  notion  
outlines   that   the   response   of   an   individual   within   a   convention   e.g.   in   the  
specific   scenario   putting   on   the   clown   shoes   and   walking   in   them,   is   a  
complex  one.  So  it  is  not  as  if  B6  might  have  said,  ‘What  would  others  think  
if   I   put   the   clown   shoes   on?’,   but   entails   from   the   part   of   the   individual  
various  negotiations,  resistances,  and  emotions  (explicit  and  implicit)  to  ‘infer  
the  intentional  states  of  other  agents’  (ibid.  p.6).  Therefore  what  B6  said  can  
be   put   down   to   the   complexity   of:   ‘How  much   can   I   improvise   here,   given  
what  the  local  cues  tell  me  about  what  others  expect?’  (ibid.  p.6).  In  addition,  
the   specific   example   is   a   complex   (yet   simple)   web   of   affordances:  
descriptive  and  natural  (wearing  the  clown  shoes,  registering  the  noise  they  
make),   prescriptive   (wearing   the   clown   shoes   imposes   a   certain   way   of  
being),  conventional  (how  much  can  I   improvise  with  the  affordances  of  the  
clown   shoes,   given  what   I   implicitly   detect   from   the   cultural   affordances   in  
the  specific  sociocultural  niche,   that  will  make  my   improvisation  acceptable  
by  the  social  niche  I  am  in?).  
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Therefore,   in   the   social   ecosystem   of   Margarita   within   the   various  
landscapes  of  affordances,  what  drove   the  system   forward  was   in  big  part  
(embodied   brain)   inference,  whereas   in  WS   I   what   drove   the   system  was  
contagion.   It   was   what   the   audience–participants   inferred   explicitly   and  
implicitly  they  should  be  doing  under  the  watchful  eye  of  the  other  audience–
participants  within  a  space  performing-­rehearsing.  This  varied  depending  on  
the  person  (because  each  audience–participant  is  different).  For  example,  a  
type   of   contraption-­props   invited   the   audience–participants   to   enter   a  
comfortable  zone  only  to  challenge  this  sense  of  comfort  at  a  later  stage:  the  
tunnels   (Fig.   32)   invited   people   to   lie   inside   them   but   by   doing   so   the  
audience–participant   had   to   share   the   same   head   cushion   with   another  
audience–participant.   This   situation   was   considered   challenging   for   some,  
like  one  of  the  audience–participants  admitted  later:   ‘I  wasn't  brave  enough  
to  put  my  head  on  the  shared  pillow’  (B10)  or  a  ‘lovely  invitation’  for  another  
audience–participant   who   said:   ‘Why   wouldn’t   you   want   to   wiggle   into  
snuggly  tunnels  and  lie  on  your  back  and  then  realise  other  people’s  heads  
are  really  close  to  you  as  you  felt   just  that  shift   in  the  bean  bag  as  another  
person  joined  you?’  (B4).    
This   approach   was   very   different   from   that   in  Work   Space   I,   where   the  
engagement   with   the   conventional   cultural   affordances   in   this   case   was  
related  to  craft  activity  and  specific  written  rules,  which  unleashed  a  stream  
of   impulsive   and   in   some   cases   inconsequential   talk.   The   central   voice   in  
WS  I  was  based  on  an  impulsive  improvised  exercise:  the  person  who  was  
talking   on   the   microphone   was   known   to   a   large   part   of   the   group;;   the  
speakers   (people)  were  present  and   they  were   therefore  at   the  same   level  
as   the   rest   of   the   group.   In  WS   II,   however,   the   collage   of   voices   talking  
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about   Margarita   came   from   a   surround   sound   system   and   through  
headphones,   and   most   of   it   was   pre-­recorded.   Even   if   the   audience–
participants   had   recognised   some   of   the   voices,   they   were   not   able   to  
engage  in  a  dialogue  with  the  person  whose  voice  was  heard,  as  this  person  
was  not  present.    
4.4.3  Regimes  of  shared  attention  
According  to  the  patterns  of  practice  approach  there  is  a  bidirectional  plastic  
relation   between   brains   (neuronal   networks)   and   the   shaping   of   practices.  
This   understanding   situates   systems   into   the   sphere   of   processes   and  
systems-­in-­action,   and   frames   the   notion   of   attention   not   as   a   single  
behaviour   that   is   passive   or   active,   but   as   the   ‘analysis   of   structured  
(patterned),  maintained  relations  between  embodied  minds  and  their  social,  
material,  and  discursive  “environments”’  (Roepstorff  et  al.  2010,  p.1057).  B6  
shared  their  experience:  
I   kept   thinking   of   spaces   where   all   these   other   voices   were  
coming   from.  So   I  was   thinking  about   the  spaces   that   they  were  
describing   but   I   was   also   thinking   about   where   is   the   person  
who’s  speaking,  where  were   they  when   they  were  speaking   […]  
Why  am  I  connecting  with  that  story  and  why  am  I  not  connecting  
with   this   other   story   […]   and   also   people   outside   the   space,  
people   in   the  Hidden  Café,   thinking   I  am  here   they  are   there  so  
this  like  of  constellation  type  diagram  in  my  head  all  the  time.    
  
Drawing  from  the  above  account  and  the  patterns  of  practice  approach  I  will  
refer   to   the   disembodied   voice   collage   (pattern   of   practice)   in  WS   II   as  
possessing   the   quality   of   en-­spacing   itself   in   various   places   in   the   studio  
theatre  simultaneously:  working   together  with   the  multiple  printed  drafts  on  
the  floor,  with  the  projected  images  from  the  outside  of   the  theatre  (Hidden  
Café   and   campus),   and   generating   further   multiple   draft   scenographies   in  
the   individuals’   imagination,   what   McAuley   (1999,   p.127)   refers   to   as   the  
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tension   between   the   real   and   unreal.   Margarita,   the   installation,   therefore  
contextualised  a  system  network-­in-­action  as  understood  by  the  patterns  of  
practice   approach,   where   attention   was   distributed   and   the   patterns   of  
practice,  the  regimes  of  shared  attention,  arose  from  the  constant  interaction  
of  audience–participants,  props,  and  beliefs.  In  that  sense  I  argue  that  in  WS  
II  attention  had  agency   in  a  sense   that   it  was   the   regimes  of  attention   that  
built   the   tapestry  of   inference,  which  drove   the  system,  and   it   is  something  
that   can   be  manipulated   by   the   designer,   using   the   clout   technique,   using  
coordinated   action   between   multiple   participants,   guided   by   attention  
(Ramstead   et   al.   2016,   p.   15).   For   example,   a   specific   affordance   was  
created,  a  ‘conventional’  stage-­audience  relation,  when  Olivia  performed  her  
song  and   thus  altered   the   field  of  affordances,  and  had   the  attention  of  all  




According   to   the   theories   used   here,   brains   are   proactive   and   predictive,  
meaning   that   the   audience–participants   were   using   their   prior   knowledge;;  
this   prior   knowledge   is   not   stored   but   encoded   in   the   hierarchical   neural  
networks   (predictive   processing),   in   their   bodies,   and   the   patterned  
sociocultural  practices.  This  prior  knowledge  across  brain,  body,  and  world  
Figure 48. The clout example. 
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(material   and  social)   helped   them   to  direct   their   attention  and  engage  with  
novel   landscapes   of   affordances   encountered   during   the   performance  
through   the   act   of   movement,   hearing,   and   repetition,   for   the   creation   of  
meaning   for   themselves   and   for   others.   This   constituted   the   disciplined  
means  that  were  provided  by  the  affordances  of  the  contraptions,  and  by  the  
cultural   affordances   as   patterns   of   practices   and   regimes   of   attention  
between   the  audience–participants,   the  props  and   theatre  space,  and   their  
fellow  audience–participants.  The  genuine  means  was  what  occurred;;  it  was  
the  autonomous  system  of  Margarita   itself,  what   the  audience  brought   into  
this   scenographic   system   network,   transforming   it   into   a   scenographic  
system  network-­in-­action.    
Ramstead  et  al.,  building  on  frameworks  of  radical  embodied  neuroscience,  
outline   two   ways   of   changing   the   affordances   available   to   an   organism:  
Firstly  by  changing  the  architecture  of  its  material  environment.  Secondly,  by  
‘altering   its   form   of   life’   (here,   ‘form   of   life’   is   adapted   from  Wittgenstein’s  
notion  of  ‘form  of  life’,  indicating  the  set  of  behavioural  patterns  characteristic  
of  a  group  or  population).  Ramstead  et  al.  further  add  that  this  altering  may  
happen  by  ‘giving  it  [the  organism]  the  means  or  knowledge  to  acquire  new  
abilities  that  are  already  available  in  that  form  of  life  interacting  for  example  
with  new  ways  with   the  affordances  of   its  niches’   (Ramstead  et  al.  2016  p.  
4).    
Similarly   to   the   above,   Margarita,   through   the   soundscape   and   the  
contraption-­props,   was   providing   a   specific   material   architecture   to   the  
audience–participants,   but   at   the   same   time,   the   installation  was   revealing  
tools   to   be   used   in   an   embodied   way   by   the   audience–participants,   who  
changed  the  affordances  of   the  ecosystem  for   themselves  and  for   their  co-­
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participants.  Margarita  was  not  a  tabula  rasa  but  came  with  ‘prior  knowledge’  
from  the  voices  and  the  contraption-­props,  etc.  and  provided  a  scenographic  
system   network,   the   ‘ethics’,   the   ‘disciplined   means’,   the   ‘patterns   of  
practice’   in   order   to   become  a   scenographic   system  network-­in-­action   that  
allowed  for  the  various  levels  of  couplings  and  changes  through  the  actions  
of  listening,  walking,  sitting,  perceiving,  etc.  from  the  audience–participants.    
4.5  Interim  Conclusions:  Appropriating  Rita    
By  constructing  a  succession  of  designer  environments,  such  as  
the   human-­built   worlds   of   education,   structured   play,   art   and  
science,  we  repeatedly  structure  our  own  minds.  These  designer  
environments   have   slowly   become   tailored   to   creatures   like   us,  
and  they  ‘know’  us  as  well  as  we  know  them  (Clark  2016,  p.279).  
  
Whereas   in  WS  I   the  system  was  driven  by  contagion,   I  summarise  based  
on  data,  discussions,  and  observation  that  in  the  case  of  WS  II  the  system-­
in-­action  was  driven  by   inference   (social,   shared   intentionality).   The   space  
and   the   installation   afforded   overall   more   reflection,   listening,   and  
observation   rather   than   spontaneity;;   this   was   down   to   various   complex  
factors,  one  of  which  was  that  the  materials  in  WS  II  were  affording  specific  
invitations  to  the  audience–participants,  whereas  in  WS  I  the  materials  were  
raw  and  afforded   for   less  specific   instructions  and   invitations,   thus  creating  
noise   to   the   predictive   brains.   In   WS   II   the   predictive   brains   were   not  
overwhelmed  allowing  for  more  introspection,  listening,  and  reflection.    








Figure 50. WS II – Attempts on Margarita (multiple drafts). The scenographer developed 
contraptions-props, giving simple invitations (solicitations) to the audience, inviting them to interact. 
Figure 49. WS I-–a scenographic workshop on consciousness. The audience–participants were 
invited to find the affordances in the materials and create a collective scenographic artefact.  
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Participant   B4   (USB,   personal   post-­show   communication,   Folder   4)  
expressed  that  they  were  interested  that  other  people  spoke  about  Margarita  
as  somehow  external  to  themselves:      
‘For  me  the  work  –  as  with  much  in  the  immersive  –  enabled  me  
to   explore   me   –   all   the   ‘other’   voices   were   fascinating   –   I  
appropriated   them  not  on  behalf   of  a   third  party  Margarita  but  a  
first  person  self  –  I  appropriated  Margarita  –  she  is  me  […]  It  was  
a  pick  and  mix  of  identity  play.’  
  
Margarita   is  a  cultural  artefact  and  a  designer  niche   (Hutchins  2014;;  Clark  
2016).  Margarita  is  a  montage  as  rhythm  of  the  self  and,  as  outlined  earlier  
in   the   invisible   scenography,   made   the   audience–participants   face  
themselves  and   their  existential  condition   in   that  moment  and   in   relation   to  
their   co-­audiences,   and   find   the   immaterial-­material   in   this   condition  
(feelings,   imagination,  actions,  senses,  etc.)  to  generate  their  experience  of  
the  scenographic  language.  Margarita  is  ‘the  spirit  of  the  space’  according  to  
Oddey  and  White,  who  argue  that  ‘[t]here  is  a  poetic  intention  alongside  the  
practical,   where   the   spirit   of   the   space   develops   alongside   the   nature   of  
performance’  (2010,  p.14).  Margarita   is  an  embodied  beyond  post-­dramatic  
situation,   where   the   montage   is   the   thing   itself.   Margarita   is   a   cognitive  
scenography  fuelled  by  the  notion  of  the  contraption.  
Two  participants  in  the  post-­show  interview:  
B2:   ‘I   had   a   weird   experience   at   one   point,   where   I   didn’t   do   any   voice  
recording  but  I  thought  it  was  my  own  voice…’  
B10:  ‘I  had  that  too!’  (laughter)  ‘I  don’t  remember  saying  that..’  
B2:  ‘Yes,  that’s  like  me,  but  it’s  not  me…that  was  very  weird’  
B3:   ‘What  was   the  person  saying?  Were   they  saying   things   that  you  might  
have  said?’  
B2:  ‘No!  (laughter)  […]’  
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And  so   the  above  may   lead   to   the  question:   did   the  audience–participants  
appropriate  Margarita,   or   did  Margarita   appropriate   the   audience?   Did   the  
audience  make  the  space  or  did  the  space  make  the  audience?  This  circular  
co-­origination  will   be   explored   further   in  WS   III,   Phishing   Things   Together  
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WORK  SPACE  III  
SOCIAL  
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Chapter  5:  Work  Space  III-­  Phishing  Things  Together  (the  
predictive  brain)  
	  
In  WS  III  with  reference  to  my  overarching  research  question,  I  argue  further  
about  how  cognitive  frameworks  may  be  used  to  help  us  with  designing  the  
possibilities  of  material,   immaterial,  and  social   interrelations  and  how  this  is  
done.  Specifically  I  am  approaching  groundlessness  in  scenography  through  
the  prism  of  what  Lotker  suggests  in  reference  to  social  geographer  Doreen  
Massey   (2005)   as   a   need   to   think   about   scenography   ‘as   designing   the  
possibilities  of   interrelations,  as  something  that   is  always   in  flux,  something  
predicated  upon  the  existence  of  plurality’  (2015,  p.16).  In  order  to  do  this  I  
will  focus  on  how  my  practice  imbricated  within  the  cognitive  frameworks  of  
the   free-­energy  principle   (FEP)  and  predictive  processing   (PP)   (as  outlined  
in  p.165-­170)  and  4E  cognitive   frameworks  can  contribute   to  contemporary  
‘expanding  scenography’  knowledge,  and  logic.    
5.1  WS  III:  the  Venue,  the  People  Involved,  and  an  Original  
Method  for  Capturing  Audience–Participants’  Responses    
Work  Space   III:  Phishing  Things  Together   (the  predictive  brain)   took  place  
on  the  20th  of  October  2015  at  the  Live  Art  Bistro  (LAB)  which  produces,  and  
programmes  live-­art  and  performance  events  in  Leeds.  This  piece  needed  to  
exist   in   an   area   where   the   audience–participants   had   to   actively   visit   the  
performance–installation  and  not  be  familiar  with  the  venue,  or  the  workings  
of  the  venue  (LAB  had  very  recently  moved  to  the  particular  space).  
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The  space  looked  very  different  to  the  one  in  WS  II  due  to  its  DIY  aesthetics  
(Fig.  52),  emanating  a  sense  of  contraption:  what  used  to  be  a  garage  was  
now   a   carpeted   large   ground   floor   unit,   with   a   considerably   lower   ceiling  
compared   to   that   of   stage@leeds.   This   decision   brought   up   insightful  
information  at  the  post-­show  discussions,  in  terms  of  the  venue  affecting  the  
context  and  the  experience  itself  due  to  the  ‘thinness’  (C12)  of  the  threshold  
between   the   busy   street   on   ‘a   very   peaceful   October   evening,   a   really  
beautiful   sunset’   (S5   audience-­member   on   Skype   conversations)   and  
‘entering  into  a  dark’  interior  of  LAB  ‘walking  on  a  kind  of  carpeted  floor,  old  
dirty  warehouse’  (S9  Skype).  C2  who  had  attended  both  WS  II,  and  WS  III  
commented  on  the  shift  of  the  context  between  the  two:  the  first  time  (WS  II)  
was  ‘theatre’  whereas  at  LAB,  because  they  knew  it  is  a  live-­art  space,  they  
read  it  as  ‘installation’.  C6  said  that  the  space  framed  it  as  an  event,  rather  
than  an  installation  in  a  gallery.  
It   had  some  basic   lighting  and   tech   facilities,  and  we  had   to  bring   in  more  
lights   and  equipment,   and  position   these   in   places   that  were   conspicuous,  
not  hidden   like   in  a   theatre  apparatus.  Finally  because  storage  areas  were  
limited,   some  of   the  venue’s   furniture  was  placed  around   the  edges  of   the  
space,   allowing   the   audience–participants   to   sit   as   observers   in   the   dark  
edges  if  they  wished,  but  also  giving  the  sense  again  of  it  being  a  transient  
area,   literally   rough   around   the   edges,   therefore   in   process.   C3,   and   C6  
commented  on  the  fact  that  because  the  space  had  a  bar  it  made  it  feel  less  
formal.  The  context  of  each  audience–participant  shifted  depending  on  their  
embodied  system  and  their  response  to  the  shifting  environment.  As  I  have  
already  inferred  from  the  previous  practices:  
How  an  agent  responds  and  what  an  agent  perceives  will  depend  
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to  a  great  degree  on  the  overall  dynamical  state  of  the  brain,  but  
also   on   environmental   factors,   embodied   affective   and  
intersubjective  factors  […]  because  the  brain   is  part  of   the   larger  
embodied   system   that   is   coping   with   its   changing   environment  






The   people   who   were   involved   in   this   project   were:   myself   (the   principle  
investigator),  three  artist-­participants  (Ben  Eyes  in  sound,  Katherine  Graham  
in   lighting   and   Martha   Dais   in   performance).   The   audience–participants  
(around   25   in   total)   were   mostly   members   of   staff   and   students   from   the  
University  of  Leeds,  peers,  friends  from  Leeds,  friends  of  friends,  and  some  
people  invited  by  LAB.  This  was  a  three-­hour  durational  installation  where  I  
had  the  role  of  the  observer  and  the  ‘dialogic  facilitator’  (Blaikie  2000,  p.52)  
between   the   work   and   the   artists-­participants.   The   audience–participants  
were  free  to  drop  in  and  out  at  any  time.  
Figure 52. The process aesthetics of the work @ LAB. Image © Alaena Turner. 
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In   terms   of   the   documentation   the   installation  was   recorded   from   different  
angles   with   three   video   cameras   (image   and   sound)   and   I   used   a   stills  
camera  as  did   two  other  appointed  participants.  There   is  also  a      recording  
from   a   post-­show   discussion   of   approximately   20min   between  myself   and  
those  audience–participants  who  remained  after  the  show.    
I  devised  an  original  method  for  collecting  audiences’  responses:  the  Skype-­
station,   a   part   of   the   work   (Fig.   53,   and   54   below),   which   allowed  
communication   between   the   audience–participants   and   a   group   of   my  
friends,   collaborators   or   family   members   who   were   in   different   cities   or  
countries.  The  disembodied  guests  had  a  script  and  asked  questions  to  the  
audience–participants   regarding   the   space.   The   dialogues   were   recorded  
and  gave  me  limited  but  insightful  information  on  the  audience–participants’  
perception   of   the   space,   and   their   experience.   This   incorporated  
methodological   tool   was   tried   for   the   first   time   here   and   demonstrated   a  
potential   for   capturing   audience–participants’   responses   both   in   relation   to  
what   the   participants   were   saying,   and   in   the   ways   they   were   saying   it.  
These   parameters   were   revealing   in   terms   of   their   experience,   and  
emotions,  and  added  to  the  research  data  in  that  sense.  However  I  am  still  
reflecting   upon   how   the   tone   of   the   voices   can   inform   the   research,   and  
considering  taking  it  further  in  the  future,  especially  as  a  methodological  tool  
for   collecting   audience–participants’   responses   related   to   feeling.  
Approximately  one  month  after  the  event  I  had  one-­to-­one  interviews  with  12  
of  the  audience–participants,  whom  I  asked  specific  questions  i.e.  regarding  
any  tensions  they  found  in  their  engagement  with  the  environment,  and  how  
they   dealt   with   those   tensions;;   I   also   asked   them   to   openly   reflect   on   the  
words:   sense   and   non-­sense,   and   imagination.   The   second   part   of   the  
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interviews   therefore   tried   to   leave   space   for   the   audience–participants   to  
reflect   on   their   experience,   and   some   of   this   reflection  will   be   used   in  my  
analysis.   All   the   material   mentioned   above   can   be   accessed   through   the  
USB   drive,   at   folder   WSIII:   2.   Audience   Interviews,   3.   Audience  




5.2  Scenographic  Contraptions  (part  3):  Removing  the  
Scaffolding    
So   far   in  WS   I   and  WS   II   I   have   situated   theories   of   consciousness   and  
perception  at   the  centre  of  my  praxis  as  scaffolds   to  generate  contraption-­
environments  and  participation.  However,  one  puts  up  scaffolding  so  as   to  
Figure 53 (top). The ‘puppet-booth’ 
included a screen from which one 
could communicate with friends, 
collaborators and family members 
of mine (i.e. my mum in the image 
on the left) via Skype.  
Figure 54 (bottom). 
Disembodied philosopher of radical 
embodied neuroscience Mark 
Miller in conversation with Martha 
Dais. The script given to the 
disembodied guests was that they 
really wanted to be at the 
installation but could not make it. 
They therefore asked questions 
about the different parts of it.  
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take   it   down   once   the   underlying   construction   is   ready   to   be   revealed.  
Furthermore,   this   process   of   initiating   a   dialogue   with   these   neuroscience  
connectionist  models,  and  metaphors  (multiple  drafts  etc.),  however  useful  in  
terms  of  design  in  WS  I  and  II  didn’t  seem  productive  for  designing  WS  III.  I  
could  now  experiment  in  a  more  dynamic,  and  free  manner  using  the  tools  I  
had  already  discovered   from  WS   I,   and   II,   and   therefore  a  different  model  
was  now  needed.  
In  WS  I,  I  mentioned  that  the  system  was  driven  by  contagion,  and  in  WS  II  
mostly  by  inference;;   in  WS  III   I  wanted  to  create  an  environment  giving  the  
audience–participants   time   in  between   to   think  about   their  experience,  and  
their  next  move,  but  at  the  same  time  allow  them  to  navigate  a  friendly  social  
space.    
The  neuronal  metaphors  of  a  ‘global  workspace’  (Baars),  of  ‘multiple  drafts’,  
‘fame’,  ‘clout’  (Dennett)  etc.  that  worked  as  scaffolds  in  my  previous  practical  
experiments,  when  removed  revealed,  unsurprisingly,  groundlessness:  a  co-­
originating   network   between   the   audience–participants   and   the   design,  
powered   by   ambiguity,   precariousness,   and   uncertainty.   The   contraption-­
scenographies   that   were   created   in   WS   I,   and   WS   II   did   not   make  
‘pronouncements’   (Eco  1989,  p.142),   and  had   therefore  as  a  blueprint   this  
primal   perceptual   sense   of   uncertainty   stemming   from   the   audience–
participants’   embodied   experience   within   the   design.   The   skillful  
arrangement   of   the   affordances   was   therefore   sufficient   at   this   stage   and  
there   was   no   need   for   using   consciousness   metaphors   as   blueprints   for  
designing  WS   III.   These   blueprints   had   provided  me   initially   with   the   form  
and  later  (after  reflection  and  ‘doing-­thinking’)  with  practical  insights  on  how  
to  orchestrate  the  ‘invisible’  scenography  so  that  it  is  ‘decisive’  (Lotker  2015,  
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p.13).   In  WS   III   I   worked   therefore  with   practical   insights   I   had   developed  
already   relating   to   the   audience–participants   resolving   tensions   brought  
forward   by   the   ambiguity,   precariousness,   and   uncertainty   through   their  
structural  coupling,  skilled  intentionality,  and  inventiveness  with  affordances  
provided   by   the   designed   environment.   In   short   by   using   their   common  
sense  to  navigate  groundlessness.    
Varela   et   al,   contrary   to   cognitivism,   and   connectionism   of   their   time,   the  
1990’s,  that  seem  to  leave  the  ‘unmanageable  ambiguity’  of  common  sense  
‘at   the  periphery  of   the  enquiry’      (Varela  et  al.  1991,  p.148),  give  particular  
attention   to   common   sense   (or   background   Know-­How),   viewing   it   as   the  
context-­setting   element   of   what   is   relevant   for   the   agent   within  
groundlessness.  Indeed  in  WS  I,  and  WS  II,  common  sense  was  prominent  
from   the   part   of   the   audience–participants   in   navigating   the   contraption–
environments.   I  will   continue   to   reflect  on   the  notion  of   the  driving   force  of  
the   audience–participants   being   that   of   common   sense   but   using   more  
specific  terms  of  contemporary  enactive  frameworks  that  accept,  like  Varela  
et   al,   that   ‘basic   cognition   is   more   a   matter   of   adaptive   self-­regulation   in  
precarious   conditions   than   abstract   problem   solving   (Di   Paolo   and  
Thompson   2014,   p.76),   and   address   how   the   relational   understanding   of  
enactivism  can  be  made  consistent  with  predictive  coding  models  (Gallagher  
and   Bower   2014,   p.242).   This   will   help   me   unpack   further   the   notion   of  
groundlessness   in   scenographic  practice,  and  elaborate  on   the  how  of   the  
workings  of  groundless  scenographic  experience.  
In   Chapter   2   referring   to   the   ambiguous   nature   of   consciousness   and  
existence,   following   Merleau-­Ponty,   I   inferred   that   the   ambiguity   of   the  
scenographic  contraption   is  not  an   imperfection  but   its  definition.  What   this  
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means   in   relation   to   the   audience–participants   within   the   contraption-­
environment  is  that    ‘the  body  as  an  object  is  not  ambiguous;;  it  becomes  so  
only  in  the  experience  which  we  have  of  it’  (Merleau-­Ponty  2002  p.149);;  and  
particularly   in   all   the   Work   Spaces   the   audience–participants   were  
confronted   with   this   ambiguity   of   experiencing   their   bodies   within   ‘a   rich  
landscape  of  affordances’   (Rietveld  and  Kiverstein  2014),  and   in  relation  to  
the  other  bodies  in  the  space.  Following  that  ‘the  body  is  not  just  the  means  
but  also  an  end  of  being  a  cognitive  system’  (Di  Paolo  and  Thompson  2014,  
p.  73),  I  argue  that  the  conscious  body  is  not  just  the  means  but  also  an  end  
of   being   a   scenographic   contraption   system,   and   this   was   revealed  
particularly   in   WS   II   with   the   audience–participants’   embodied   inference  
which  drove  the  system  forward.    
Precariousness,   as   understood   by   the   enactivists,   is   an   intrinsic  
characteristic  of  autonomy   that   ‘is  not  a  positive  property  of  a  process,  but  
rather  an  unavoidable  aspect  of  materiality’  and  ‘its  negative  effects  are  what  
the   system   is   constantly   acting   against’   (Di   Paolo   and   Thompson   2014,  
p.73).   Therefore,   what   precariousness   does   paradoxically   is   to   enable  
relational  processes  to  happen  within  an  operationally  closed  network,   thus  
preventing   it   from   dying   out.   The   idea   of   precariousness   in   autonomy   is  
therefore  particularly  useful  in  terms  of  the  understanding  of  precariousness  
in   contraption   for   ‘designing   the   possibilities   of   interrelations’   (following  
Lotker)   that   don’t   let   the   scenographic   system   die   out.   As   I   have   already  
outlined   in   my   ‘ignorant   scenographer’   analysis   a   scenographic   system  
network-­in-­action   is  an  autonomous  system,   like  all  Work  Spaces,  because  
the   meaning   is   found   in   the   dynamical   processes   of   the   enfolding   and  
unfolding   of   the   audience–participant   and   the   environment.   Enactivists   Di  
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Paolo   and   Thompson   argue   that   ‘(t)o   be   a   sense-­maker   is,   among   other  
things,  to  be  autonomous  and  precarious,  that  is,  to  be  a  body,  in  the  precise  
sense  of  “body”  that  the  enactive  approach  indicates’  as  a  self-­individuating  
system      (Di   Paolo   and   Thompson   2014,   p.76).   If   all   the   bodies   of   the  
participants   leave   the   particular   space   of   the   performance   then   the  
performance   stops   as   there   is   no   sense-­making   to   be   made,   and   no  
operational   closure.   When   they   (or   one)   are   in   the   space   they   find  
themselves   in   perpetual   sense-­making   discourse,   within   a   precarious  
operational   closure   (the   scenographic   contraption   environment,   including  
themselves).  
In  order   to  unpack  what   is   referred   to  as  common  sense   in   the  contraption  
and  as  a  way  to  help  myself  and  the  reader  visualise  the  circular  causality  of  
embodiment   of   enactivism,   and   ecological   cognition   in   scenography   I   use  
the  free-­energy  principle  (FEP)  and  Predictive  Processing  (PP).    
5.2.1  The  free-­energy  principle  (FEP)  
The  free-­energy  principle  (FEP)  provides  a  unification  of  the  study  of  life  and  
the  study  of  cognition,  and  it  is  in  line  with  theories  of  self-­organisation  of  the  
living   such   as   autonomy,   autopoiesis   (Maturana   and   Varela   1980),   and  
ecological   psychology   (Gibson   1986)   (see   Bruineberg   et   al   2016,   p.3).  
According  to  Friston  ‘self-­organising  systems  (like  us)  that  are  at  equilibrium  
with   their  environment  must  minimise   their   free-­energy’   (2011,  p.91)  and   in  
this  way  ‘actively  resist  a  natural  tendency  to  disorder’  (ibid.  p.89),  which  is  
the   second   law   of   thermodynamics.   In   short,   living   systems   must   avoid  
surprises   not   ‘in   the   psychological   sense,   but   in   an   information-­theoretic  
sense—as  the  negative  log  probability  of  an  event’s  occurrence  (roughly,  the  
unlikeliness  of  the  occurrence  of  an  event)’  (Seth  2015,  p.6).      
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Friston   argues   that   agents   suppress   free-­energy   by   changing   two   things,  
action   and   perception:   their   ‘sensory   input   by   acting   on   the   world’   (active  
inference),   and   ‘their   recognition   density   by   changing   their   internal   states’  
(perceptual  inference)  (2011,  p.93).    
Jelle   Bruineberg,   Julian   Kiverstein,   and   Erik   Rietveld   argue   that   this  
minimisation  of  surprise  is  done  by  the  whole  organism  ‘being  drawn  to  act  
on  relevant  affordances  in  ways  that  result  in  the  reduction  of  dis-­attunement  
with  the  environment’  (2016,  p.11),  and  agree  with  those  who  argue  that  the  
free-­energy  principle  as  outlined  by  Friston,  is  better  suited  when  applied  to  
the  whole  system  of  animal-­environment,  and  not  only  to   its  brain.  They  go  
one  step  further  and  suggest  a  radical  embodied  term  for  perception  to  avoid  
any   reference   to   it  as  something  happening  separately   inside   the   insulated  
head   of   the   self-­organising   system,   and   replace   ‘perception’   with   ‘action-­
readiness’   as   ‘the   internal   states   of   the   individual   that,   given   its   sensory  
states   and   abilities,   prepare   the   animal   to   achieve   a   grip   on   a   particular  
situation’  (Bruineberg  and  Rietveld  2014;;  Kiverstein  and  Rietveld  2015).  I  will  
be  using  this  term  for  WS  III  and  also  agree  with  Tom  Froese’s  and  Takashi  
Ikegami’s   argument,   that   organisms   do   not   aim   ideally   to   completely  
eliminate  disorder  and   thoughtfully  propose   ‘that   it   is  more   important   to  be  
open   to   perceiving   differences   that   make   a   difference,   rather   than   to  
eliminate   differences   that   could   surprise   you’   (Froese   and   Ikegami   2013,  
p.214).   Therefore   the   phenomenological   tendency   of   the   agent   towards   a  
maximal,  or  optimal  grip  as  used  by  Bruineberg,  Rietveld,  and  Kiverstein,  is  
not   only   for   eliminating   disorder   altogether   but   for   sense-­making   in   the  
enactive  view  as  ‘a  bodily  process  of  adaptive  self-­regulation’  (Di  Paolo  and  
Thompson  2014,  p.  76).  
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Another   important  claim  that   interests  WS  III   in   terms  of   its   form  is   that   the  
free  energy  principle  accepts  that  each  ‘agent  embodies  an  optimal  model  of  
its  econiche’  and  that  ‘not  only  does  the  agent  embody  the  environment  but  
the   environment   embodies   the   agent’   (Friston   2011,   p.89).   Therefore   the  
‘physical  states  of  the  agent  (its  internal  milieu)  are  part  of  the  environment’  
(ibid.),   something   the   theory   of   the   scenographic   contraption   has   so   far  
addressed,  with  the  understanding  of  ‘being  implicated  in  the  game’  (Derrida  
1993)  and  ‘languaging’  (Maturana,  1988)  as  outlined  earlier  (p.101).  Friston  
radically  refers  to  the  circular  causality  of  embodiment  as  ‘I  think  therefore  I  
am,   iff   I  am  what   I   think’   (Friston  2011,  p.89-­90)  and  continues:   ‘(f)rom   the  
point   of   view   of   the   brain,   the   environment   includes   both   the   external   and  
internal  milieu’  (ibid.  p.  92).  The  practical  implications  of  Friston’s  statement  
above   are   that   ‘every   aspect   of   our   brain   can   be   predicted   from   our  
environment’   (Friston   2013,   p.213).   This   understanding   has   significant  
implications  for  performance  design,  and  for  how  can  scenography  make  us  
(following   Lotker   and  Gough   2013),   leading  me   to   develop   another   tool   in  
WS  III:  the  Predictive  Scenographer  which  I  have  already  referred  to  but  will  
analyse  further  in  this  chapter.    
5.2.2  Predictive  processing  (PP)    
Predictive  Coding   (or  Predictive  Processing  according   to  Clark  2013b)   is  a  
neuronal   theory   that   is   used   together   with   the   organisation   of   the   living  
principle  of  free-­energy  (FEP)  in  order  to  complement  the  neurophysiological  
anticipatory   aspect   of   the   second.   It   suggests   that   brains   are   essentially  
prediction  machines  (Friston,  2011;;  Hohwy  2013;;  Clark,  2013b);;  the  theory,  
known  also  as  the  Bayesian  Brain,  is  considered  today  a  strong  candidate  of  
‘being   the   single   principle   by   which   neural   operations   can   account   for  
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perception,  cognition,  action,  and  even  consciousness’  (Seth  2015),  but  also  
empathy,   imagination   and   creativity.   According   to   predictive   processing  
brains   are   pro-­active,   busy   with   constantly   predicting   their   own   states  
therefore   information   flows   forward.   The   predictive   brain   therefore   ‘tries   to  
create   a   neurophysiological   pattern   that   fits   the   external   (environment)  
pattern  and   they  shake  hands’   (Miller,  M.  2015.  Conversation  with  Xristina  
Penna,  Spring  2015.)    and  it  is  driven  by  prediction  error.  
The   word   prediction   is   used   in   predictive   processing   in   its   original  
understanding   of   the  meaning   of   the   word   ‘prediction’   denoting   ambiguity,  
because  most  predictions  are  not  accurate,  and  it  is  not  a  transparent  term.  
‘The   nervous   system   is   fundamentally   adapted   to   deal   with   uncertainty,  
noise,  and  ambiguity’  (Clark  2016,  p.39),  and  the  paradox  with  applying  the  
predictive  processing  theory  to  the  Work  Spaces,  as  already  observed  with  
the   theory   of   the   contraption,   is   that   uncertainty,   ambiguity,   and  
precariousness   provide   the   ‘disciplined   means’   of   the   groundless  
scenography  as  seen  in  chapter  4.    
This  theory  is  very  useful  for  WS  III  as  it  provides  a  structure  for  generating  
scenographic  participation  not  as  a  scaffold  but  as  a  top-­down  multi-­layered  
and   hierarchically   organised   model   (design)   in   which   there   is   a   constant  
bottom-­up   flow   of   prediction   errors   (audience–participants)   trying   to   be  
smoothed   over   with   top-­down   predictions   ‘at   multiple   hierarchical   levels’  
(Seth  2015,  p.5).  Within  this  understanding  the  prediction  error  was  key  for  
generating   the   system-­scenography   of   WS   III,   both   imaginatively   and  
practically  so  as  to  become  a  system  network-­in-­action.  The  implications  of  
predictive  processing   to  scenography  are   that  a  scenographer  can  now  be  
seen  as  someone  designing   the  space  ethics  of  a  multi-­functioning  design,  
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which  is  constantly  trying  to  understand  the  audience.  I  combined  this  view  
with   a   social  media   structure   (Facebook),   but   as   one   audience–participant  
said,  and  I  am  referencing  them  here  because  I  like  how  they  put  it,  ‘using  it  
(Facebook)  as  a   research  enquiry,   and  artwork,   and  bending   it   to  my  own  
purposes,  as  a  protest’  (C2).  
Following   imaginatively   what   Clark   is   describing   below,   the   processual  
scenographer   and   the   artistic   team   accommodated   the   inner   (neural)  
organisation   using   contraptions   as   building   blocks   and   providing   thus   the  
ethics   of   the   space;;   the   ‘disciplined   means’.   Imaginatively   speaking   the  
audience–participants   are   considered   the   external   factors   as   described  
below,  and  when  the  two  (audience–participants  and  designed  environment)  
come   together   in   time   they   make   the   constant   co-­determining   groundless  
scenography.  
Brains  now  emerge  as  complex  nodes  in  a  constant  two-­way  flux  
in   which   the   inner   (neural)   organization   is   open   to   constant  
reconfiguration  by  external  (bodily  and  environmental)  factors  and  
forces,   and   vice   versa.   Inner   and   outer   here   become   locked   in  
constant   co-­determining   patterns   of   exchange,   as   predictive  
agents  continuously  select  the  stimulations  that  they  receive.  This  
pattern  repeats  at  more  extended  scales  of  space  and  time,  as  we  
structure   (and   repeatedly   restructure)   the   social   and   material  
worlds  that  slowly  but  surely  structure  us  (Clark  2015a,  p.300).  
  
This   happened  with   the   construction   of   contraption-­props,   using  materials,  
sound,  costume,   light   that  generated  a  number  of  natural  and  conventional  
affordances;;  and  with  the  use  of  patterns  of  practices  such  as  drawing  and  
writing,   drinking,   chatting,   presenting,   dressing   etc.   creating   further  
possibilities   of   interrelations   in   a  work   open   to   constant   reconfiguration   by  
the   audience–participants,   who   constituted   the   ‘external   (bodily   and  
environmental  interactions)’,  or  as  I  have  referred  to  previously  the  ‘genuine  
means’.   However   in   the   installation   itself,   each   one   of   the   audience–
-­  172  -­  
participants  as  happenings  (following  Maturana  (2011,  p.146)  who  refers  to  
living  beings  as  happenings.  See  chapter  4  p.122),  were  reconfiguring  their  
self-­organisation  between  their  inner  (neural)  and  external  (environmental).  
From   what   has   been   outlined   above   with   the   free   energy   principle   and  
predictive   processing   the  main   insight   that   occurred  was   that   the   dynamic  
scenographic   systems   networks-­in-­action   of   the   Work   Spaces   were  
generated   by   each   audience–participants’   embodiment   of   their   own   best  
model   of   their   eco-­niche,   prompted   by   their   restless   predictive,   pro-­active  
brains.   This   insight   will   be   analysed   further   throughout   the   rest   of   this  
chapter.  
5.3  Outline  of  WS  III  
I   will   go   now   onto   outlining   the   ‘how’   and   ‘what’   of   WS   III   in   order   to  
familiarise  the  reader  with  the  complexity  of   the  system,  because  the  video  
footage  however  rich  cannot  in  the  specific  piece  capture  the  experience  of  
the  associations  and  interrelations.    
For   re-­powering   Margarita   after   WS   II   I   set-­up   a   Facebook   profile   of   a  
fictitious   person   called   Margarita   Attempt  
(https://www.facebook.com/margarita.attempt);;   in   the   profile-­page   I   started  
to  add  text  from  the  transcripts  of  Work  Space  II;;  I  also  downloaded  images  
from   the   web   and   added   these   on  Margarita   Attempt’s   profile   in   order   to  
complement   the   text.   For   example   (Fig.   55)   the   text   related   to   the   trip   to  
Alaska  was   used   as   a   status   of  Margarita   Attempt   and   a   photograph  was  
added,  one  that  I  found  on-­line  of  people  on  a  cruise  ship  to  Alaska.      
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Once  this  Facebook  profile  was  set-­up   I   invited  people   to   join  as   friends  of  
Margarita   Attempt.   The   Facebook   invitation   was   also   on   the   marketing  
material   of   the   installation   and   on-­line.   The   initial   idea  was   to   give   people  
Margarita’s   log-­   in   details   so   that   they   could   update   her   status;;   this   idea  
changed   because   of   logistical   and   ethical   reasons.      Hence   the   ‘contract’  
between  myself  and  the  people  who  befriended  Margarita  Attempt  ended  up  
with  me  being  able   to  browse   their  profile  pages  and  collect  material   that   I  
could   then   incorporate   creatively   in   the   environment   of   the   installation.  
Those  participants  who  did  not  agree  to  this  were  still  accepted  as   ‘friends’  
and  therefore  could  see  Margarita’s  status  updates  but  I  did  not  browse  their  
pages   to   collect  material.  A   private  message  was   sent   to   each   friend;;   this  
message   outlined   the   above   information,   giving   the   participants   the  
additional  option  to  ask  questions  about  the  project  in  private  if  they  wished.  
Figure 55. Facebook profile of Margarita Attempt 
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The   intention  behind   the  FB   idea  was   for  getting   to  know  who  was  coming  
and   to   know   in   this   way   a   bit   more   about   my   audience,   despite  
understanding  and  accepting  as  part  of  the  system  that  not  all  the  audience–
participants   that   befriended   Margarita   Attempt   would   turn   up,   and   not  
everyone  who   turned  up   to   the   installation  were   friends  with   her   on  FB.  A  
number   of   questions   arose   after   browsing   people’s   profiles   and   thinking  
about  the  project:  How  is  the  Facebook  information  going  to  be  embodied  in  
the  performance  space  (props,   image,  sound)  and  be   translated   into  a  rich  
landscape  of  affordances?  How  will   the  audience–participants   interact  with  
this   distributed   environment   (movement,   language,   creative/making,   etc.)?  
What   emotions   will   the   scenographic   environment   (sound,   props,   light,  
projections)  invoke  to  the  audience?  What  are  the  ethical  issues  of  using  the  
material  (despite  having  obtained  the  audience–participants’  consent)?  
In  an  attempt  to  respond  to  these  questions  WS  III  following  the  contraption  
concept   left   the   environment   of   the   installation   ambiguous,   using   an  
inefficient  aesthetic,  necessitating   the  perceivers   (audience–participants)   to  
Figure 56. The flyer-invitation. 
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co-­construct  the  experience,  within  rich  landscapes  of  affordances,  some  of  
which  contained  the  audience–participants’  own  ‘information’.  
       
The  information  from  FB  fed  into  the  design  as  part  of  the  ‘themes’  of  each  
part   (node)  of   the  system  scenography.  When  designing   the  space   I  spent  
time   looking  at  profiles  of   the   friends  of  Margarita  and  got   ideas  about   the  
design   arrangement.   Most   of   the   information   was   related   to   songs   (this  
brought  forward  the  plinth  idea  Fig.  71,  72,  73,  74),  selfies  (puppet  booth  Fig.  
53,   54,   and   62),   travel   memories   and   social   drinking   (tepee   Fig.   61),  
complaining  about  something,  or  ridiculing  oneself  (the  uncanny  hat  Fig.  59),  
getting  to  know  people’s  friends  and  family  (Skype  conversation  Fig.  53,  54),  
achievements  (talking  to  a  microphone  over  images)  etc.    
Anticipation  was  created  in  relation  to  which  information  from  the  audience–
participants’   profiles   they   may   have   encountered   in   the   space.   This   was  
taken  on  board  as  one  of  the  ‘errors’  that  drove  the  system,  the  creation  of  
an   anticipation,   and   people   coming   in   expecting   a   certain   arrangement  
Figure 57 (left). In WS III, I did not hand-make all of the set myself like in WS II but provided drawings. 
However, I communicated the contraption idea to the set builder. He picked up on the idea and developed 
in turn some interesting elements like the camera cover that was inside the booth see Figure 58 (right). 
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because   of   the   invitation   on   social   media.   An   audience–participant   said  
during   the   post-­show   interview:   ‘I   thought   I  would   come   in   and   find   all  my  
personal  information  hang  in  the  space  and  I  am  glad  I  didn’t  and  I  found  this  
playful   atmosphere   actually   became   curious   about   everything’.   Or   another  
(S6  from  Skype  calls):   ‘I  don’t  know,  I  came  here  to  find  a  friend  from  FB,  I  
am  not  sure  if  I  have  found  them.  I  don’t  know  if  I  am  drinking  Margarita  or  if  
I  missed  Margarita.  I  don’t  know  who  Margarita  is  but  I  think  I  have  an  idea.  
Maybe   I   am   lacking   to   find   the   physical   presence.   Yes,   I   am   Facebook  
friends  with  Margarita.  Maybe  I’ll  go  and  see  if  I  can  find  her’.  




Therefore  the  different  stations  of  WS  III  were  more  inter-­linked  than  in  WS  
II,   as   there   was   the   intention   to   evolve   them   by   initiating   more   nodes,   in  
number  and   in  complexity,  between   the  different  parts  of   this  scenographic  
network-­in-­action.  For  example  the  idea  of  the  tunnel  (Fig.  60)  was  re-­used  
Figure 59. The uncanny hat, also known as the clown hat, ‘the hat’, ‘Homage to Tadeusz Kantor, Louise 
Bourgeois, and David Lynch’. 
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with  the  same  recordings  as  in  WS  II,  of  people  sharing  their  experiences  of  
travel,   landscapes,   intimate   confessions   and   accidents   in   all   tunnels.  
However   this   time   one   tunnel   had   a   live   recording   coming   from   the  
audience–participant   who   was   each   time   inside   the   tepee:   the   audience–
participants  deciding  to  enter  into  the  tepee  were  asked  to  describe  aloud  a  
landscape   from   memory   and   their   description   was   heard   live   through   the  
headphones  inside  this  tunnel.    
  
When   entering   the   tepee   people   were   offered   to   choose   between   a  
Margarita  cocktail   (in  a  plastic  cup)  or  a  slice  of  pizza  Margarita,  and  were  
provided  therefore  with  more  layers  of  affordances  (taste  of  the  drink  or  the  
pizza,   holding   a   plastic   cup   with   an   alcoholic   drink,   holding   the   slice   of  
pizza),  which   in  some  cases  triggered  the  description  of   the   landscape:  C7  
said  that  drinking  the  margarita  impacted  on  her  description  of  a  landscape;;  
‘the  margarita  tent  made  me  return  to  a  particular  point  that  I  have  not  really    
reflected  on  since   it  occurred.  This  was   triggered  by   the  smell  and   taste  of  
the  drink.  I  found  this  to  be  both  relaxing  and  thought  provoking’.  
Figure 60. An audience-
participant lying inside the 
tunnel listening to a recording. 
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The   lights,   cameras,   sound   were   all   ‘disguised’   as   part   of   the   process  
aesthetics  of  each  of   the  contraptions  aiming   to  generate  an  extra   layer  of  
questioning,  and  process-­experience   to   the  audience–participants   following  
again  the  affordance  of  ‘touch’  instead  of  ‘don’t  touch’  and  the  generation  of  
layers  of  meaning  from  something  that  is  not  finished,  or  the  feeling  of  being  
backstage.   So   for   example   while   people   were   inside   the   booth   trying   on  
faces  the  intention  was  for  them  to  encounter  underlying  aesthetics  of  more  
process,   rough-­and-­ready   and   backstage,   generating   nuanced   internal  
questions   of   the   whys   of   the   absurd   aesthetics:   Why   is   the   camera   in   a  
wooden  box,  and  why  is  the  light  coming  through  the  plastic  jug?  (Fig.  62)  
Figure 61 (left). An audience-participant entering the tepee with the margarita cocktail. When inside the 
tepee they were asked to describe a landscape from memory (this was the only element in WS III that was 
ushered). 
Figure 62 (right). Inside the booth. Audience-participants’ faces were printed in advance (from their FB 
profiles) and left for the audience-participants to explore by finding various potential combinations of 
these ‘cut-out masks’ and their own faces in front of the camera. 
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   (You   will   now   be   guided   through   to   the   video   footage  WS   III.mov,   in  
folder  WS  III).  Please  watch  now  the  footage  from  the  beginning  up  to  02:52.  
Another   contraption   element   within   the   overall   scenographic   contraption  
environment   of   WS   III   included   the   affordance   of   the   cultural   patterned  
activity  of  drawing/doodling/writing;;  this  activity  replaced  in  a  way  the  playing  
with   the   buttons   from   WS   II.   What   the   audience–participants   drew   was  
projected  on  the  curtain  of  the  booth  (see  Fig.  64,  65.  Please  watch  now     
07:11   to   09:48)   and   was   conspicuous   to   other   audience–participants;;   this  
projection  in  turn  created  a  backdrop  for  the  people  who  were  trying  on  the  
face  cut-­out  ‘masks’  inside  the  booth.    
  
  
Figure 63 (left). Audience-participants 
drawing or writing. Figures (below) 64, 
65, 66, 67. What the audience-
participants drew was projected on the 
backdrop of the booth (Figs. 64, 65). 
Inside the booth people were trying on 
the ‘masks’ in front of a camera with a 
backdrop of the drawings. This 
combination of the face with the mask in 
front of the customised backdrop was 
simultaneously projected on the round 
ball- piñata (Figs. 66, and 67). 
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WS   III   was   a   social   space,   because   it   was   designed   as   such,   using   the  
insights   from   the   previous   Work   Spaces.   For   example,   a   significant  
difference  to  this  scenography  in  comparison  to  WS  II  was  that  there  was  no  
surround  sound.  The  voices  and  sounds  were  transmitted  from  within  each  
Figure 68. Audience-participants watching the faces, or other inventive interactions, coming from 
inside the booth. 
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station   with   the   speakers   being   placed   inside   the   various   parts   of   the  
installation   (in   tubes   or   special   pockets,   like   in   Fig.   69).   This   followed   the  
observation   made   in  WS   II   of   the   sound   imposing   itself   on   the   way   the  
audience–participants  behaved  (solemn,  reflective,  the  inferential  approach),  
and  I  wanted  in  WS  III  to  create  a  more  energetic  environment,  something  in  
between  WS  I,  and  WS  II.  I  therefore  refrained  from  using  a  surround  sound,  
and   opted   for   designing   the   scenography   of   the   sound   coming   out   from  
different   sources  within   the   installation.   The   sound   scenography   therefore,  
was  not  linear  like  in  WS  II  but  each  chapter  corresponded  to  a  station  and  





What  was  intended  was  to  avoid  having  a  confusing  sound  landscape,  but  also  
avoiding  big  moments  of  silence.  Therefore  I  developed  a  score  as  guide  (Fig.  
70,   below)   which   was   a   precarious   score   that   took   into   account   the  
Figure 69. The speakers were placed inside elements of the set (like the white tube next to the 
armchair in the specific case) giving an intimate encounter (when encountered) depending on the 
positioning of the audience-participants. 
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interrelation  of  the  different  parts  of  the  installation  (i.e.  avoiding  or  inciting  the  
overlapping  of  sound).  Some  of  the  chapters,  like  the  plinth  as  will  be  outlined  
below,  we  decided  to  be  operated  spontaneously  by  the  sound  designer.  
  
  Figure 70. The sound script of WS III. 
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This  design  decision  generated  a  social  space  as  it  allowed  intervals  in  time  
and  space  in  which  people  felt  it  was  ‘allowed’    to  engage  in  talking  to  each  
other,   about   their   experience,   or   other   topics.   I   inferred   this   from   the   data  
when  asking  during  the  interviews  ‘Did  you  feel  you  were  allowed  to  talk  or  
not?’,  and  received  answers  confirming  that  audience  felt  comfortable  to  talk  
to   each   other   at   parts   both   about   the   experience,   and   also  within   a   social  
context  of  ‘catching  up’.  (USB  drive,  folder  WSIII:  2.  Audience  Interviews) 
5.4  Applications  of  Embodied  Prediction  in  WS  III  
5.4.1  Action,  tension,  expectation  and  other  immaterial  nodes  of      
commun(icat)ion    in  WS  III  
Earlier   I   agreed   with   Harpin   and   Nicolson’s   account   of   referring   to  
performance   participation   in   cases   as   being   ‘less   an   action   than   an  
encounter  and  perception’   (2017,  p.6).   I  will  now  shift   this  assertion  slightly  
by   assuming   that   action   and   perception,   following   the   enactivists,   work  
together;;   this   is   also   a   view   within   the   specific   framework   of   Predictive  
Processing   (PP).  According   to  Andy  Clark,  action  needs   to  be   reconceived  
when   talking   about   embodied   prediction,   because   it   should   not   be  
understood  as  a  response  to  successive  inputs  but  as  something  that  brings  
forth   ‘the   evolving   streams   of   sensory   information   that   keep   us   viable  
(keeping  us  fed,  warm,  and  watered)’  (2015b,  p.2)  and  thus  ‘results  from  our  
own   predictions   concerning   the   flow   of   sensation’   (Clark   2015b,   p.7).   This  
complements   action   as   perception   as   they   are   both   working   together   in  
reducing   prediction   error,   and   it   is   what   Bruineberg   et   al.   have   named   as  
action-­readiness:  
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(P)erception  on  our  account  just  is  the  organism’s  preparing  itself  
to  act  in  ways  that  reduce  surprisal,  thereby  improving  grip  on  its  
environment   both   by   getting   ready   for   what   is   to   come   and   by  
engaging   with   affordances   offered   by   it   in   action.   The  
environmental   affordances   scaffold   the   individual’s   actions  
(Bruineberg  et  al.  2016,  p.  14).  
  
The   affordances   in   the   installation   were   designed   not   to   be   evident,   but  
rather  layered.  On  the  other  hand  they  were  not  hidden  to  create  a  hierarchy  
between  the  creator  of  the  work,  who  knows  where  something  is  hidden,  and  
the   novice,   who   does   not   know   but   rather   the   idea   was   to   create   a  
groundless   (enfolding-­unfolding)   meaning   making   experience   in   which   the  
audience–participants  were  asked  to  locate,  explore  or  make  up  the  nodes-­
associations,   to  navigate   in  an   inventive  manner.  According   to   the  point  of  
view  of  one  of  the  audience–participants  when  describing  the  space:  ‘We  are  
finding  parts  of  ourselves,  playing,  playing  with  the  light,  unexpected  events  
[…]  wood,  fabric,  cameras,  sound  equipment,  and  a  bit  of  alcohol.  Shades  of  
red,  grey,  it  is  pretty  dark,  you  cannot  see  much.  It  provokes  you  in  terms  of  
fiction’  (Skype  3).  
The  connections  and  associations  therefore  that  are  made  by  the  audience–
participants   between   the   available   stations   were   driven   by   an   on-­going  
sense-­making  process  (or  non-­sense-­making  process),  and  action-­readiness  
based   on   their   previous   knowledge,   prediction,   and   skilled   intentionality   on  
multiple  landscapes  of  affordances.    
Skilled   intentionality   treats   context   as   just   more   affordances—a  
landscape  of   affordances  available   in   an  ecological   niche  —and  
avoids   the   frame   problem   by   starting   from   the   phenomenon   of  
maintaining   grip   on   multiple   affordances   simultaneously  
(Bruineberg  and  Rietveld  2014,  p.10).    
  
The  context  that  is  necessary  for  our  predictive  brains  to  be  able  to  coexist  in  
a   particular   eco-­niche   can   be   treated   as   ‘just   more   affordances’;;  WS   III’s  
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context   therefore   was   made   out   of   affordances,   that   were   the  
scenographer’s   tool   to   try  and  predict   the  audience–participants’  responses  
in   order   to   create   ‘possibilities   of   interrelations’   (Lotker);;   more   like   a  
scenography   as   predictive   affordance-­o-­graphy.   The   aim   was   again   the  
subtle   development   of   webs   of   affordances   and   the   co-­generation   of   the  
action-­readiness   patterns   from   the   enfolding   of   the   audience–participants,  
and  even  the  co-­invention  of  new  ways  of   interaction  that  the  designer  and  
the  art   team  may  not  have  thought  about  previously.  I  will  give  an  example  
below:  
(Please   go   now   and   watch      06:31-­06:54)   The   contraption-­prop   of   the  
plinth  was  at  precarious  moments  very   loud  and  aimed   to  attract  attention,  
the  ‘clout’,  and  ‘fame’  example  as  outlined  in  WS  II.  Sounds  of  clapping,  loud  
pop  music,  and  booing  were  heard   intermittently  via   two  speakers  on  both  
sides  of   the  plinth,   to   give   the   impression   to   the  audience–participant  who  
was  on   the  steps  of  being  on  stage  as  a   front-­person   in  a  band   (Figs.  71,  
72),  and  thus  generating  different  feelings  to  the  person  who  decided  to  put  
themselves   up   there,   and   to   those  watching   (please   go   now   to      05:37-­
05:55).  
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The   area   ‘on   stage’   was   restricted   aiming   to  make   the   audience–participant  
feel  vulnerable,  and  the  height  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  steps  was  just  at  an  
uncomfortable   level   for   jumping   (C2  described   it  as   ‘dangerous’  but   ‘not   in  a  
threatening  way’).  Several  audience–participants  dealt  with  the  tension  that  the  
Figures 71, 72. The plinth, or steps, or treads, or pedestal. 
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affordances   of   the   plinth   emanated   by   deliberately   avoiding   it:   C4   said   she  
thought  that  if  she  stood  on  the  steps…she  didn’t  want  to  do  that,  while  others  
(as  seen  in  the  images  above,  and  in  the  video)  engaged  with  it  to  resolve  the  
tension,  or  in  order  to  get  an  optimal  grip:  S3  Skype  said  ‘there  were  the  steps  
and  I  went  on  to  bow.  It  is  part  of  my  job,  I  am  a  pianist,  so  I  did  it’.  
However,   once   up   or   in   a   tactile   relation   with   the   plinth,   another   field   of  
affordances  was  discovered  by  some.  These  steps  had  subwoofer  speakers  
inside;;   depending   on   the   strength   of   the   bass   sound   they   would   vibrate  
offering   a   mechanoreceptive   sensory   experience   to   the   audience–
participant.   This   quality   was   discovered   gradually   by   the   audience–
participants  who  decided  to  engage  with  it,  and  later  told  others  about  it.  C7  
said   they  spend  some   time  with   the  plinth,  and   found  a  way   in  which   they  
could  understand  the  vibration  from  different  parts  of  their  body  ‘fascinating’.  
When  they  went  on  it  originally  they  were  expecting  a  sound  experience,  and  
the   vibrations   were   not   particularly   strong,   but   then   it   ‘kicked   in’   and   they  
realised  that  ‘the  experience  of  standing  in  that  spot  wasn’t  about  what  they  
thought  it  was  about  in  an  experiential  way’.  From  afar  it  seemed  about  ‘one  
person   presenting   themselves   becoming   a   statue,   a   stage  whatever’,   said  
C7   during   the   interview,   but   the   vibration  moved   the   attention   circle   (they  
reference   Stanislavski   here)   to   their   feet   and   they   wanted   to   understand  
what  their  feet  were  doing.  They  then  went  and  ‘recommended  it  to  people’  
like  to  the  audience–participant  on  Figs.  73,  74  below,  and       03:35-­4:17.  
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This  person  (Figs.  73  and  74),  whose  attention  was  pointed  to  the  vibration  
quality   by   C7   engaged   with   it   without   using   the   stepping-­up   solicitation-­
invitation   but   found   a   different   field   of   affordances,   maintaining   a   grip  
simultaneously  on  a  shifting  constellation  of  affordances,  while  performing-­
rehearsing.  They  talked  during  the  post-­show  discussion  about  ‘the  physical  
feeling  of  the  sound,  and  how  it  transferred  in  the  body’,  an  invitation  to    ‘play  
with  the  sound’,  changing  depending  on  where  the  body  was,  ranging  from  a  
relaxing  experience  to  an  earthquake  shaking  you.  They  also  said  they  were  
aware  they  were  being  watched,  and  one  can  see  in  the  video  footage  (   
05:02-­05:34)   how   other   audience–participants,   wanted   to   capture   this  
moment  on  their  phones,  or  watched  this  ambiguous  performance.  C5  said  
that  they  recalled  liking  it  when  there  was  some  ambiguity  for  example  with  
the  plinth,  ‘the  man  hugging  the  plinth’,  they  found  it  unusual  and  interesting  
Figures 73, 74.  The plinth. 
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to   watch,   they   thought   it   was   a   performance,   and   ‘that   he   was  
experimenting’.  It  surprised  them,  and  they  found  it  inventive  (C5).  
What   is   of   further   interest   here   is   something   already   mentioned   in   the  
previous  Work  Spaces:  the  error  response  generated  by  the  violation  of  the  
audiences’   expectations,   and   the   use   of   a   disciplined   surprise   for   the  
creation  of  meaning.   ‘The  organism  is  ready  to  act  on  relevant  affordances  
so   as   to   improve   its   grip   on   the   environment   thereby   reducing   surprisal’  
(Bruineberg   et   al.   2016,   p.   14),   but   this   ‘surprisal’   can   be   enhanced   or  
annihilated   by   situating   the   audience–participants   in   a   landscape   of  
deliberate   tensions,  or   layers  of   ‘surprisal’.  The  sense-­making  autonomous  
bodies   of   the   audience–participants   may   experience   more   joy   when  
‘surprisal’   exceeds   their   expectations   (i.e.   the   vibration   in   the   plinth),  
something  that  for  the  specific  context  of  the  contraption  counts  also  towards  
an  optimal  grip.  The  aim  of  the  design  context  therefore,  was  to  provide  an  
escalation  of  layers  of  familiarity  and  layers  of  surprisal.  Tim  Ingold  writes:  
those   who   are   truly   open   to   the   world,   though   perpetually  
astonished,   are   never   surprised.   If   this   attitude   of   unsurprised  
astonishment   leaves   then   [sic]   vulnerable,   it   is   also   a   source   of  
strength,   resilience   and   wisdom.   For   rather   than   waiting   for   the  
unexpected   to   occur,   and   being   caught   out   in   consequence,   it  
allows  them  at  every  moment   to  respond  to   the   flux  of   the  world  
with  care,  judgement  and  sensitivity  (2011,  p.75).  
  
And  so  following  the  above  understanding  but  applying  it   to  the  contraption  
my   aim   was   not   to   present   the   unexpected   and   the   surprise   out   of  
proportions,  but  aimed  to  calmly  but  assertively  orchestrate   the  playfulness  
of   the   scenographic   interrelations.  This   aim  was   indeed   co-­dependent   and  
co-­originating   with   the   audience–participants,   their   mood,   their   ‘attitude   of  
unsurprised  astonishment’  and  so  the  example  with  the  person  on  Figs.  73  
and  74  was  one  of  the  successful  moments  of  communication  between  the  
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scenographer,   the  audience–participant,  and   their  co-­audience–participants  
in   getting   an   optimal   grip.   The   art   team   provided   the   potential   for   this  
interaction   to   occur   but   the   unfolding   of   the   response   came   from   the  
audience–participant  who  was  in  turn  ‘recommended’  the  specific  affordance  
by  a  co-­audience–participant.    
5.4.2  The  predictive  scenographer:  designing  uncertainty  for  
generating  audience  interaction  and  participation  
I  hope  that   from  the  way  I  have  outlined  the  work  so   far,   it   is  clear  by  now  
how  the  use  of  structures  and  the  theories  that  create  the  form  of  the  Work  
Spaces   facilitate   both   the   interaction   of   the   audience–participants  with   the  
actual   contraption-­environments   themselves   and   the   bringing   forth   of  
feelings,  memories,   affect,   and   emotions.   Scenographer   Richard   Foreman  
writes:  
Form  in  art-­form  isn’t  a  container  (of  content)  but  rather  a  rule  for  
generating  a  possible  ‘next  move’.  That’s  where  the  subject  is  (in  
the  next  move,  dictated  or  made  possible  by   the   form)   (2002,  p.  
198).  
  
The   continuation   between   mind   and   life   is   something   observed   and  
understood   in   performance   design   as   argued   in   the   introduction   and   an  
example   of   this   is   the   way   Foreman   here   is   using   his   practitioner   ‘Know-­
How’  (Nelson  2013)  to  give  an  analysis  of  form  in  art-­form,  which  is  similar  to  
the  way  predictive  processing   theory  has  been  used   in   this   chapter   to   talk  
about  WS   III.   The  way   Foreman   talks   about   the   form   being   a   rule   for   the  
possibility   of   a   next   move   is   similar   to   what   the   scenographic   contraption  
does   as   a   form   by   orchestrating   the   affordances   that   generate   the   next  
move.  The  audience–participants  themselves  however  are  happenings  (see  
chapter  4  p.122),  which  embody  the  above  hierarchical  ecological  model  and  
so  in  their  case,  their  embodied  brains  are  the  complex  and  non-­linear  top-­
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down   predictive   flow   and   the   sensory   inputs   from   the   environment   are  
bottom-­up,   and   linear,   making   therefore   this   exchange   between   the  
designed  world  and   the  audience–participant  a   circular,   constant  weave;;  a  
groundless  scenography.    
A  scenographer,  as  I  have  outlined  earlier  needs  to  envisage  this  vibrancy  of  
the   ‘next  move’,   and   as   I   have   already   outlined   and   will   do   so   with  more  
focus  here,  4Es,  free  energy  principle,  and  predictive  processing  can  help  us  
with   both   designing   and   understanding   the   ‘how’.   In   order   to   do   this   I   am  
introducing   another   scenographic   tool   here,   that   of   the   ‘Predictive  
scenographer’.  With  this  I  aim  to  add  to  my  research  question  regarding  the  
ways   with   which   we   can   use   4E   cognition,   the   free   energy   principle,   and  
predictive   processing   to   investigate   the   audiences’   experience   of   dynamic  
scenographic   systems,   and   also   add   further   to   my   research   on   the  
implications  of  the  above  theories  on  scenographic  making  processes.    
Scenographers  design  complex  yet   in  many  cases  simple  scenographies  
using   material,   and   their   sensorimotor   understanding   to   ‘predict’   what  
experience  their  design  will  generate  to  the  audience.  Exact  prediction  on  
one   hand   is   impossible   due   to   the   varying   audience–participants’  
responses,  and  on  the  other  hand  because,  even  if   it  were  possible,   total  
prediction   would   have   generated   a   system   that   is   easily   navigated   and  
(unless  this   is   intended)  would  have  lacked  the  tension  that  makes  for  an  
engaging  dialogue  between  the  audience–participant  and  the  work.    
Scenographers  orchestrate  sensibilities  between  material,   immaterial,  and  
social,   and   because   this   orchestration   is   happening   live,   and   in   many  
cases   in   their  physical  absence,   this  suggests   that  scenographers  should  
register  prediction  error  as  a  driving  force,  that  needs  to  be  accounted  for  
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in   the   design   as   an   underlying   agent   of   ambiguity,   precariousness,   and  
uncertainty.   I   suggest   that   the   understanding   of   prediction   error   as   a  
design   tool   for   the   generation   of   bidirectional   flow   between   audience–
participants   and   the   designed   environment,   and   for   achieving  
transformation   is   crucial:   we   are   changed   by   error   and   we   create   error.  
Error   is   encountered   and   understood   here   as   the   difference   between  
anticipated   and   actual   sensory   input,   which   can   be   experienced   i.e.   as  
surprise,  as  rupture,  as   failure  etc.  but  needs  orchestration  on  a  practical  
level   in  order  to  avoid  overexposure,  and  therefore  lose  its  transformative  
power.   For   example:   Carsten   Höller’s   work   Test   Site   (2006)   at   Tate’s  
Turbine  Hall  was  an  installation  of  a  number  of  steep  slides  available  to  the  
audience–participants   as   a   platform   for   experiencing   playfulness   and  
rapture.      Curator   Jessica   Morgan   ‘asserts   the   transformative   effect   on  
one’s   behaviour   offered   by   sliding   that   will   “subtly   alter   our   outlook”   and  
“provide   an   altered   perspective”   through   the   exhilarating   and   joyful  
experience  it  offers’  (cited  in  Windsor  2011)  and  presents  sliding  as  a  sort  
of  prescription  that  on  a  daily  dosage  can  enhance  our  wellbeing.  Windsor  
however  points  out  the  irony  of  this  prescription  practice  as  with  regularity  
he  argues  ‘(w)hat  is  extraordinary  soon  becomes  passé  with  overexposure’  
(Windsor   2011)   therefore   the   transformative   possibility   of   the   work   may  
evaporate.   My   interest   rests   on   the   how,   when   the   initial   excitement   is  
gone  we   can  maintain   a   genuine   relationship   between   the   audience  and  
the  work.  
This  model  of  the  ‘predictive  scenographer’  as  the  absent  maestro  of  error  I  
am  proposing  here  can  be  better  understood  with  an  example  given  by  Clark  
to  show  how  the  levels  of  the  hierarchical  prediction  could  be  fleshed  out  in  
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the  predictive  processing  paradigm.  The  example  is  as  follows:  Imagine  you  
are  playing  a  game  between  two  people,  person  One  (the  higher  predicting  
level)   and   person  Two   (the   lower   level).  One   is   asked   to   describe   a   room  
where  Two  is  in.  One  who  is  not  in  the  room,  knows  the  room  as  they  have  
seen  it,  or  been  there  before  but  now  cannot  actively  view  it.  One  therefore  
describes  the  room  by  recalling   its  features  by  saying:   ‘There’s  a  vase  with  
yellow  flowers  on   the   table   in   front  of  you’.   If   the  case   is  correct   then  Two,  
who   is   in   the   room   and   can   see   it,   does   not   say   anything   in   response  
(silence),  but  if  a  piece  of  the  information  described  is  wrong  Two  will  point  it  
out.  So  for  example   if   the  flowers  are  not  yellow  Two  will  say:   ‘The  flowers  
are  yellow’,  therefore  communicating  only  the  error.  So  One  now  knows  that  
their   prediction   that   ‘the   flowers   are   yellow’   is   wrong,   and   they   need   to  
rephrase   correcting   the   error   of   their   previous   phrase   (i.e.   using   the   next  
likely  colour  and  saying  ‘The  flowers  are  red’)  (2015,  p.5).  If  there  is  silence  
from   Two   then   there   is   a   settlement   in   the   description   between   One   and  
Two.  The  message   therefore   in   this  model   is   in   the  error;;   if   a   response   is  
accurate   it   does   not   provoke   a   reaction,   whereas   if   a   response   (yellow  
flowers)   is   incorrect   it   generates   a   richly   informative   signal,   the   prediction  
error  signal,  in  order  to  smooth  out  the  prediction  process.  It  is  worth  adding  
that   the   downward-­flowing   predictions   (One)   are   complex   and   non-­linear  
while   the   upward-­flowing   error   signals   (Two)   are   simple   and   linear   (Clark  
2015b,  p.5).    
A   Predictive   Scenographer   similarly   to   person   One   in   the   example   above  
who   knows   the   space   but   cannot   actively   see   it,   has   an   overview   of   their  
design:   they   know  what   it   looks   like   and   how   it   functions   since   they   have  
provided   it.   Despite   the   fact   that   this   knowledge   places   them   in   a   certain  
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‘hierarchical   level’  of  prediction  it  does  not  affect  their  control  of  the  system  
once   this   is  up  and   running,  as   they  have  no  access   to   it.   In   their   turn   the  
audience–participants  try  to  navigate  the  space  similarly  to  Clark’s  example  
with   person   Two,   by   making   reflexive,   intellectual   and   more   reflective  
meaning  with  their  predictive  embodied  brains.    
C10  who  was  part   of   the  art   team  pointed  out   that  we   (the   creative   team)  
originally  thought  that  when  people  go  up  the  plinth  they  would  look  from  the  
direction  of  the  steep  side  like  if  it  were  a  stage,  but  during  the  show  people  
who   decided   to   step   up   turned   to   look   at   different   directions   to   view   the  
space   from   above,   and   did   not   face   only   to   one   side   (Fig.      71,   72).   This  
happened  because   the   design   did   not   provide   the   specific   convention   e.g.  
having   audience–participants   looking   at   the   elevated   person   only   from   the  
steep   side,   because   the   rest   of   the   audience–participants  were   dispersed.  
The  plinth  design  therefore  provided  within  its  constraint  the  freedom  to  the  
audience–participants  on  the  plinth  to  decide  where  to  look.  This  ‘prediction  
error’  that  myself  and  the  art-­team  didn’t  think  about  was  the  very  essence  of  
the   ‘genuine   means’,   as   referred   to   in   chapter   4,   from   the   part   of   the  
audience–participants  who  took  this  freedom  to   invent  their  own  affordance  
and  engagement  with  their  stepping,  and  looking  around  the  room  when  on  
the  plinth.      
Furthermore,   this   error   can   work   as   information   for   the   scenographer  
(myself):  Next  time  I  may  decide  to  design  the  plinth  or  a  similar  experience,  
I   will   take   the   audience–participants’   embodied   feedback   on   board,   and  
depending  on  the  context  I  will  evolve  the  design  accordingly.  As  mentioned  
in  the  methodology  I  am  learning  also  both  as  an  artist  and  as  a  researcher  
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each   time   from   my   work   and   the   audience–participants’   encounters   with  
affordances.  
Borrowing   creatively   from   the   predictive   processing  model   I   am  making   a  
case   of   a   ‘predictive   scenographer’   whose   role   is   to   generate   patterns   of  
expectation   within   the   scenographic   eco-­niche.   These   patterns   of  
expectation  will  in  turn  structure  and  nuance  the  prediction  error  flow  for  the  
generation   of   the   possibilities   of   interrelations,   and   transformation  with   the  
action-­readiness   patterns   of   the   audience–participants.   As   Clark   puts   it  
‘prediction  error  carries  the  news’  and  is  the  hero  (or  anti-­hero)  of  this  whole  
family   of   Baysian  models’   (Clark   2015b,   p.4).   This   is   very  much   the   case  
with   the   scenographic   contraption,   especially   in   WS   III   where   I   have  
demonstrated  how  error  can  be  used  as  a  creative  tool.  What  the  contraption  
does   is   to   layer   top-­down   provocations   of   subtle   surprisal   by   the  way   it   is  
made,   the  way   it   is   not   something   finished  and  already  processed.  So   the  
bottom-­up   embodied   errors   (the   audience–participants)   are   the  
scenographic  heroes  of  WS  III  and  also  of  the  previous  Work  Spaces;;  their  
embodied  brains  drive  the  contraption  system  network-­in-­action  forward.    
In  WS   III   the   predictive   scenographer   was   further   enacted   by  Martha,   the  
performer,   who   tried   to   guess   the   stories   of   the   audience–participants’  
Facebook  photographs,  an  impossible  task  (   02:58-­03:24),  and  got  caught  
and  exposed  sometimes  by   the  people  whose   image   it  was.  This   failure   to  
predict  turned  out  to  render  the  specific  activity  playful,  funny,  and  awkward  
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Finally  the  predictive  processing  paradigm  helped  me  furthermore  here  to    
frame   the   predictive   scenographer   as   not   someone   who   hypothesises   but  
who   accommodates,   an   observation,   which   goes   back   to   WS   II.   The  
response   from   B5   back   then   was   that:   ‘yes   it   was   (the   scenographic  
environment)  accommodating  but  in  a  very  smooth  way  established  a  kind  of  
I  would  almost  dare  to  say  ethics’.  Following  this  up  I  imbricate  it  again  with  
Clark’s   recent   understanding   of   prediction   error   minimisation   not   as   a  
hypothesis,  but  as  an  accommodation  process:    
The  task  of  PP  systems  is  not  to  infer  the  best  description  of  the  
world   given   the   sensory   evidence.   The   fundamental   task,   using  
prediction   errors   as   the   lever,   is   to   find   the   neuronal   activity  
patterns   that   most   successfully   accommodate   (in   action,   and   in  
readiness  for  action)  current  sensory  states  (Clark  2016,  p.8).  
  
This  understanding  of  inference  corroborates  the  scenographic  contraption’s  
understanding  of  not  wanting   to  make   ‘pronouncements’   (Eco  1989,  p.142)  
and   present   the   ‘best   description   of   the   world’   (Clark   2016,   p.8)   but   to  
generate  an  artwork  made  from  a  collection  of  contraptions,  or  a  contraption  
environment   that   most   successfully   accommodate   the   different   audience–
participants’  embodied  histories  and  worlds.  This  success  is  related  to  what  I  
referred  earlier   to  how  a   relation  with   the  artwork  can  be  maintained  when  
the   first   surprise   has   faded;;   in   short   how   can   audience–participants   be  
genuinely  engaged  (provoked  to  imagine,  have  fun,  reflect,  empathise  etc.).    
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5.4.3  Appropriating  the  audience:  experience,  emotion,  affect  
  
The   scenographer   (using   the   predictive   processing   theory   and   the   free  
energy  principle  as  blueprints)  together  with  the  art  team,  had  provided  a  top-­
down   organisational   probabilistic   design.   This   design   was   met   by   the  
incoming   constant   flow   of   bottom-­up   prediction   errors:   the   audience–
participants.   On   the   other   hand,   each   one   of   the   audience–participants  
themselves  (living  systems),  provided  top-­down  predictions  that  were  met  by  
the  errors  of   the  environment.  There  was   the   creation   therefore  of   endless  
circular,  causal  ‘drafts’  within  the  contraption-­environment  of  WS  III.  
For  WS   III  overall   I  would  say   that   the  statistical  model  of   the  environment  
that   each   audience–participant   encountered   was   that   of   an   interrelational  
scenography.   Audience–participants   who   were   not   familiar,   or   not   in   the  
mood  for  engaging  with   this  specific   interrelational   inventive  model,  or  what  
they  made   of   it   depending   on   their   ‘histories’   and   action-­readiness   patters  
Figure 75. An audience-participant under the uncanny hat, and another one watching them.  
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(mood)   on   the   day,   found   more   resistances   in   following   the   system,   or  
tensions  at  points.  When  this  happened  some  either  persisted  on  their  own  
to  get  an  optimal  grip  (similarly  to  participant  A2  from  WS  I)  or   in  cases  got  
an  optimal  grip  encouraged  by  people  who  ‘recommended’  parts  of  the  work,  
or  by  watching  what  others  did,  without  participating   themselves,  or  by   just  
leaving.      
When   asked   during   the   interviews   if   they   felt   any   tensions   and   how   they  
dealt   with   these   tensions   the   audience–participants   answered   providing  
different   approaches   depending   on   the   level   of   the   tension,   and   their  
experience.  C2  for  example  engaged  with  the  hat  despite  the  fact  that  they  
felt   like  they  were   ‘wearing  something  ridiculous’,  however  when  it  came  to  
the  plinth  which  they  described  as  ‘dangerous’  they  resolved  the  tension  by  
not   participating.      C3   had   a   similar   reaction   to   the   plinth   by   staying   away  
from   it,   but   enjoyed   watching   others   having   fun   with   it.   C5   felt   that   they  
enjoyed   more   when   they   observed   others   overall   rather   than   being  
observed;;  when   they   felt   observed   it   felt   awkward  and   they  moved   space.  
They  didn’t  approach  any  space  that  was  busy.    C8  said  that  knowing  others  
in  the  space  made  them  feel  comfortable  ‘an  atmosphere  that  you  can  relax  
and  be  social’,  and  hypothesised   that   they  would  have  probably   left   if   they  
didn’t  know  anyone;;  and  so  on.    
However   from   the   audience–participants   who   were   interviewed   everyone  
suggested  that  they  were  at  some  point  guided  by  what  others  were  doing,  
either   by   being   directly   ‘recommended’   something   or   indirectly   by   simply  
watching   and   wanting   to   participate,   or   just   by   watching.   For   example   C2  
said  that  they  ‘read  by  looking’  what  other  people  were  doing.  C3  said  that  it  
was  ‘a  word  of  mouth’  experience  C5  put   it  as   ‘you  work  out  what  to  do  by  
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seeing   what   others   did;;   there   was   nothing   that   someone   did   to   break   the  
rules’.  Consequently  the  audience–participants  were  part  of  the  scenography  
that   ‘makes’   the   other   audience–participants.   This  making   is,   as   has   been  
outlined   so   far,   a   multifaceted   co-­originating   process,   including   in   the  
relational  forces  ‘affect,  attention,  and  affordances’  which  ‘interact  to  sculpt  a  
field   of   solicitations   out   of   the   total   landscape   of   available   affordances’  
(Ramstead  et  al.  2016,  p.  13).  
Harpin   and   Nicholson   refer   to   the   contributions   in   their   recently   edited  
volume   Performance   and   Participation:   Practices,   Audiences,   Politics   as  
responding  ‘to  the  contemporary  call  to  attend  to  affect  –  not  as  a  subset  of  
human   sensibility   but   as   a   relational   force   that   exists   between   bodies,  
objects  and   technologies’   (Harpin  and  Nicolson,  2017,  p.7).   I  am  adding   to  
the  above  relational  force  the  word  brains,  and  aim  to  contribute  to  reflecting  
on   the   audiences’   engagement   with   this   understanding   of   affect   as   an  
embodied   relational   force,   what   Gallagher   and   Bower   call   ‘a   cocktail,   a  
mélange   of   aspects   that   make   up   one’s   affective   state’   (Gallagher   and  
Bower  2014,  p.235).  
This   relational   force   was   behind   the   word   ‘phishing’   in   the   title   of  WS   III.  
Phishing   is   ‘a   fraud  perpetrated  on   the   Internet;;  spec.   the   impersonation  of  
reputable   companies   in   order   to   induce   individuals   to   reveal   personal  
information’   (OED,   2017).   The   suggested   fraudulent   action   during  WS   III  
was   that   the   installation   used   personal   information   of   some   people’s   FB  
profiles   (with   their   approval),   but   also   their   personal   embodied   information  
during   the   installation:   what   they   did   in   the   space,   how   they   felt   and   in  
relation   to   the   space,   objects,   and   people   as   part   of   the   contraption-­
environment.    
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I  attempted  to  achieve  this  in  WS  III  by  combining  levels  of  familiarity  of  each  
audience–participant   into   the   landscape   of   affordances   using   the   past,  
present,  future.  For  example,  one  level  involved  asking  audience  in  advance  
of  the  performance  for  using  their  personal  information  from  their  profiles  on  
Facebook:  This  created  anticipation  on  the  part  of  the  audience–participants  
who  agreed   to  share   their   information   in   terms  of  how  this  may  be  used   in  
the   installation.   Another   level   was   the   ‘exposing’   or   ‘sharing’   during   the  
actual   show,   where   audience–participants   were   projecting   their   faces   for  
others   to   see,   or   describing   a   landscape   and   their   voice   was   heard   live  
through  head-­phones  at  another  part  of  the  installation  etc.    
There  was  one  moment  that  was  intentionally,  and  craftily  designed  to  bring  
all   these   interrelational   forces   together   however:   the   piñata   moment.   This  
was   the   ‘clout’  moment   of  WS   III,   and   the  attention  as   contagion  element.  
During   the   final   fifteen  minutes   of   the   installation   everyone   got   together   in  
the  centre  of   the  room  to  see   the  white  round  ball,  where   faces  were  once  
projected,   being   smashed   by   one   of   their   co-­audience–participants   (   
09:54-­13:02).  
The  piñata  moment  as  can  be  seen  from  the  video  created  an  agentive,  and  
bodily   co-­ordinated   common   ground   between   bodies,   objects,   affect,  
attention,   emotions,   technologies,   and   the   affordances   (even   the  
disembodied   Skype   participant   who   could   hear   but   not   see   what   was  
happening   was   at   that   point   part   of   the   piñata).   There   was   a   responsive  
movement  occurring   in   relation   to   the  main  blind-­folded  bodies  holding   the  
bat,  and  a  synchronised  affect  in  the  form  of  an  embodied  satisfaction  which  
emanated  when  the  piñata  was  smashed.  During  the  post-­show  discussion  
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one  of  the  participants  referred  to  this  embodied  experience  as:  ‘it  was  really  
fun,  not  even  doing  it  but  just  watching:  Oh  you  missed  it!  Oh  you  got  it!’.  
In   terms   of   the   contraption   idea   the   piñata   denotes   a   telos   but   one   that  
continues  to  exist,  because  it  includes  things  that  the  audience–participants  
can  take  away  with  them.  One  of  the  audience–participants  asked  me  if  they  
could   take   more   sweets   for   their   daughter   and   this   transported   me   to   an  
image   related   to  Margarita   continuing   to   exist   in   some   kid’s   belly.  Another  
audience–participant   opened   their   hand   and   showed   me   what   they   had  
found   between   the   treats:   a   little   scale   model   of   the   clown   hat,   that   was  
hidden   between   the   treats   and   the   audience–participant   kept.   Somebody  
made  a   joke   saying   that   the  piñata   reminded   them  of   an  egg,   a  Margarita  
egg  that  hatched,  or  following  an  animism  route  by  saying  it  was  like  hitting  
someone.    
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5.5  Interim  conclusion  
The  audience–participants’  predictive  brains  are  understood  to  get  a  grip  on  
multiple  fields  of  affordances  (both  material,  cultural  etc.)  simultaneously  and  
these  become  interweaved  in  this  circular  causal  weave  between  embodied  
brain   and   world.   The   plurality   of   possible   fields   of   interrelations   the  
audience–participants   make   in   relation   to   the   design   stretch   across  
interoceptive,  proprioceptive,  and  exteroceptive  information,  providing  ‘a  rich  
new   entry   point   for   accounts   of   experience,   emotion,   and   affect:   accounts  
that  do  not  compartmentalize  cognition  and  emotion,  but  reveal  them  as  (at  
most)  distinctive  threads  in  a  single  inferential  weave’  (Clark  2015a,  p.296).  
WS   III’s   scenography   could   be   described   as   an   embodied,   and   ecological  
Figure 76 (above). Attempt on smashing the 
piñata. 
Figures 77 and 78 (below). Collecting sweets, 
balloons, and other treats from inside the piñata.  
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playful   prediction   algorithm   that   had   the   audience–participants   as  
anticipating   errors   predicating   the   next   moves   in   order   to   maintain   the  
organisation  of   the  system;;  or  as  one  audience–participant   referred   to   it   in  
the   post-­show   discussion   ‘a   playground   for   adults’.   What   Foreman  
understands  as  a  ‘next  move’,  and  what  the  contraption’s  understanding  is  of  
these   next   moves   following   predictive   processing   within   an   expanded  
scenography   view   resonate   also   with   Lotker’s   call   to   think   about  
scenography   as   ‘designing   the   possibilities   of   interrelations   as   something  
that   is  always   in   flux,  something  predicated  upon   the  existence  of  plurality’  
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6.1  Key  Findings  and  Claims  
  
I   will   now   address   my   research   questions   in   order   to   present   the   key  
findings,   and   claims  made   through   this   practice-­research,   and   outline   how  
these  may  benefit  the  knowledge  of  scenographic  processes  and  reception.  
–  How  might  current  post-­cognitivist  theories  that  refer  to  the  mind  as  
embodied,   embedded,   enactive,   ecological,   and   affective   (known   as  
4Es)   be   used   as   critical   and   creative   frameworks   for   analysing   and  
understanding   the   multimodal   nature   of   scenographic   making  
processes  and  participation?  
The  multimodal  nature  of  scenography  is  discussed  in  this  research  project  
in  relation  to  scenography  that  is  ‘an  artistic  discipline  in  and  of  itself’  (Lotker  
2015,  p.17),  or  what  Hans-­Thies  Lehman  refers  to  as  ‘visual  dramaturgy’  to  
be  understood  as  ‘one  that  is  not  subordinated  to  the  text  and  can  therefore  
freely   develop   its   own   logic’   (2006,   p.   93).   In   the   Work   Spaces,   the  
multimodal  nature  of  consciousness  was  contextualised  scenographically  as  
an   equally   multimodal   collection   of   contraptions   (or   contraption-­
environments).   The   integration   in   turn   of   4Es   cognitive   frameworks   within  
‘scenographic   contraption’,   brought   forth   the   logic   of   ‘scenographic  
groundlessness’:   the   understanding   of   the   experience   of   scenography   as  
enacted   by   the   audience–participants’   ‘coupling   with   the   environment’  
(Thompson  2005).   
A   ‘groundless   scenography’   places   therefore   scenographic   operations   and  
experience   beyond   emergence   and   into   co-­emergence,   co-­origination,   co-­
relation   and   a   bi-­directional   understanding   between   the   autonomous  
embodied  brains  of   the  audience  and   the  designed  environment.  This   is   a  
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common   understanding   in   recent   research   on   the   relation   between  
audiences  and  the  scenographic  world  (i.e.  McKinney  2008;;  Shearing  2015;;  
Beer   2016).   Scenography   is   specifically   defined   as   ‘groundless’   using  
enactive   theory   in   this   thesis  when   it   is  understood  as  equally  co-­emerging  
through   time   between   material-­immaterial-­social,   and   not   as   solely   an  
emerging   property,   or   one   that   privileges   one   part   (i.e.   material)   over  
another.   
What   this   research   brings   into   this   co-­originating,   and   co-­specifying  
understanding   (apart   from  defining   it   as   ‘groundless’)   is   an   original  way   of  
orchestrating   this   groundless   experience   in   contemporary   scenography   by  
designing   uncertainty.   This   is   demonstrable   by   using   the   notion   of   the  
‘scenographic   contraption’,   which   accepts   similarly   to   the   enactivist  
approach,  and   to  post-­structuralist  understanding   that   there   is  not  one  way  
of  tackling  groundlessness  i.e.  by  designing  one  centre  or  a  telos,  instead  a  
different  type  of  doing-­thinking  needs  to  be  employed  by  the  scenographer.  
In   order   to   locate   how   I   navigated  within   the   ‘contraption   paradigm’   in   this  
research  I  have  pinpointed  three  different  phases  of  the  scenographer:  The  
‘ignorant   scenographer’   who,   in   relation   to   the   audience–participants,  
generates  a  groundless  scenography  using  their  artist’s  gift  of  ignorance  for  
the  audience–participants  to  grapple  and  navigate  using  their  gift  of  common  
sense.   The   ‘Janus-­faced   scenographer’   who,   in   relation   to   the   audience–
participants,  thinks  both  with  the  material  and  the  immaterial  affordances  for  
orchestrating  groundless  experience,  and  with  notions  of  passive  and  active.  
Finally,  the  ‘predictive  scenographer’  who  in  trying  to  predict  their  audience–
participants,   orchestrates   error   by   providing   top-­down   complex   ambiguous  
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environments,   using   material   and   sociocultural   affordances,   and   leaves  
ground  for  the  audience–participants  to  respond  with  bottom-­up  responses.    
These  different  perspectives  are  tools  (as  seen  in  the  methodology  section)  
that   have   emerged   from  my   iterative   imbrication   of   4E   cognitive   literature  
within   my   practice.   These   three   tools   work   at   different   levels   of  
understanding   and   are   all   aiming   together   with   the   ‘history’   of   the  
scenographer  (what   the  scenographer  brings   into   their  work  based  on  their  
past   experience,   knowledge,   aesthetics,   way   of   being   etc.)   to   establish   a  
language   as   doing   (‘languaging’   (Maturana   2002))   between   the   audience–
participants,   the   design,   and   the   artists   (scenographer,   performers,   sound  
designer,  lighting  designer  etc.).   
What   is   further   important   for   this  project   is   the  multi-­disciplinary,  and   inter-­
disciplinary  approach  that  cognitive  science  takes  to  knowledge,  and  this  as  
I   said   in   the   introduction   is   useful   because   it   generates   an   up-­to-­date  
conversation  between  scenography  and  other  contemporary  knowledge.  For  
myself   and   for   other   researchers   in   the   field   this   constant   generation   of  
cross-­disciplinary  findings  proves  a  valuable  source  of  material,  which  cross-­
pollinates  and  develops  knowledge  across  science,  the  arts,  and  humanities,  
but  also  offers  abundant  creative  possibilities,  if  one  is  willing  to  notice  these.  
These   possibilities   are   also   based   on   structural   understanding   (be   it  
language   structure,   organic   structure,   material   structure,   structure   of  
thought,  metaphorical  structure).  This  is  because  enactivism  is  based  on  the  
understanding   of   the   structure   of   living   systems   as   cognitive   systems   and  
provides   creative,   and   meaning-­making   tools   for   scenographers   in   their  
doing-­thinking  between  life,  art,  brain  and  world. 
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I   have   therefore   outlined   in   the   thesis   how   4Es   can   be   both   critical   and  
creative   frameworks   for   analysing   the   multimodal   nature   of   contemporary  
scenography.  This  however,  is  the  case  because  these  frameworks  share  a  
common   understanding   with   the   logic   of   contemporary   scenography,   the  
implications  of  which  I  will  further  unpack  in  my  conclusion.    
  
–   How   might   4Es   frameworks   and   specifically   radical   embodied  
cognitive   neuroscience   and   the   more   generally   applied   notions   of  
encultured  cognition  contribute  further  to  understanding  the  workings  
of   dynamic   scenographic   systems   within   the   current   landscape   of  
hybrid,  participatory  performance?  
‘Scenographic   groundlessness’   can   be   better   understood,   I   argue,   if   we  
replace  the  Cartesian-­based  notion  of   ‘perspective’,  or   the   idea  of   ‘the  set’,  
‘the  centre’  or  ‘the  stage’  in  scenography  with  the  notion  of  ‘contraption’.  The  
notion  of   ‘contraption’  exposes  the  notion  of   ‘perspective’,  the  notion  of   ‘the  
set’,  ‘the  centre’  ‘the  stage’  and  even  the  notion  of  ‘Cartesian  dualism’  to  the  
rest   of   the   system   (audience),   positioning   in   this   way   the   audience–
participant   in   a   circular   causal   embodied   relationship   with   the   process  
scenography,   which   is   also   distributed   to   include   their   co-­audience–
participants.    
By   replacing   ‘perspective’  with   ‘contraption’   therefore,  and  by  exposing   the  
scenographic   apparatus   we   move   both   as   scenographers   and   audiences  
from   ‘seeing   the   world   as   it   is’   to   accepting   the   world   as   it   happens,   as  
shifting.     The  experience   is   therefore  designed   in   relation   to   the  audience–
participant   not   only   in   terms   of   a   spatial   three   hundred   and   sixty   degrees  
surround  but  also  by  asking  the  question  ‘how  does  scenography  make  the  
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audience’   (Lotker   and  Gough  2013).  Here   frameworks   like   the   free-­energy  
principle   (Friston   2011)   have   been   employed   in   understanding   further   the  
idea   of   co-­origination   as   the   theory   radically   supports   that   the   audience–
participant   embodies   the   design   but   also   that   the   design   embodies   the  
audience–participant,   in   a   sense   that   ‘the   physical   states   of   the   agent   (its  
internal  milieu)  are  part  of  the  environment’  (Friston  2011,  p.89).  Below  (Fig.  
80)   is   an   updated   diagram,   which   builds   on   the   one   on   p.6   regarding   the  
relation  between  what  I  call  the  making  of  our  worldviews  and  the  making  of  
the  stage.   It  suggests   the  contraption  as   the  appropriate  critical,  analytical,  



















The  above  diagram  shows  the  causal  relationship  between  the  scenographic  
contraption  and  the  free  energy  principle,  and  outlines  the  relation  between  
4E   frameworks   –which   understand   cognition   as   co-­constructed   between  
Concepts	  =	  Metaphors Covering	  a	  story
Metaphors	  interweaved	  within	  our	  collective	  thinking	  and	  doing
Cartesian	  dualism
"I	  think	  therefore	  I	  am"	  (René	  Descartes),	  early	  17th	  centuryBrain	  insulated	  from	  outside	  world	  ,	  making	  internal	  representations	  of	  an	  independent	  outside	  world.
RepresentationGroundFoundationHierarchy	  around	  a	  centre	  (point	  )
Scenographic	  Perspective The	  world	  seen	  'as	  it	  is'Theatre	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  natureIllusion	  of	  reality	  
RepresentationGroundFoundationHierarchy	  around	  a	  centre	  (point)Scene
Free-­‐‑energy	  Principle 'I	  think	  therefore	  I	  am,	  if	  I	  am	  what	  I	  think'	  (Karl	  Friston,	  2011)The	  agent	  embodies	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  environment	  embodies	  the	  agent
Self-­‐‑modifying	  processesGroundlessnessProcess	  PredictionContingencyAmbiguity/Uncertainty
Scenographic	  Contraption
(the	  scenographic	  contraption	  includes	  scenographic	  perspective	  as	  one	  way	  of	  viewing,,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  based	  on	  it)
The	  world	  accepted	  as	  shifting	  A	  performance	  co-­‐‑constructed	  with	  the	  agentThe	  space	  perfroming-­‐‑rehearsingCircular	  causality	  	  of	  embodied	  cognition
Self-­‐‑modifying	  processesGroundlessnessProcess	  PredictionContingencyAmbiguity/UncertaintyRehearsal,	  Imporvisation
Figure 80. An updated conceptualisation attempt of the contraption theory following Bal and Bleeker, and 
Friston’s free energy principle. The structure of a contraption as critical, analytical, and practical tool for 
tackling, transforming, and orchestrating groundlessness in participatory scenography. 
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agent   and   environment–   and   the   study   of   contemporary   scenography   in   a  
post-­representational   performance   landscape.   The   juxtaposing   example   in  
the   diagram   between   the   ‘scenographic   perspective’   and   contraption   is  
offered  in  order  to  make  my  argument  accessible.   I  am  not  suggesting  that  
chronologically   there  haven’t  been   further  understandings  between   the   two  
(i.e.  the  stage  as  machine  by  constructivists  like  Meyerhold  in  the  early  20th  
century  etc.).  
The   multimodal   nature   of   scenographic   making   processes   in   participatory  
formats  as  understood  through  this  project  is  an  iterative  exploration.  This  is  
because  both  the  scenographer,  and  the  scenography  ‘learn’  each  time  from  
the   audience–participants,   because   the   space   is   performing-­rehearsing;;  
similarly   to   a   conventional   theatrical   practice   in   which   the   scenographer  
‘learns’  by  attending  rehearsals  and  by  observing  the  actors/performers.  This  
insight   of   learning   how   to   learn   is   an   enactive   view.   It   generates   an  
interrelation  not  only  between  the  audience–participants  and  the  design  but  
also   between   the   scenographer   and   the   audience–participants.   The  
‘predictive   scenographer’   sees   what   their   design   can   unexpectedly   afford  
more   than   what   they   had   predicted.      It   generates   a   new   type   of  
scenographer  who  visits  their  work  and  by  being  in  the  work  and  exploring,  
by  being  vigilant,  they  learn  more  from  the  audience–participants’  ‘embodied  
feedback’  about  their  own  work.  An  extension  of  this  thinking  would  be  that  
audience–participants  also  engage  in  this  dynamic  ‘learning’  as  observed  by  
C2  who  attended  both  WS  II,  and  WS  III  and  said  they  came  into  the  work  
the  second  time  having  ‘information  in  advance’. 
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–   How  might  the  empirical  metaphorical  models  of  consciousness  
of  Baars  (1988),  Dennett  (1991)  and  Edelman  and  Tononi  (2000)  and  the  
predictive   processing   framework   (Clark   2013b)   be   employed   and  
applied   imaginatively   as   creative   methods   for   developing   the  
aesthetics  of  dynamic  performance/scenography  systems?  
Bleeker’s   (2005;;   2008),   and   later   Germano’s   (2013)   understanding   of   the  
dialogic   relation   between   the   theatrical   apparatus   and   perception,   and  my  
argument   regarding   the   understanding   of   contemporary   scenography   and  
participation   ‘as   contraption’   have   been   imaginatively   merged   in   my  
Performance   Experiments   WS   I,   WS   II,   and   WS   III   with   contemporary  
cognitive  theories  of  consciousness,  perception,  and  cognition.    
I   have   argued   that   computational   and   connectionist   models   of   rhizomes,  
multiple   drafts,   brain-­webs,   and   predictive   machines   can   be   inspiring  
blueprints  for  giving  access  to  the  structure,  both  material  and  immaterial,  of  
groundlessness   and   scenographic   systems   networks-­in-­action.   The  
‘scenographic   systems   networks-­in-­action’   I   created   during   this   research  
project   can   be   unpacked   as   occurring   between   the   autonomous   living  
entities   of   me   (as   an   autonomous   living   being,   ‘a   happening’   (Maturana  
2011,  p.146)),  my  collaborators  (each  one  as  an  autonomous  living  being,  ‘a  
happening’   (ibid.)),   and   the   audience–participants   (again   each   audience–
participant  member   an   autonomous   living   being,   ‘a   happening’   (ibid.))   and  
are  scenographic  contraptions.    
The   scenographic   contraption   has   occurred   using   my   ‘artist’s   gift   of  
ignorance’,  and   I  have  an   ‘acceptance  of   the  world  as   it   is,   in   full  crisis,  by  
formulating  a  new  grammar  that  rests  not  on  a  system  of  organization  but  on  
an  assumption  of  disorder’   (Eco  1989,  p.  141).  The  notion  of  crisis  as  Eco  
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puts   it  needs  unpacking  as  crisis  can   take  many   forms.  The  contemporary  
crisis   I   argue   can   be   traced   in   the   embodied   or   embedded   in   the   world  
‘brainweb’   or   the   ‘rhizome’.   It   is   the   networks,   and   the   communication  
through  these  networks  (like  the  Internet  for  example)  that  is  in  crisis,  as  it  is  
a  medium  we  have  not  managed  to  master,  and  probably  will  never  be  able  
to  master,  by  giving   it  a  centre.  Therefore,  a  different  kind  of  mastering,  or  
approach  to   this  crisis  needs  to  be  put   into  place,  one  that   is  similar   to   the  
contraption,  an  exposed  self-­generating  construction.    
The  crisis   that   the  contraption  embodies   is   related   to  what  groundlessness  
generates   (anxiety,   rapture,   playfulness,   reflection,   malfunction,  
appropriation,   life   itself   etc.).   Additionally,   a   contraption   brings   us   face   to  
face  with  its  history:  one  can  see  how  the  pieces  of  the  contraption  are  put  
together,   and   therefore   make   assumptions   on   how   they   are   made,   what  
stages   they  may   have   gone   through,  what   they   have   encountered.  And   in  
this  sense,  as  mentioned  above,  the  contraption  is  revealing,  it  reveals  itself  
to   the  audience,   it  does  not  attempt   to  hide  or  disguise   its  malfunctions,   its  
precarious  nature  exposing  thus  the  artist-­scenographer-­inventor  who  made  
it;;   this   exposure   is   an   invitation   to   the   audience   to   contribute   critically,   to  
judge,   observe,   participate,   collaborate,   conspire,   make   their   own   stories,  
and  allow  themselves  to  be  exposed.    
The   creative   fleshing   out   of   the   empirical   metaphorical   models   of  
consciousness,  perception,  and  cognition,  which  I  have  named  ‘scenography  
in   the   flesh’   contributed   to   the   aesthetics   of   scenography   ‘as   contraption’  
with   the   use   of   ambiguity,   precarity   and   uncertainty   as   elements   for  
organising   top-­down   and   bottom-­up   dynamics   that   drive   the   scenography  
forward.  The  agentive  capacities  of  contraption-­props  that  occurred  by  using  
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this  method  revealed  their  power  to  actively  orchestrate  not  only  space,  but  
also   affect   and   feelings.   This   insight   was   taken   further   with   each   iteration  
(Work  Spaces)   by   creating   or   adjusting   the   nodes   and   associations  within  
the  system  scenography.  
  
–   What  are   the   implications  of   the   findings  of  4Es,  and  embodied  
predictive  processing  (PP)  on  scenographic  making  processes?  
At  the  same  time  as  tackling  the  overall  architecture  of  groundlessness  using  
contraption,   I   have   also   dealt   with   the   building   blocks   of   groundlessness,  
which   are   the   co-­originating   relations   between   the   action-­readiness   of   the  
embodied  brains  of  the  audiences  and  the  affordances  (material,  immaterial,  
social)  generated  by   the  design.   I  will  zoom   in  now   into  how  the  expanded  
radical   embodied   notions   of   affordances,   encultured   cognition,   and  
prediction  error  have  helped  me   in  understanding   the  dynamic  workings  of  
participatory  scenographies,  and  have  contributed  to  vocabularies  for  talking  
about  these  complexities.  
I  will   refer  here   to  a  particularly  prominent  example  of   this  groundlessness  
that   was   designed   using   the   contraption   approach   and   frameworks   of  
sociocultural  affordances  during  WS  II.  The  overall  scenography  in  WS  II  co-­
originated   from   the   orchestration   of   the   audience–participants’   attention,  
understood  as  the  relational  patterns  between  the  audience–participants  and  
the   material   and   sociocultural   affordances   provided   by   the   design.  
Specifically,  in  the  case  of  the  ‘buttons  area’  behind  the  scrim  in  WS  II  (see  
Fig.   38)   the   theatrical   apparatus   was   playfully   exposed   as   a   ‘performing-­
rehearsing’  or  ‘on  stage-­backstage’  scenography  without  a  hierarchy  around  
a  centre  point  but  various  places  of  focus.  These  addressed  the  audience–
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participants’   attention   simultaneously   through   different   focal   points,   and  
cultural  affordances   related   to   the   theatrical  apparatus.  The   in-­betweens  of  
‘performing-­rehearsing’,   ‘back   stage-­on   stage’   allowed   for   pockets   of  
reflection   and   rendered   scenographic   participation   ‘as   inference’.      The  
contraption   therefore   positioned   the   sociocultural   affordances   related   to  
‘performance-­rehearsal’,  and  ‘on  stage-­backstage’  as  its  tools.  Sociocultural  
affordances,  in  this  thesis  related  to  exposing  the  theatre  apparatus,  helped  
me   to  develop  my  crafting  of   the   immaterial   in   relation   to   the  material,  and  
this  has  been  the  value  of  the  4E  frameworks  throughout  this  project.    
I   will   also   refer   here   to   the   ‘predictive   scenographer’   as   an   example   to  
demonstrate  how   these   frameworks  have  helped  me   in  understanding   that  
affordances   depend   on   the   action-­readiness   of   the   audience–participant,  
and   are   therefore   also   co-­relational,   and   even   co-­originating.   This   is  
particularly   helpful   when   one   wants   to   design   a   context-­sensitive  
scenography   as   it   places   the   scenographer   in   a   hypothetical   dialogic  
relationship   with   the   potential   audience–participants’   multiple   and   different  
skills,  and  brings  forth  together  with  ‘prediction’  the  ‘scenographic  error’  and  
‘contingency’   as   tools   for   generating   participation.   The   co-­origination  
therefore   extends   beyond   the   actual   scenography   to   include   also   the  
disembodied   scenographer,   who   uses   material   affordances   playfully,   and  
craftily  as  ‘bait’  to  get  the  audience–participants  to  be  part  of  the  contraption  
props  (enter  into,  sit  etc.),  but  also  the  sociocultural  affordances  as  another  
artful   way   of   ‘phishing’   the   ‘immaterial’   personal   response   of   the   audience  
(i.e.  feelings,  affect,  senses  raging  from  rapture,  disgust,  to  drinking  alcohol  
and  being   transported   imaginatively   to  your  holidays   in  Rome,  and  sharing  
this   experience   with   others).   At   the   same   time   though   the   above   are   not  
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enforced   on   the   audience–participants,   and   do   not   happen   within   a   pre-­
specified  order,  but  unfold  and  enfold  in  relation  to  the  environment.  
A  corollary  of  the  above  is  that  the  design  is  not  only  that  which  is  seen  but  
also   that  which   is   to  be  discovered;;  and   the  audience–participant  needs   to  
work  towards  inventing  and  sharing  their  experience  for  the  scenography  to  
unfold;;   like   for   example   in  WS   III   the   layer   of   ‘feeling   the   sound’   via   the  
vibrations   of   the   plinth,   that   was   ‘recommended’   from   one   audience–
participant   to   the   other.  Occasionally   it   is   also   the   case   that   the   design   is  
what   is   not   supposed   to   be   seen   for   example   the   backstage   aesthetics  
inside   the   ‘mask   booth’   during  WS   III;;   or   the   hand-­made   and   often   rough  
aesthetics   of   certain   parts   of   the   theatre   props   that   can   be   seen   because  
they  are  accessible   to   the  audience–participants,   and  not  presented  as  an  
illusion  from  afar.    
I  hope  that   in  the  Work  Spaces   I  have  demonstrated  how  this  thinking  with  
material   and   sociocultural   affordances   has   been   developed   iteratively  
becoming   with   time   a   tool   of   knowledge   for   the   scenographer   in   doing-­
thinking  between  material-­immaterial,  and  by   learning   from   their  audience–
participants.    
  
–   What  are   the   implications  of   the   findings  of  4Es,  and  predictive  
processing  (PP)  on  scenographic  reception  research?  
–   In  what  ways  might  we  use  4Es  and  predictive  processing  (PP)  to  
investigate   the   audiences’   experience   of   dynamic/scenographic  
systems?  
4Es  and  predictive  processing  were  the  tools  that  helped  me  in  rendering  the  
‘tacit’  ‘explicit’  (Nelson  2013,  p.43)  by  enabling  me,  after  the  iterative  process  
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of   this   research   to   ‘tell’7   more   of   what   I   knew   as   a   practitioner   about   my  
understanding  of  scenography,  contraption,  and  groundlessness.  The  Work  
Spaces   I   generated   are   the   praxis   (action)   that   led   me   to   insights   of  
orchestrating   scenographic   experience,   my   poiesis   (creation,   production),  
and   to  develop  a   language   to  be  able   to  communicate  my   tacit  knowledge  
such   as   ‘contagious   scenography’,   the   ‘clout   effect’,   ‘scenographic  
contraption’  etc.  (see  Appendix  C).    
What   is  the  benefit  of  this  marriage?  Why  wouldn’t   I  be  able  to  come  up  to  
the   same   insights/conclusions   by   using   only   philosophy?   I   hope   I   have  
argued   sufficiently   that   cognitive   science   can   introduce   something   that   is  
very   important   for   a   practitioner-­researcher   in   scenographic   thinking-­doing  
and  this  is  the  providing  of  the  form  of  groundlessness  as  a  circular  causality  
of  embodiment  for  understanding  what  scenography  ‘as  contraption’  does.    
Following   Charles   Whitehead,   another   valuable   contribution   of   cognitive  
science  to  theatre  and  performance  lies  in  science’s  ability  to  ‘emancipate  us  
from  the  negative  aspects  of  our  own  cultural  heritage’   (2004,  p.87)  one  of  
these   aspects,   I   will   add,   being   Cartesian   dualism.   This   research   has  
investigated   how   this   emancipation  may   happen,   and  what  might   proceed  
after  it  has  happened  when  we  start  thinking-­doing  beyond  representation.   
4Es  and  predictive  processing  also  provided  me  with  the  tools  to  engage  in  a  
dialogue  with   other   performance   scholarship   and   practice   and   in   cases   to  
unpack   further   some   understandings.   For   example,   the   understanding   of  
‘participation  as  perception’  (Harpin  and  Nicholson  2017)  viewed  through  the  
                                                
7  To  ‘tell’  here  is  following  Michael  Polanyi  when  he  introduces  human  knowledge  and  
observes  that  ‘we  know  more  than  we  can  tell’  (1966,  p.4).  My  practice-­research  
helped  me  to  be  able  to  ‘tell’  more  of  what  I  knew  as  a  practitioner.  
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main   radical   embodied   prism   of   perception   as   ‘action-­readiness   states’  
(Bruineberg   et   al.   2016)   dissolves   the   idea   of   ‘participation   as   perception’  
(Harpin  and  Nicholson  2017)   into  what   I  would   refer   to  as   ‘participation  as  
patterns  of  action-­readiness’  (working  in  reducing  prediction  error).  What  this  
practically   means   is   the   understanding   of   the   body   of   the   audience–
participant  being  not  just  the  means  but  also  an  end  of  being  a  scenographic  
contraption  system,  and  has  helped  me  as  a  scenographer  to  articulate  the  
experience  of  the  audience–participant  as  shifting  and  as  co-­originating  with  
the  environment.  
This   dialogue   through   doing-­thinking   with   contemporary   post-­cognitivist  
approaches,  where  action  is  perception  and  our  action-­readiness  embodied  
brains   are   in   a   forward   flow   of   sense-­making,   eliminating   ‘surprisal’  
(Bruineberg  et  al.  2016)  has  enriched  both  the  creative  and  analytical  skills  
in  understanding   the  workings  of   the  dynamic  scenographic  systems  WS  I,  
II,   and   III.   Dynamic   scenographic   systems   are   ‘scenographic   systems  
networks-­in-­action’,   another   term   for   a   groundless   scenography,   which  
stresses  the  nuance  that  the  co-­originating  aspect  of  scenography  is  not  only  
circular   between   its   members   and   the   environment   but   also   distributed   to  
include  social  interaction.  It  is  both  the  distributed  and  circular  causality  that  
generates   the   ‘groundless   scenography’,   which   has   the   scenographic  
contraption  as   its   invisible,   and   visible,  material,   and   immaterial   lawmaker.  
Enactivism,  embodied,  and  ecological  frameworks  of  cognition  can  therefore  
aid  us  to  understand  groundlessness  in  contemporary  performance  both  as  
form   and   as   method,   by   providing   the   models   and   the   vocabularies   for  
articulating  the  relationship  between  action  and  perception.    
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In   extent,   the   concept   of   a   ‘groundless   scenography’   and   ‘scenographic  
contraption’  can  be  applied  to  any  scenography.  For  example,  ‘scenographic  
groundlessness’   can   be   used   to   explain   the   work   of   scenographer   Katrin  
Brack,   who   uses   single   materials   that   interact   with   the   bodies   of   the  
performers  on  stage.  Brack’s  scenography  of  The  Hermannsschlacht  (2010)  
consisted  of  large  pieces  of  foam  which  worked  with  or  against  the  bodies  of  
the  performers  and  were  used  in  juxtaposition  to  the  concept  of  war,  in  order  
to  give  the  essence  of  a  battleground.  Brack’s  use  of  foam,  can  be  referred  
to  as  a  ‘scenographic  contraption’  and  ‘what  it  does’  (McKinney  and  Palmer  
2017)  can  be  examined   through   the  prism  of  groundlessness,  an  unfolding  
and   enfolding   of   the   environment,   the   materials   and   the   bodies   of   the  
performers,  but  also   the  action-­readiness  patterns   that   these   juxtapositions  
generated   to   the   audience’s   embodied   brains.   The   ‘how   it   does   it’   can   be  
explored   analytically   using   post-­cognitive   frameworks,   but   I   don’t   have   the  
space   to   expand   on   this   here.   A   groundless   understanding   can   also   be  
applied   to   historic   scenographic   examples   such   as   the   Teatro   Olympico  
(circa  1580).  This   is  an   ironic   turn   for   the   ‘scanographic  contraption’  as   the  
Renaissance  era  is  so  precious  about  perspective  and  the  vanishing  point  to  
the   extent,   however,   that   a   wrong   move   or   wrong   seating   may   generate  
‘error’,   and   it   therefore   renders   the   whole   apparatus   precarious   and   a  
contraption.  I  will  not  go  further  into  analysing  these  examples  at  this  stage,  
due   to   the   limitations   of   this   research,   but   I   hope   I   can   demonstrate   the  
potential   for   further  application  and  development  of   the  methods  and  forms  
outlined  in  this  research.  
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6.2  Conclusion:  Towards  a  CogScenography  –  Cognition,  
Contraption,  Metaphor,  Consciousness,  Groundlessness    
 
This   thesis,   as   mentioned   earlier,   is   contributing   to   the   understanding   of  
scenography  within   the   ‘scenographic   turn’   (coined  by  Collins  and  Aronson  
in  2015)  as  a  discipline  ‘in  and  of  itself’  (Lotker  2015,  p.17);;  a  discipline  that  
eludes  being  pinned  down  and  defined,  to  the  extent  that  I  argue  is  similar  to  
consciousness  and  cognition.  Maturana  and  Varela  observe  that:      
living  systems  are  cognitive  systems  and  living  as  a  process  is  a  
process   of   cognition.   This   statement   is   valid   for   all   organisms,  
with  and  without  a  nervous  system  (1980,  p.13).    
  
Since  the  ‘scenographic  systems  networks-­in-­action’,  are  comprised  of  living  
systems  (audience,  artists),  I  argue  that  they  can  be  considered  themselves  
cognitive   systems.   Therefore,   the   scenographic   contraption   is   a   cognitive  
system  and  a   living   system,  meaning   that   it   does   not   pre-­exist   or   exist   by  
itself,   but   it   happens   in   process.   This   process   is   cognitive,   in   the   post-­
cognitivist  understanding  of   the  word,  meaning   that   it  develops   in  a  mutual  
enfolding   relationship   with   the   material,   immaterial   and   social   and   is  
therefore   groundless.   ‘Scenographic   groundlessness’   is   a   conceptual  
framework   for   understanding      the   experience   of   scenography   as   a   co-­
originating   process   of   enfolding   and   unfolding   between   the   audience,   their  
co-­audience,   the   artist(s),   and   the   designed   environment.   My   aim   is   the  
generation  of  inclusive,  transformative,  and  inspiring  work,  to  help  audiences  
navigate   critically   and   to   operate   genuinely   within   a   contemporary  
performance  landscape  without  foundations.    
An  original  theory  of  ‘scenography  as  cognition’  and  ‘cognitive  scenography’  
(CogScenography)   is   therefore   introduced   and   investigated   in   this   thesis  
based  on  my  praxis  of   the   ‘scenographic  contraption’.   I  am  suggesting   the  
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original   notion   of   ‘contraption’   as   new   methodology   and   ideology   for  
understanding  contemporary  scenography,  and  participation  ‘as  contraption’.  
The   contraption   contextualizes   in   a   ‘scenographic’   (Hann,   forthcoming)  
manner   the   processes,   ambiguity,   and   dynamics   of   consciousness   and  
cognition  and   relates   these   to   the   current   groundless   landscape  of   theatre  
and  performance.    
The  overall  aim  of   the   theory  of  a  CogScenography   is   to  generate  genuine  
relationships   between   the   space   and   the   audience   through   subtle   yet  
assertive   ways   of   orchestrating   the   audience–participants’   being   in   the  
space.   These   subtle   ways   need   backing   up   by   theories   that   share   this  
subtlety.   Specifically,   I   have   generated   original   practice   of   the   hybrid  
participatory   scenographic   kind   (Work   Spaces),   and   I   have   used   in   my  
analysis   of   this   practice   action-­oriented   cognitive   theories,   the   agent-­
environment  coupling  principle,  and  embodied  predictive  processing  theory,  
all  of  which  entail  non-­representational  understandings  of  engagement  with  
the   world.   In   the   Work   Spaces   I   have   developed   the   following   insights  
towards  a  theory  of  a  CogScenography,  however  these  can  be  extended  to  
include  other  forms  of  performance  design  and  performance  practice.  
A   scenography  as   cognition/   a   cognitive   scenography/  CogScenography   is  
governed  by  laws  of  a  scenographic  contraption  and  generates  a  groundless  
scenographic  experience.  This  means  that  it:  
–   Provides   non-­binary   material-­immaterial   context   for   the   audience–
participants   to   respond   with   action-­readiness   patterns,   and   sets   of  
sensorimotor   skills   going   beyond   representational   understandings   of  
scenography.    
-­  223  -­  
–  Mobilises  the  audience–participants,  and  the  performers  using  affordances  
and  prediction  error.  
–  Leaves  space  for  reflection,  and  for  imagination.  
–  Transforms  by  using  material   from  the  audience  (drawings,  making  skills,  
information,  voice,  presence,  movement  etc.).  
–  Enters   into  dialogue  with  cognitive  science  by  drawing   imaginatively  from  
organisational   structures   of   living   (therefore   cognitive)   systems   and  
consciousness,   and   by   understanding   performance   experience   as  
groundless.    
–   Contributes   to   a   vocabulary   for   talking   about   material-­immaterial-­social  
relationships  by  applying  4Es   frameworks   to  develop  new  approaches  and  
habits   of   embodied   and   ecological   audiencing   and   spectating   beyond  
representation.  
This  study  accepts  that  the  above  insights  and  the  work  itself  do  not  provide  
an  absolute  scenographic  method,  a  unique  answer  to  what  is  scenography,  
or  a  one-­way  solution  of  how  to  make  scenographies.  It  provides  however,  a  
number  of   shifting  methodological   tools  or  practice   tools   (see  Appendix  C)  
and   a   way   of   thinking   about   performance   design   and   practice   that  
contributes   to   making   and   thinking   in   a   scenography   as   process   and  
exchange  with  the  audience.    
In   terms   of   where   this   research   project   leaves   the   scenography   and  
cognition   exchange   in   the   field,   I   hope   that   the   understanding   of  
scenography  ‘as  contraption’,  my  unpacking  of  scenographic  experience  as  
‘groundless’,  and  the  three  perspectives  of  a  scenographer  (the  ignorant,  the  
Janus-­faced,   and   the   predictive   scenographer)   have   contributed   to   the  
performance-­cognition   debate   regarding   ‘the   importance,   relevance,   and  
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applications  of  cognitive  science  to  the  equally  multifaceted  modes  of  theatre  
and  performance’  (Shaughnessy  2013,  p.7).    
This   thesis   also   agrees   –and   has   elaborated   through   practice–   with   Di  
Benedetto’s   argument   that   ‘if   scenography   takes   up   the   challenges   of  
neurobiology,   the  potential   for   novel  multiverses  are   infinite’   (2013,  p.190).  
However,   it   also   addresses   an   aspect   that   is   related   to   the   transformative  
power  of  art,  and  its  philosophical  extension  and  by  reversing  Di  Benedetto’s  
(2013,   p.190)   earlier   call   I   posit   that:   If   cognitive   science   takes   up   the  
challenges   of   creative   and   ‘contraption’   methodologies,   the   potential   for  
novel  multiverses  are  infinite.  Indeed,  there  is  a  growing  interest  in  bringing  
art  more  closely  in  conversation  with  post-­cognitive  disciplines,  which  I  argue  
that   it  presents  an   ‘artistic   turn’  of   the  cognitive   field,   to  which   this  study   is  
contributing   (see   Appendix   A),   and   aims   to   continue   contributing   in   the  
future.  For  example,  the  contextualisation  of  consciousness  and  cognition  as  
‘contraption’  may  be  useful,  both  as  form  and  method,  for  understanding  the  
circular  causality  of  embodiment  in  the  free-­energy  principle.    
Science  is  turned  towards  finding  efficient  and  successful  solutions  to  given  
tasks,   but   the  more   science   delves   into   cognition   the  more   it   realises   the  
need  for  messier  methods  of  understanding  the  ambiguity  of  human  nature.  
The   multimodal   methodologies   of   performance   may   help   with   generating  
novel  perspectives  of  our  embodied  selves,  our  social  relationships,  and  the  
world.      
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Appendix  A  
Dissemination  of  Research  
I   have   presented   part   of   my   research   findings   at   major   national   (UK)   and  
international   conferences   on   the   intersections   of   performance   and   cognition  
(please  refer  to  A2  below).    
I   have   also   engaged   in   interdisciplinary   discussions   as   I  was   invited   on   the  
19th  November  2015  to  present  at  the  School  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  
Language   Sciences,   University   of   Edinburgh   my   research   as   part   of  
Embodied   Mind-­Embodied   Design   workshop   alongside   a   number   of  
prominent  young  researchers   in   the   field  of  cognitive  studies  stretching   from  
linguistics,   to   robotics,   philosophy,   and   psychology.   I   will   be   presenting  my  
work   on  Designing   Uncertainty   for   Generating   Audiences’   Participation   this  
coming  November  at  the  Worlding  the  Brain  2017  gathering  at  the  University  
of   Amsterdam,   which   is   another   opportunity   for   bringing   together   artists,  
creative  researchers  and  other  scholars  interested  in  4E  cognition.    
Specifically:  
A.1  Publications  
Penna,   X.   2014.   Uncovered:   Performing   everyday   clothes   (visual   essay)  
Scene.  2  (1&2),  pp.  9–14.  
A.2  Presentations  
–  Designing   Uncertainty   for   Generating   Audiences’   Participation.  Worlding  
The  Brain  Conference  2017,  University  of  Amsterdam,  NL,  November  2017  
  
–   I  Want  You   to  Participate   ||   pause   for   thought   (organiser   of   colloquium),  
PCI,  UoL,  May  2017  (web-­site:  https://thegrid.ai/participation/)  
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–Scenographic   Contraptions:   a   manifestation   for   a   post-­representational  
performance   design   method   (flash   presentation).   PSi#23,  
performance+design  group,  June  2017  
  
–   ‘Phishing   Things   Together’:   Using   Cognitive   Theory,   and   Practice  
Research   to   Further   our   Understanding   of   Designing   in   a   Groundless  
Contemporary   Performance   Landscape   (paper).   Cognitive   Futures   in   the  
Arts  and  Humanities  Conference  2017,  New  York,  June  2017  
  
–   Applications   of   Cognitive   Science   in   Scenographic   Reception   and  
Processes:   Scenographic   Contraptions   (paper).   Cognitive   Futures   in   the  
Humanities  Conference  2016,  Helsinki,  June  2016    
  
–   Scenographic   Contraptions:   An   Embodied   Conversation   (presentation).  
‘Embodied  Mind,  Embodied  Design’  workshop  at   the  School  of  Philosophy,  
Psychology  and  Language  Science  and  School  of  Education,  The  University  
of  Edinburgh,  November  2015  
  
–  Attempts   on  Staging  Consciousness:   Towards   a  Cognitive   Scenography  
(paper).  IFTR2015,  Theatre  and  Democracy  Conference,  Hyderabad,  India,  
July  2015  
  
–Work   Space   I-­   a   Scenographic   Workshop   on   Consciousness:  
Scenographic   artefact   (flash   talk).   Scenography   as   Shared   Space  
Symposium  (IFTR  scenography  working  group),  Prague  Quadrennial  2015,  
June  2015  
  
–   Attempts   on   Margarita   (multiple   drafts):   A   Cognitive   Dramaturgy  
Generated  by  Voice  and  Space   (paper).  Second  Symposium  on  Embodied  
Cognition  and  Performance  2015,  AISB  Convention,  University  of  Kent,  April  
2015  
  
–   Costume   Project(ion)-­The   Costume   Rehearses   (Flash   Talk).   Critical  
Costume  Conference,   Aalto   University   of   Design,   Helsinki,   Finland,  March  
2015  
  
–   Making   Up   Two   Minds   DIFfERNET-­Towards   a   Cognitive   Scenography  
(paper).   Irish   Society   of   Theatre   Research   (ISTR)   2014,   Consciousness   and  
Cognition:  Theatre  Practice  and  Performance  Conference,  Cork,  May  2014  
A.3  Presentations  entry-­points  to  the  research  
–  A  Blink  of  an  Eye’:  a  Layered  Scenography  Depicting  the  Brain's  Underlying  
Parallelism   (paper).   4th   Global   Conference,   Performance:   Visual   Aspects   of  
Performance  Practice,  Mansfield  College,  Oxford,  September  2013  
–  Making   Up   Two   Minds-­a   Scenographic   Experiment   (practice-­led   research)  
TESTing,   staging   performance   design   research   @   World   Stage   Design  
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Exhibition,   Cardiff,   September   2013.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6pt9I9A2yY&t=209s        
  
–   Scenographic   Contraptions-­in   Aid   of   the   Body’s   Memory   (paper).   Critical  
Costume  conference,  Edge  Hill  University,  Ormskirk,  UK,  January  2013  
A.4  Practice  
–  Work   Space   I:   a   Scenographic   Workshop   on   Consciousness,   a   workshop  
(14th  May  2014),  stage@leeds,  Alec  Clegg.  
  
–  Work  Space   II:  Attempts  on  Margarita   (multiple  drafts),   a   sound   installation  
(26th  February  2015),  stage@leeds,  Stage  One  
  
–   Work   Space   III:   Phishing   Things   Together   (the   predictive   brain),   a  
participatory  installation  (20th  October  2015),  Live  Art  Bistro.  
A.5  Applications  of  the  Research  
As   an   extension   of   this   practice   I   have   applied   some   of   the   insights   of  
orchestrating   a   social   space   using   materials   and   affordances   in   the  
intersection   of   arts   and   politics   working   for   the   pan-­European   cross-­border  
movement  DiEM25   (August  2016  ongoing)  and  artist  Danae  Stratou.   I   have  
devised  the  blueprint  of  DiEM  Voice  a  scenographic  system  network-­in-­action,  
which   operates   in   two   parts:   it   generates   audiences’   responses   during   the  
DiEM25  events-­talks;;  and   it  commissions  artists   to  generate  original  artwork  
in   response   to   the   audiences’   questions   and   suggestions   regarding   the  
political  future  of  Europe  (for  more  information  see  Appendix  D).  This  proposal  
could   not   have   been   materialised   without   the   thinking-­doing   through   this  
research.  
Finally   I   have   applied   the   ‘scenographic   contraption’   as   a   teaching   tool   for  
undergraduate   performance   production   students   for   creating   participatory  
encounters   between   materials   and   audiences   (University   of   Surrey,   May  
2016).  
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Appendix  B  
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B.1    Questionnaires  for  voice  recordings  WS  II:  Attempts  on  
Margarita  (multiple  drafts)    
  
! 1!
Work Space I I-  Attempts on Margarita (multiple drafts) 
 
Researcher: Xristina (Christina) Penna 
Department: Performance and Cultural Industries, UoL 
Supervisors: Joslin McKinney, Anna Fenemore 
School of Performance and Cultural Industries 
Univerity of Leeds 
 
FEMALE PARTICIPANTS FORM [male participants please see questionnaire (m)] 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this practice-led research project! 
 
Please record your voice answering/describing the following questions/situations.  
 
Please send the audio files to Xristina (researcher) and Ben (sound designer): 
pccp@leeds.ac.uk and ben.eyes@gmail.com ) by the 12th of February. 
 
(You don’t need to answer all the questions and you can spend as much time on the 
questions as you want/feel necessary. You can withdraw from this study up to the 
25th of Feb by contacting xristina at: pccp@leeds.ac.uk) Enjoy! 
 
[Recording your voice: You can do this and send it via e-mail through your mobile 





In the beginning of your recording please read out the following paragraph: 
 
I (your full name) am happy for my voice to be recorded for Christina Penna’s 
research project. I am aware that my voice and what I say will be heard as part of the 
performance ‘Attempts on Margarita (multiple drafts)’ and will be used for further 
dissemination of the research in the form of edited video and audio footage. 
 
First impression: 
(describe yourself in third person i.e. ‘She has dark hair…’) 
Can you describe her characteristics? Colour of hair? Colour of eyes? Is she tall, 
short? Does she smile? Does she look people in the eyes? What is she wearing at 
the moment (describe what you are wearing but in third person)? What else? 
 
Shitty Jobs: 
Have you ever done a job that you didn’t like or that it made you feel uncomfortable? 
Bored? Unsettled? Can you explain to us what that job was? What annoyed you 
most? What did you have to do in that job? How did you feel? 
 
Secret pleasures  
No 1: Every Tuesday she buys several tabloids (like Grazia, Hello! Etc) and sits 
alone in her room with them. She turns to the horoscope page, reads it and if she 
likes what it predicts for the week she cuts out the page and staples it into her binder.  
Can you describe this scene? 
 
No 2: She likes trying on older women’s clothes. Can you tell us why? Where does 
she find the clothes? 
 
No 3: can you think of something else she likes doing in secret? 





Can you describe the room/place you are in? 
 
Travels: 
Could you read out the following text? 
Margarita’s taken a cruise ship once in her life, from Seattle to Alaska, and through 
Glacier Bay.  Of course, Alaska was beautiful; it was the first time she had ever taken 
a vacation to somewhere cold. But Margarita told me that she loved it because of 
something else; something mechanical. She loved the fact that the ship was in near-
perpetual motion.  She was always on her way somewhere! So she never lost any 
time--when she was eating, when she was sleeping, when she was doing all of the 
routine things that ‘eat away’ time during the day, Margarita was still in motion, going 
somewhere, aimed toward something, like wearing rocket shoes through your 
everyday life. 
 
Can you describe a time when you were travelling and things went wrong? Delayed 
flight? Food poisoning? How did this make you feel? 
Can you describe an image that you have of a beautiful landscape that has remained 
in your memory? How did you feel experiencing this landscape? 
 
Accident: 
Have you or someone you know had an accident that has impacted your/their life? 
Can you describe it?  
 
Cocktails: 
How do you make a Margarita cocktail? 
 
                                                                           THANK YOU! 
Come and see how Margarita develops! 
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B.2  Information  announcement  form  for  WS  III:  Phishing  
Things  Together  (the  predictive  brain)  
      
 





What you say or do may be viewed or heard by others in this space 




For more information on how the material will be used please ask at the entrance  
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B.3  Material  handed  out  to  the  audience–participants  WS  III:  
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Appendix  C  
  
C.1       Tables  of  Terminology–  Towards  a  Cognitive  
Scenography  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table  1.    




–   – A conceptual model of contemporary post-
representational scenography. By replacing but 
also embracing ‘perspective’, ‘the set’, ‘the 
centre’, ‘the stage/scene’, ‘cartesian dualism’ it 
conceptualises contemporary scenography as the 
exposed theatrical apparatus in process 
–   – A methodological tool for tackling 
groundlessness in contemporary post-
representational scenography  
–   – A critical practical tool-prop, or an environment 
which prioritises ingenuity, and inventive 
playfulness over effectiveness for the 
orchestration of a groundless scenography 
– An analytical tool for talking about the 
multimodal nature of scenographic processes, 
reception and operations. Understands 
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participation ‘as contraption’ 
Groundless 
Scenography 
A conceptual framework for understanding  the 
experience of scenography as a co-originating 
process of enfolding and unfolding between the 
audience, the design, and the co-audience. 
Space performing-
rehearsing 
Following Bernard Tschumi and Dorita Hannah. 
A framework for understanding scenographic 
participation through patterns of shared attention 
by exposing the theatrical apparatus. As a term it 
helps with the understanding of the perpertual, 
discursive nature of scenography happening 
between scene (space) and graphi (event). 
  
CRITICAL AND CREATIVE TOOLS  
  
The clout effect   The manipulation of sociocultural affordances 
through the design in order to guide attention to a 
certain field of affordances.  
Contagious 
scenography  
A similar approach to the clout, but distributed 
over time, and generated spontaneously by the 
audience themselves.  
Scenographic error  ‘Scenographic error’ is designed deliberately by 
the Predictive Scenographer in the scenographic 
contraptions to generate possibilities of 
interaction, affect and thinking. 
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  Table  2.    





Language as a doing developed within a 
groundless scenography as a mode of  
communication between: 
– the audience and the scenographer together 
with their art team 




Another term for a groundless scenography to 
denote not only the co-originating understanding 
but also the simultaneous distributed correlation 
between audience, design, and co-audience. 
 




What the design of the undisciplined contraption 
environment has to offer (affordances). (Note: 
the disciplined means include also the 
orchestration of the audience as part of the 
design, and as generators of affordances). 
 
Genuine means 
The structural coupling of the audience–
participants with the ‘disciplined means’ 





The scenographer who designs ‘the diciplined 





The scenographer cannot access the autonomous 
experience of the audience. The way the 
scenographer can access and affect their 
audience is by altering their fileds of 
affordances. The audience in turn alter during the 





The scenographer who does not know ‘the story’ 




1.   – Operates between passive – active 
2.   – Operates between material – immaterial 
3.   – Operates between the space as ‘performing-
rehearsing’ 
– Understands the audience as ‘performing-
rehearsing’ 
– Understands the performer as ‘on stage- back 
stage’ 
[– Operates between two cultures (this applies to 
the specific Practice Research)] 




4.   Orchestrates scenographic error by providing 
downward-flowing complex and non-linear 
material and sociocultural affordances to their 
audiences. Tries to predict their audiences, and 
is each time surprised by the audiences’ 
response to the work. Develops their skill by 
attending their work, and therefore learning from 
their audience ‘embodied feedback’. 
 
           Table 3.  
CRITICAL AND CREATIVE  NOTIONS 
 
 
Scenography in the 
flesh 
An imaginative dialogue between scenography 
and cognitive science by ‘en-spacing’ 
contemporary cognitive metaphorical 
architectures of consciousness and perception for 
the creation of scenographic interaction. 
 
The easy problem of 
scenography 
The materials of scenography (paint, light, 
projections, haze, positioning of audience etc.). Is 
understood in a non-binary relation with the ‘hard 
problem’. 
 
The hard problem of 
scenography  
The immaterial of scenography (experience, 
feelings, affect etc.). Is understood in a non-
binary relation with the ‘easy problem’. 
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The ethics of the space 
The calm yet assertive  way of a scenography 




5.   The subtle yet rich landscapes of affordances 
offered by the design that do not impose 
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Appendix  D  
  
D.1       Applications  of  a  Cognitive  Scenography  in  activism  
DiEMVoice  
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D.2    Realisation  of  Phase  1    
DiEM  Voice   at  Teatro   Italia,  Rome   (March  2017),  Volksbühne,  Berlin   (May  
2017),  Bozar,  Centre  for  Fine  Arts,  Brussels  (September  2017)  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
  
Figure above left and bottom right: The audience send in their questions and thoughts. These were 
printed  out and stuck on the pillars of the foyer. Images of this process were projected inside the 
theatre space above the speakers.  
Figure above right: DiEM Voice projection at Bozar, Centre for Fine Arts Brussels. Set design by 
Studio Jonas Staal. 
Figure below left: An audience’s suggestion from the DiEM25 event at Volksbühne in Berlin.  
